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These are difﬁcult times for ‘modern’ people who believe that there are 
proper sorts of knowledge, usually produced and disseminated in places 
like universities. Today, knowledges of various kinds are being produced at 
all sorts of places, and disseminated in all sorts of ways. Universities can 
no longer claim to be the sole guardians of knowledge, even of more or 
less academic knowledge, which is being produced as much outside the 
university as inside. While both the left and the right are challenging the 
status of certain ways of producing and presenting knowledge, the relations 
between expertise and the various forms of common sense are becoming 
increasingly conﬂicted. Knowledge Goes Pop jumps into the middle of this 
messy terrain, and offers an incisive and insightful analysis of both sides of the 
line dividing cultural criticism from popular knowledge. Hopefully, Birchall’s 
book will set in motion a sustained and rigorous discussion of the place of 
‘knowledge’ in the coming modernity.
Lawrence Grossberg, author of ‘Caught in the Crossﬁre: 
Kids, Politics and America’s Future’, Morris David 
Distinguished Professor of Cultural Studies and 
Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Preface
WHY I WROTE THIS BOOK
A voice on late-night talk radio told me that Kentucky Fried Chicken injects its 
food with drugs that render men impotent. A colleague asked if I thought the 
FBI was ‘in’ on 9/11. An alien abductee on the Internet claimed extraterrestrials 
implanted a microchip in her left buttock. The front page of a gossip mag 
screamed ‘Julia Roberts in Porn Scandal’. A best-seller suggested gender differ-
ence is so great, men and women may as well come from different planets. A 
spiritual healer claimed he could cure my aunt’s chronic fatigue syndrome with 
the energizing power of crystals.
This book came out of a deep fascination with the popular knowledges 
that saturate our experience of everyday understanding and communication in 
the twenty-ﬁrst century. I was struck by how we mediate and are mediated by 
popular knowledges, how they inﬂuence the way we position ourselves in the 
world and shape the way we imagine the world works. I wanted to call such 
phenomena ‘knowledge’ in order to remind myself of its relation to the more 
‘ofﬁcial’ knowledges that also tell us who we are, what to believe, and how to 
conduct ourselves socially. From Michel Foucault’s work, I knew that power 
relations are determined by knowledge, but I also wanted to think about the 
relations between knowledges in terms of power. Are popular knowledges, I 
wondered, marginalized by ofﬁcial knowledges? What challenge do they pose 
to traditional sites of knowledge production? Why does their presence cause so 
much institutional anxiety?
When I began to tell people that I was studying conspiracy theories (among 
other examples of popular knowledge) they responded in one of two ways. They 
either asked why on earth people believe in such ‘nonsense’ or grilled me for 
what really happened to Diana, JFK, or Martin Luther King. Was September 11 
a set-up to legitimize the invasion of ﬁrstly Afghanistan and then Iraq? Is there 
such a thing as the New World Order? Does the Bilderberg group really pull the 
strings? They wanted me to tell them why these stories existed or if they were 
true. And in some ways it might have been easier to address these concerns. I 
could, with regards to the second concern, occupy myself with the veracity of 
particular statements produced within popular knowledges. (Was Diana really 
murdered? Do aliens actually abduct humans? Will this book improve my sex 
life? Have the latest celebrity couple truly broken up?) Let’s face it, we are all 
capable of becoming absorbed by the details and this is part of the pleasure to 
be found in gossip, conspiracy theory, alien abduction narratives and the like. 
Some commentators have gone down this route, debunking certain theories and 
ideas perpetuated by these kinds of narratives.
Other commentators have addressed the ﬁrst concern as to why people 
believe in ‘false’ or ‘fragile’ knowledge. Such approaches tend to perform symp-
tomatic readings of popular knowledge in which the knowledge always takes the 
place of some psychosocial lack, or is read as a political act performed by usually 
disenfranchised agents. Francis Wheen, for example, in an article extracted from 
his book How Mumbo Jumbo Overtook the World writes, ‘The new irrationalism 
is an expression of despair by people who feel impotent to improve their lives 
and suspect that they are at the mercy of secretive, impersonal forces whether 
these be the Pentagon or invaders from Mars. Political leaders accept it as a 
safe outlet for dissent, fulﬁlling much the same function that Marx attributed to 
religion’ (2004: 12).
Indeed, there are all sorts of routes to answer the question ‘Why do we 
turn to popular knowledge?’ – via psychoanalysis, philosophy, history, or 
anthropology – but I wanted to write a book that could open up a different 
way of responding to popular knowledges: one that moves beyond the truth 
or falsity of statements produced by a particular knowledge and the question 
of why people might choose to invest in them. Working against the grain 
of much academic work on fan communities and the idea of empowered 
consumers (in my ﬁeld of cultural studies especially), I wanted to focus on 
the knowledge believed in, rather than those who believe. That is not to say 
that I wanted to eliminate the ‘subject’ altogether as there is always a residual 
concept of subjectivity in discursive mechanisms but I did not want to make 
claims as to these subjects’ intentions, desires, or reasons for belief. While I 
knew psychological motive and socio-political pressures would all inform a 
reading of popular knowledge’s increased circulation and employment, I felt 
that focusing on what makes each popular knowledge possible in the ﬁrst 
place would allow me to consider the relationship between ‘official’ and 
‘unofficial’, ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ knowledges. I thought that under-
standing these relationships was necessary for approaching some key events 
of our age. Having written this book, I still do.
With so many claims on what knowledge is and what it should be – exem-
pliﬁed not least by current international debates about school curricula (see 
Apple 2003) – I wanted to perform a timely investigation into the relationship 
between un-legitimated and legitimated forms of knowledge. Of course, thinking 
through this relationship threw up difﬁcult self-reﬂexive questions about any 
knowledge in a disciplinary form – including cultural studies, the particular 
knowledge-producing discourse that I identiﬁed with – that I might mobilize 
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to analyse popular knowledge. That is to say, I realized that the way in which 
I approached such cultural phenomena was crucial: if I approached popular 
knowledges according to an ideal of critical distance, say, positioning popular 
knowledges as the other of, foreign to, and outside legitimated knowledge, I 
would in effect already have decided in advance what these popular knowledges 
were. Indeed, although such an approach would have allowed me to pontiﬁcate 
about the political significance (either positively or negatively) of popular 
knowledges, position them as subcultural, or think about their role within 
everyday life (acts familiar within cultural studies), I would not have been 
able to think about the close relationship they hold to my own knowledge 
production. Taking this relationship into account would, I hoped, lead to a better 
understanding not only of why popular knowledges matter but also what kinds 
of strategies we can employ in order to gain this better understanding. In other 
words, as well as thinking about the role of popular knowledge in contemporary 
culture, I also wanted to think about what kind of cultural studies might be 
up to the job of thinking through the questions it raises about legitimacy and 
responsibility.
I have tackled the themes of this book through two main examples: con-
spiracy theory and gossip. I could have chosen to concentrate on a number 
of others, such as urban legends, the self-help rhetoric and pop-psychology 
that permeates talk shows such as Oprah (US Harpo Productions) and Montel 
Williams (US Paramount Pictures), or alien abduction narratives. While singular 
and unique, I felt that such knowledges could usefully be considered on a 
continuum. This whole book could be thought of as exploring the question of 
how to do justice to popular knowledge – how to analyse it responsibly in a 
tension between the universal (popular knowledge as a whole) and the singular 
(individual instances of popular knowledge). This meant making decisions about 
which examples to focus on. I could not study all forms of popular knowledge 
(although I wanted to open up more space for such work).
Besides, reading ‘responsibly’ would never be about producing exhaustive lists. 
And so, I had to make some decisions as to which forms and singular practices 
of popular knowledge (conspiracy theory, gossip) and case studies (such as 
Diana and September 11 conspiracy theories, and the gossip that permeated the 
lead up to the second Gulf War) I considered to be important and interesting. 
My selections, therefore, were informed by two aspects. Firstly, my desire to 
do justice to each example obviously placed a limitation on how many could 
be included. But, more pertinently, it seemed to me that conspiracy theory and 
gossip and their framings of knowledge were in urgent need of consideration at 
this socio-political conjuncture, when war is waged on little more than gossip, 
and interpreting information as calculated plot shapes a whole nation’s future. 
These choices might have been different at another time. I hope in making 
these decisions about what to focus on, I have kept open the way for further 
investigations into other popular, or indeed, unpopular knowledges.
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Mostly, I wanted to write a kind of ‘self-help’ book for the contemporary 
zeitgeist – characterized, I’d argue, by the making of decisions on the basis 
of knowledge that cannot be decided. Keep it with you at all times for you 
never know when talk radio will be talking again, when paranoia will inﬂect 
a colleague’s voice, when everyone around you will turn to a way of knowing 
that you haven’t yet learned to trust, or equally when your government will try 
to persuade you that their knowledge is not infected by its popular ‘other’. It 
might not be a question of arming yourself against these cognitive effects, but 
of opening yourself to them. It might be disorientating; you may require some 
assistance; or at least desire some company . . .
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CHAPTER 1
Know It All
Conspiracy theory, alien abduction narratives, astrology, urban legends, self-help 
rhetoric, gossip, new age practices. It is so tempting, when someone asks what 
popular knowledge is, to respond by listing some examples. But this doesn’t 
really answer the question; it merely illustrates an answer that remains absent. 
It is easier to point to examples already penetrating everyday life than to come 
up with a list of hard-and-fast characteristics that can always be disputed. I don’t 
intend this book to become a checklist that people can reference in order to 
ascertain the ‘popular knowledge-ness’ of one discourse or another. I recognize 
that there are as many differences as similarities between various forms of 
popular knowledge and that discourses will slide imperceptibly between the 
‘unofﬁcial’ and ‘ofﬁcial’, between the ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’, between the 
‘high’ and ‘popular’.1 Though singular and unique, I do think that knowledges 
like the ones I began by listing can usefully be thought of on a continuum of 
popular cognitive practices that deny scientiﬁc rationalism and justiﬁed true 
belief as the only criteria for knowledge. In thinking of this continuum, I will be 
able to make a meaningful engagement with questions regarding the status of 
knowledge in general.
KNOWLEDGE-SCAPE
While I will ultimately challenge the terms outlined in Figure 1, I want to use it 
as a springboard for thinking about the status of knowledge as it is theoretically 
conﬁgured, experienced, or presented to us in everyday encounters. It might 
be helpful to think of this diagram as a visual representation of an historically 
rooted debate in the ‘West’ about different kinds of knowledge.
Lingering at the top right-hand corner of Figure 1 (Position A) lies ‘just-
iﬁed true belief’. This formulation of knowledge can be traced back to Plato’s 
Theaetetus written in 360 BCE in which Socrates is in dialogue with Theaetetus 
about the nature of knowledge. The logic of the ‘justiﬁed true belief’ account is 
as follows (S delineates the knowing subject, and p the proposition known). S 
knows that p if and only if:
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 p is true;
 S believes that p; and
 S is justiﬁed in believing that p.
If something is false (say, for example, the proposition that Prince Charles wrote 
this book), we cannot know it: this would be to know no thing (nothing). So, the 
proposition has to be knowable as true. Of course, we can believe something 
without necessarily knowing it; it only becomes knowledge if we can establish 
its truth and justiﬁcation. Epistemologically, belief does not refer to the idea of 
having faith, rather it indicates our assent to a statement’s truth. Much attention 
in the dominant epistemological traditions has been given to the question of 
how justiﬁcation can be ascertained and, latterly – since Edmund Gettier (1963) 
showed ‘justiﬁed true belief’ to be insecure or incomplete as a deﬁnition – what 
other criteria have to be in play for knowledge to be knowledge. Despite the 
many challenges to this deﬁnition of knowledge, I have situated ‘justiﬁed true 
belief’ as an example of the ‘ofﬁcial’ and ‘legitimate’ because of the force it has 
had and continues to have in ‘common sense’ understandings of knowledge.
Figure 1 Knowledge-scape
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Below the horizontal dividing line of Figure 1 (positions B and C) lie dis-
cursive phenomena more closely associated with the popular (whether this be 
in the sense of populist or mass circulation and participation). That which, albeit 
provisionally, falls into the category of ‘legitimate’ and popular (position B) can be 
traced back at least to the challenge put forward in the English Civil War to the 
divine right of kings, and, latterly, to the drive for universal suffrage. Whereas for 
Plato, those ideas that couldn’t fulﬁl the criteria of knowledge were branded and 
devalued as opinion or doxa, in the tradition of what we could call democratic 
or Christian socialism, and populism of all political ilks, the knowledge of ‘the 
people’ is valued as being untainted by high ofﬁce and therefore closer to truth. 
Such ideas see ‘the people’ and their knowledge as legitimate (more legitimate, 
even, than those in corrupting positions of power).
Broadly speaking, tabloids from both ends of the political spectrum (I am 
thinking primarily of the British press in this instance) such as the Mirror and 
the Sun, champion the ‘man on the street’ over politicians, large corporations 
and, more ambivalently, the law (particularly EU law, which is fashioned as 
being remote or insensitive to the concerns of the British people). This rhetoric, 
privileging the individual over the corporation or state, can be seen reﬂected 
in a surge of populist politics from the Conservatives and New Labour in con-
temporary Britain, in the admonitions of the ‘nanny state’ and advocacy of 
personal autonomy and choice. Elsewhere, populists who peddle their various 
politics in the name of the people include Australia’s Pauline Hanson, Winston 
Peters in New Zealand, Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Carl I. Hagen in Norway, 
William Jennings Bryan, Huey Long, Paul Wellstone, Howard Dean and John 
Edwards in the United States, Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, Silvio Berlusconi in 
Italy, Jörg Haider in Austria, Lula in Brazil, Preston Manning in Canada and Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela.2
Under the category of the ‘legitimate’ and popular, we could also situate 
‘common sense’. Usually notions claimed as unmediated, self-evident common 
sense (such as the possibility of agency, the difference between the human 
and inhuman, or what constitutes truth) are ﬁltered down from humanism and 
are in actual fact highly ideological and situated. Such ideas have legitimacy in 
their own terms with regards to the dominant ideology and are popular in their 
standing. That is to say, they are widely disseminated and, in general, support the 
ofﬁcial ideas of that society (even while they might be voiced with different, 
more individualist, concerns).
Position C in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 1 is traditionally ascribed 
to the phenomena that I am interested in for this book (though in some 
appropriative accounts that praise popular knowledges, such phenomena has 
been ascribed position B). Under this category fall all those knowledges that 
traditionally have not counted as knowledge at all: knowledges of an uncertain 
status; knowledges that have not been veriﬁed; knowledges that are ofﬁcially 
discredited (for different reasons) but which still enjoy mass circulation. These 
4 Knowledge Goes Pop
would include gossip and conspiracy theory (the two main examples I consider 
in this book), but also those knowledges I began this chapter by listing. With 
regards to a deﬁnition, I will postpone any attempt until later and as I will have 
much more to say about this realm, I will move on swiftly to position D.
The top left-hand corner of Figure 1 is perhaps the most slippery position 
of all, or at least the one that exposes the instability of all the positions. The 
clearest example of a knowledge that is ofﬁcial yet illegitimate arises from 
Marx’s conception of revolutionary knowledge. Knowledge that the working 
class is exploited is part of the ofﬁcial logic of capital and yet the expression 
of this knowledge is branded illegitimate by the ruling class. Exploitation is 
both part of the smooth running of industry, say, but it cannot be seen as a 
‘legitimate’ idea to know because this might sanction resistance and revolution. 
Inequality and exploitation are ‘legitimate’ and ofﬁcial (position A) for those in 
power, but knowledge of them is framed as illegitimate in order to maintain the 
status quo. Position D, then, is the space of ideology. Here, discourses such as 
racism can be institutionalized (and ofﬁcial) and yet remain unacknowledged 
(illegitimate). Equally, in a slightly different formula, discourses like racism can 
be institutionalized (and ofﬁcial) and yet be exposed, dismissed and deemed 
illegitimate by another discourse, say liberalism or human rights. Either way, such 
discourses are positioned as illegitimate and ofﬁcial.
Figure 1 is something of a ruse (as is the as-yet unseen Table 1). I am not 
usually a fan of diagrams and tables because of their rigid appearance. The posi-
tions in Figure 1 are far from ﬁxed and are dependent on external, contingent 
factors. All of the knowledges in position A, for example, could equally be in 
position D. What is illegitimate knowledge from one political position could be 
legitimate for another, depending on what legitimating criteria is drawn upon. I 
have, however, tried to provide a diagram that expresses the dominant ideology 
in the ‘West’ with regards to knowledge culture. The interventions that I will 
summarize and draw upon below arise from those disciplines that I feel to 
be the most helpful in preparing the ground to consider a particular dynamic 
evident in the diagram; namely, the tension between positions A and C. That is, 
I am interested primarily in questioning the relationship between knowledge 
that holds an ofﬁcially ‘legitimate’ status and that which is considered to be of 
‘illegitimate’ and popular status (at least from the vantage point of the ‘ofﬁcial’). 
This is the tension that will organize the concerns of this book, though the 
other positions in Figure 1 will never be far from view and will occasionally take 
centre stage.
KNOWLEDGE NOW
When thinking through the contemporary conditions of popular knowledge, 
we would do well to remember that the exchange of knowledge on a mass level 
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is nothing new. The rise of the print medium and of general literacy ensured a 
degree of knowledge exchange on a wide scale. Locally, of course, ‘illegitimate’ 
knowledges have always been exchanged. Yet, the velocity and scale of knowledge 
exchange in the Internet age is unique. Those local, ‘illegitimate’ knowledges now 
enjoy mass participation. But it is not only the speed and scale of dissemination 
that marks this situation out as particular to the late twentieth, early twenty-ﬁrst 
century. The whole question and context of knowledge into which popular 
knowledge arrives is situated within an epistemological conjuncture. Moreover, 
the ground into which popular knowledge arrives determines the way it will 
be conﬁgured, what role it has to play, and what will be challenged by that 
arrival. The questions raised by popular knowledge are unique today because of 
the particular way in which the ground of knowledge is conﬁgured. We could 
schematize part of that epistemological conjuncture as in Table 1.
The linear construction of this table is misleading, not only because of the 
interdependent and porous boundary between each knowledge but because 
there is no intrinsic order or hierarchy of importance to these knowledges 
(although we are often led to believe there is). It also disguises the way in which 
deﬁnitions are disputed within particular discourses, let alone between them. 
Moreover, this table is by no means exhaustive. We could, for example, add 
religious knowledge and scientiﬁc knowledge, and no doubt the list could go on 
in an endless, somewhat Borgesian, taxonomy. It is not my intention to attempt 
such work here, but this table should at least hint at the way in which new 
deﬁnitions of knowledge have both symbolic and material repercussions. When 
the humanities’ concept of knowledge is symbolically displaced by that proposed 
by the knowledge economy, for example, the institution the humanities’ concept 
is attached to – the university – in turn has to adapt to that challenge (by being 
forced to respond to market pressures). This symbolic displacement has very real 
effects on the experience of higher education.
Let me look at this effect in the UK more closely (although similar policies 
concerning the knowledge economy have been proposed by most governments 
in the ‘developed’ world). The role of the university is integral to the vision of 
a successful knowledge driven economy as outlined in the 1998 Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) White Paper, Our Competitive Future: Building 
the Knowledge Driven Economy. It provides incentives for universities to 
develop links with businesses, to aid what is called ‘knowledge transfer’. The 
signiﬁer ‘university’ is borrowed by ‘the university for industry’ – an idea that 
has lead to the creation of a public-private partnership whose services are 
currently delivered by Learndirect. The emphasis here is on the (often online) 
delivery of business and IT-oriented skills. The focus is on the acquisition of 
tangible content, rather than the experience of learning and the development 
of transferable cognitive skills. The development of this alternative ‘university’ 
implies that the traditional university is somehow ill equipped to cater for the 
new knowledge economy. In fact, higher education centres have been working 
6 Knowledge Goes Pop
Table 1
Form of 
Knowledge
Site of Production 
and Circulation
Means of 
Legitimation
Criteria 
Knowledge 
economy
Industry; 
commerce; 
government policy; 
the economy; 
economics; 
management 
theory; sociology; 
the media
Free market 
economy; 
neoliberal/ 
neoconservative 
capitalism; 
appeal to new 
and ‘inevitable’ 
economic phase; 
the media
Commercial use 
and proﬁtability; 
design and 
innovation; tacit 
knowledge with 
codiﬁed technical 
knowledge
Knowledge 
within the 
humanities 
The university Appeals to 
‘the university’; 
university 
endorsed awards; 
grants and 
bursaries; tradition 
Intellectual 
use; internally 
established 
measures 
such as reason 
and scientiﬁc 
rationalism; that 
which yields 
cultural capital
Popular 
knowledge
Relatively unofﬁcial 
and unregulated 
sites (e.g. Internet; 
face-to-face 
interaction)
Insider knowledge; 
paradoxical 
reliance upon 
‘ofﬁcial’ 
accreditation; 
degree of risk 
or perseverance 
required to obtain 
information 
Whether it has 
been dismissed, 
excluded or 
suppressed by any 
of the above.
Indigenous 
knowledge
Localized sites; 
‘home’
Tradition; culture; 
claims on the land
Repetition; that 
which is revered; 
often dogmatic; 
spiritually or 
agriculturally 
useful
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with Learndirect to deliver these courses but there are still indications that the 
traditional degree programme is considered to be out of step with the needs of 
industry. Some of this is valid criticism, and many universities have attempted to 
address these problems through work placement schemes and modularization. 
But there are many reasons why academics are resisting this change in the focus 
of degree programmes and the aims of higher education institutions. These 
range from political objections (many disciplines are based on critiquing rather 
than supporting commercial culture), to pedagogic concerns (over what effects 
the corporatization of higher education has on teaching). Straight away we can 
see an incompatibility arising between the ﬁrst knowledge in our table and the 
second.
It is not that the humanities’ deﬁnition of knowledge is wholly different from 
knowledge that holds such a premium in the knowledge economy if, for the 
sake of argument, we take the former to be a philosophically derived deﬁnition 
of knowledge as a belief which is veriﬁed as far as possible and is subject to 
conditions of fallibility (the ‘justified true belief’ model). After all, scientific 
methodology, which is central to the knowledge economy, is based on such 
principles set forth by scientiﬁc rationalism: the idea that everything is rational 
and explicable through empirical observation and the consequent deduction 
of laws. However, the humanities are not generally interested in the economic 
utility of its knowledge (except in as much as the production and publication of 
ideas are pretty much essential to the furtherance of an academic career these 
days). Also, the objects of knowledge are very different between the knowledge 
economy and the humanities. The former is interested in scientiﬁc, technical, 
service-based, brand-oriented knowledge, and the latter in knowledge about 
history, culture and knowledge itself. These are not mutually exclusive interests 
(if they were, I would not be writing about them here – and, in fact, the cultural 
inﬂection of commerce has been widely commented on), but businesses take 
historical and cultural factors into consideration when developing or marketing 
a brand or product primarily in order to gain a competitive edge in the market. 
Knowledge in the humanities by contrast is valued for being intellectually rather 
than economically ‘useful’.
Although the DTI White Paper claims that the knowledge economy ‘is not 
just about pushing back the frontiers of knowledge’ but also ‘the more effective 
use and exploitation of all types of knowledge in all manner of activity’, it is 
not clear how knowledges within the humanities, some of which are based 
on a tradition of critique and challenge, could be made economically useful 
in a direct way without fundamentally changing those disciplines (so that, for 
example, cultural studies gives way to practice and skills based media studies). 
Despite certain similarities in the conﬁguration of knowledge, the knowledge 
economy and the humanities value knowledge for fundamentally different 
reasons. Given its predominance, it is inevitable that the knowledge economy 
will inﬂuence the future of the university and affect the appeal of different 
8 Knowledge Goes Pop
knowledges for students persuaded to think of themselves as customers in 
training to be ‘knowledge workers’.
When it comes to knowledge, there is not an inﬁnite space for different con-
ﬁgurations to exist. Those that gain precedence will inﬂuence what it means 
to know; what kind of knowledge is culturally valued; how we learn; and who 
will have access to knowledge and power. What, we could ask, happens to 
the idea of knowledge, its meaning and place in the world, when the signiﬁer 
‘knowledge’ is taken up by a different, even rival, discursive practice? What role 
will the university play if it is no longer the main site of knowledge deﬁnition, 
legitimation, and production? These questions are not purely conceptual; they 
have very real effects on the funding of particular disciplines at degree and 
doctoral levels.
I think of this task as a never-ending, culturally and economically focused 
epistemological enquiry. It is in this epistemological conjuncture that popular 
knowledges exist.
THOSE IN THE KNOW
As a backdrop to thinking about popular knowledge, I want to highlight just 
some of the (relatively) recent academic approaches to knowledge that have 
helped me to understand how knowledge has been positioned in the humanities 
and what challenges popular knowledges pose to that positioning. And although 
I won’t explicitly refer to some of this work again, being aware of it will, I hope, 
convey how my approach in this book has developed, and establish the ground 
upon which I want to build in the chapters that follow.
Michel Foucault
No foray into the concept of knowledge could be attempted without acknow-
ledging a debt to Michel Foucault. Foucault was concerned with analysing 
governing epistemic structures. In the ﬁrst instance, this took the form of an 
archaeological method that dug below and beyond the ‘empirical content of 
speciﬁc knowledges’ (McNay 1994: 510); beyond, that is, a list of ﬁndings and 
a record of the key ﬁgures – beyond what is known, towards a conception of a 
particular knowledge in terms of how subjects are conﬁgured and constituted 
by it – to get to the material conditions that shape a body of knowledge in one 
way rather than another.3 In terms of the history of thought, this represents a 
shift from thinking in biographical terms, from privileging the ‘knowing subject’ 
(as a history of epistemology, for example, often does) towards ‘a theory of 
discursive practice’ (Foucault [1966] 1992: xiv). Foucault knew that this was 
contentious: ‘Can one speak of science and its history . . . without reference to 
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the scientist himself – and I am speaking not merely of the concrete individual 
represented by a proper name, but of his work and the particular form of his 
thought?’ (Foucault [1966] 1992: xii). He claims to not want to ‘deny the validity 
of intellectual biographies, or the possibility of a history of theories, concepts, 
or themes’ but rather to look beyond the ‘customary boundaries’ to ‘systems 
of regularities that have a decisive role’ in the history of a particular body of 
knowledge (Foucault [1966] 1992: xii–xiv).
In time, Foucault’s archaeological approach gave way to or transformed into 
a genealogical method that enabled him to give a fuller account of the role 
of power within the process of knowledge production. Of primary concern 
in genealogical texts such as The History of Sexuality ([1976] 1978), and 
Discipline and Punish ([1975] 1977) are the ways in which discourses produce 
and organize knowledge according to institutionalized (but not necessarily top-
down) power relations. Power in these genealogies is not simply repressive. 
Rather, power is at work in all social relations and can produce new roles and 
behaviour as well as controlling others. Foucault writes, ‘Power must be analysed 
as something which circulates, or as something which only functions in the 
form of a chain’ (1980: 98).
All of which shapes an understanding of any knowledge, popular or other-
wise. And while I am not about to produce a Foucauldian study of popular know-
ledge in the chapters that follow, there are several Foucauldian insights that 
are relevant to my project. What do we need to know about Foucault’s work in 
order to think about popular knowledge?
1 His formulation ‘power/knowledge’. Evident in both the archaeological 
and genealogical methods (which some critics see as just two conﬁgurations 
of the same method) this is a concern with why certain knowledges are 
invested in and others fall to the wayside. The truth and dominance of one 
statement is established, for Foucault, at the expense of other – often equally 
valid – statements. He uses the signiﬁer ‘power/knowledge’ to think through 
the process of why some knowledges come to light and others do not. When 
I turn my attention more fully to popular knowledges, I want to retain this 
idea that contingent forces allow only some things to become known. I would 
also want us to extend this, moving outside of Foucault’s concerns somewhat, 
to think about why some knowledges are ratiﬁed and ofﬁcial whereas others 
are left to be taken up in popular culture – which, while engendering it’s own 
‘legitimacies’ and standards, can still, in comparison to ‘ofﬁcial’ knowledge, be 
considered ‘unofﬁcial’.
2 The way in which Foucault fashions the relationship between knowledge 
and power. This obviously draws on what we have just said about ‘power/
knowledge’. What I want to stress here is that, after Foucault, knowledge can-
not be thought outside of power relations. But power, here, is not simply an 
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oppressive force. Rather, Foucault contends (mainly in The History of Sexuality, 
Volume I) that power can also be productive, allowing for new forms of 
behaviour and resistance. This makes for a chainlike concept of power, moving 
through all social relations, as opposed to just a top-down relation. The advantage 
of Foucault’s thought over, say, economic determinist accounts, is that, as McNay 
writes, ‘the idea that all thought is in the service of dominatory regimes cannot 
adequately explain how conﬂicting perspectives may arise in the same regime. 
Nor does it explain the emergence of counterfactuals or how knowledge is 
necessarily distinguishable from the rationalized systems through which society 
is ordered’ (1994: 64). All of which has important ramiﬁcations for me here. 
Firstly because a variety of political positions can be detected in different 
examples of popular knowledge; and secondly because popular knowledges 
are not simply subjugated by more ‘legitimate’ knowledges. The power invested 
in a ‘legitimate’ discourse, while delimiting what can be said and done within it, 
also makes other, even sometimes openly oppositional or resistant discourses 
possible. At times, I will present popular knowledges that give rise to statements 
that resist other more ‘legitimate’ knowledges; at others, more compliant 
statements will be evident.
3 His concept of ‘discourse’. Foucault admits (as early as the 1969 Arch-
aeology of Knowledge) that his use of the term ‘discourse’ ﬂuctuates: ‘treating it 
sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as individualizable 
groups of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts 
for a certain number of statements’ (Foucault [1969] 1994: 80). In this way, 
the concept shifts between different conceptual levels, beginning with the 
most general, to include all instances of signiﬁcation. This gives way to a more 
speciﬁc or bounded formulation to indicate a collection of particular utterances. 
Finally, in its most radical guise, ‘discourse’ refers to the unwritten rules that 
determine the boundaries of a knowledge. As Robert Young explains, Foucault 
encourages us ‘to analyse not simply what was thought or said, per se, but all the 
discursive rules and categories that were a priori, assumed as a constituent part 
of discourse and therefore of knowledge, and so fundamental that they remained 
unvoiced and unthought’ (1981: 48). The shift in focus is from knowledge as 
a transcendent entity held in a repository for later retrieval, towards thinking 
about the conditions of knowledge making. Foucault’s work, that is, reminds us 
that the word ‘knowledge’ was once used as a verb (see Lloyd 2005: 197).
In locating discursive formations, Foucauldian analysis avoids being a history 
of ideas:
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system 
of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or 
thematic choices, one can deﬁne a regularity (an order, correlations, positions 
and functionings, transformations), we will say . . . that we are dealing with a 
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discursive formation – thus avoiding words already overladen with conditions 
and consequences, and in any case inadequate to the task of designating such 
a dispersion, such as ‘science, ‘ideology’, ‘theory’, or ‘domain of objectivity. 
(Foucault [1969] 1994: 38)
Foucault, then, fashions the concept of discourse in order to be able to identify a 
series of statements linked not by content but by a rule of formation – ‘The rules 
of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, 
modiﬁcation, and disappearance) in a given discursive division’ (Foucault [1969] 
1994: 38). A discourse, for Foucault, plays an integral role in the formation of 
a discipline, determining the kind of statements that can be made within it. 
But a discourse also determines a set of exclusionary procedures that delimit 
the objects under study. If a statement does not adhere to a given discursive 
paradigm, it risks being deemed illegitimate.
We could say that a discourse is the mechanism by which information is trans-
lated into knowledge (a working formulation that is only permissible if we accept 
that the information to be translated is never ‘pure’ or unmediated to begin with). 
It is this notion that I want to take forward, positioning popular knowledge 
as a discursive formation (though not a discipline) that is characterized by 
a collection of statements and texts produced in different (para)institutional 
contexts that give rise to ideological formations. As such, popular knowledge has 
its own rules of formation that determine how knowledge is produced within it. 
But popular knowledge is also that which has been excluded from other, more 
‘legitimate’, discourses by practices embedded within rationalist institutions.
4 Foucault’s study of marginal texts and informal knowledges. It is 
worth noting that, when studying the deep structures of knowledge during 
his archaeological phase, Foucault broke with the conventions of historical 
research to consider both formal and informal knowledges. Prompted by the 
concerns of this book, I might be tempted to think of this in terms of popular 
knowledge but Foucault was focused on producing a history of science that pays 
as much attention to the ‘softer’ sciences ‘that concern living beings, languages, 
or economic facts’ as to more ‘rigorous’ or ‘noble’ sciences like ‘mathematics, 
cosmology, and physics’ (Foucault [1966] 1992: ix). Yet his endeavour – to 
establish that even ‘the practice of old beliefs, including not only genuine 
discoveries, but also the most naïve notions, [obey], at a given moment, the 
laws of a certain code of knowledge’ (Foucault [1966] 1992: ix) – emphasizes 
the importance of understanding the structure of less formal knowledges and 
their relationship to formal knowledges. Through this process, the ‘frontiers 
[between different types of knowledge] are redrawn and things usually far apart 
are brought closer, and vice versa’ (Foucault [1966] 1992: x).
Equally, Foucault’s focus on non-canonical texts sets a helpful precedent 
to studies such as mine (and resonates with the project of cultural studies in 
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general). His texts take into account cultural and discursive phenomena that 
others saw as marginal, like documents concerning child masturbation, or 
paedophilia. As well as encouraging us on our travels into the under-analysed 
arena of popular knowledge (at least as a distinct area of study), this non-
canonical focus alleviates some of the concern over working on knowledges 
that, in some cases, do not themselves yet have canonical texts as such.
5 Overall, I want to take forward Foucault’s way of thinking about the 
discursive conditions of production for and rules of constraint upon a 
knowledge-producing discourse. His emphasis on how Enlightenment thinking 
codiﬁed and policed knowledge through discourses will be helpful for thinking 
about the anxiety popular knowledges can prompt and the familiar charges of 
irrationality that they receive.
The Sociology of Knowledge
From the sociology of knowledge I want to highlight the prevailing idea (one 
which we have already seen at work in Foucault) that knowledge is socially 
constructed and determined. As E. Doyle McCarthy recognizes, ‘knowledge is best 
conceived and studied as culture, and the various types of social knowledges 
communicate and signal social meanings – such as meanings about power 
and pleasure, beauty and death, goodness and danger’ (1996: 1). In this cultural 
guise, knowledges can give rise to new behaviours and objects. The sociology 
of knowledge, then, considers the effect of society on knowledge and the social 
construction of knowledge – in other words, how society shapes knowledge 
and how knowledge shapes society (in terms of social reality). The usefulness of 
such an approach, of course, is to recognize all knowledges, both ofﬁcial (such 
as scientiﬁc knowledge) and unofﬁcial (such as folklore) – as genres of socially 
(and geographically) situated knowledge.
Significantly, the sociology of knowledge has placed itself within the 
discursive ﬁeld, recognizing the discipline as one knowledge among others. 
Doyle McCarthy writes:
the lasting value . . . of the sociology of knowledge is its capacity to draw 
attention to itself as part of its own enquiry: to enable us to scrutinize the 
current “turn to culture”, both in society and in social science; to grasp – with 
more than an ounce of critical detachment – the effects that social scientiﬁc 
ideas and methods have on contemporary life; to ask how knowledge of 
culture and its operations can operate as a form of domination, since it is a 
resource from which many peoples are excluded. (1996: 107)
So in this book I will invoke cultural studies and theory as knowledges and, 
therefore, as culture. But as the above quotation suggests, I need to recognize 
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that these knowledges are of a different order to other cultural forms (even 
other socially situated knowledges). We cannot allow the idea that ‘all knowledge 
is cultural’ to blind us to the fact that some cultural forms are more specialist 
than others. Many of the concerns central to the sociology of knowledge, then, 
will also be important here. However, some sociological concerns – such as a 
consideration of which social groups are more susceptible to belief in some 
knowledges over others – will be sidelined, for reasons that I will explain below. 
The main difference will be one of methodology. Whereas the sociology of 
knowledge relies largely on ethnographic studies (whether positivist or 
interpretative), this book will be concerned primarily with ‘textual’ mediations 
of popular knowledge whether virtual, televisual, journalistic, or literary.
Anthropology
The sociology of knowledge has been concerned with broadly (applied) 
philosophical questions around the nature of knowledge (which can, but do 
not necessarily, address the object of study here – popular knowledge) but 
folklorists have concerned themselves with producing a record of every aspect 
of knowledge transmission in informal settings. Folklorists, therefore, have been 
interested in much of the same material that I am looking at in this book. The 
novelty of Knowledge Goes Pop is perhaps, then, not in the objects looked 
at but in the way of looking at them. Folklorists have produced accounts and 
analyses of all kinds of discursive formats such as jokes, urban legends, fairy 
tales, proverbs, blessings and curses, customs, lullabies, riddles, catchphrases, 
gestures, greetings, and superstitions. They have also extended their interests 
to extranarrative objects such as costumes, art and crafts, dance and music. But 
folklorists are also interested in how these elements form a whole way of life. Jan 
Harold Brunvard explains:
Folklore manifests itself in many oral and verbal forms (‘mentifects’), in 
kinesiological forms (customary behaviour, or ‘sociofacts’), and in material 
forms (‘artefacts’), but folklore itself is the whole traditional complex of 
thought, content, and process – which ultimately can never be recorded in its 
entirety; it lives only in its performance or communication, as people interact 
with one another. (1968: 9)
Traditional folklorists have been very concerned with what such elements of 
folklife can tell them about group identities. Ellen McHale writes:
traditional forms of knowledge are learned informally within a one-to-one 
or small group exchange, through performance, or by example. In all cases, 
folklore and folklife are learned and perpetuated within the context of the 
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‘group’, for it is the shared experience which shapes and gives meaning to 
the exchange. (1994: 2.1)
Robert Baron and Nicholas Spitzer read folklore as that which takes place in 
private – ‘shared by groups in informal settings’ (1992: 1–2) – but which publicly 
express a collective identity. While there is by no means a consensus on what 
deﬁnes folklore, one of the reasons for examining such phenomena outside of 
this body of work, I think, lies in the desire to move away from the emphasis on 
group dynamics. What is interesting about popular knowledges, I want to suggest, 
is that they seem to transcend geographically located groupings with a self-
replicating structure that deﬁes an ethnography of one-to-one communication. 
There are folklorists who take on board contemporary culture and technology 
but, as a discipline, it is largely dominated by painstaking records of individual 
examples of folklore, the danger being that while the object is different every 
time, the conclusions can be surprisingly routine.4
Barre Toelken actually posits folklore as that which resists mass mediation: 
‘In spite of the combined forces of technology, science, television, religion, 
urbanization, and creeping literacy, we prefer our close personal associations 
as the basis for learning about life and transmitting important observations 
and expressions’ (1979: 25). He conﬁgures techno-globalization as a force that 
threatens folklore, rather than rethinking folklore as able to incorporate the 
characteristics of globalized culture. He goes on to write, ‘[folklore’s] primary 
characteristic is that its ingredients seem to come directly from dynamic inter-
actions among human beings in communal-traditional performance contexts 
rather than through the rigid lines and fossilised structures of technical 
instruction or bureaucratised education, or through the relatively stable channels 
of the classical traditions’ (Toelken 1979: 28–9). In this definition, Toelken 
opposes informal face-to-face communication to instruction that seems at a 
remove from these lived practices either because it is mediated or because it is 
organized into a formal body of knowledge as part of a wider idea of education.
Despite these reservations, the study of folklore serves as an important 
precedent for the current study. Veteran folklorist Richard M. Dorson (1968) 
describes folklore as the hidden submerged culture lying behind the shadow 
of ofﬁcial civilization. Brunvard writes, ‘Folklore is the traditional, unofﬁcial, 
noninstitutional part of culture’ (1968: 8–9). These descriptions certainly point 
towards the relationship between ‘ofﬁcial’ and ‘unofﬁcial’ knowledges that I want 
to observe, while perhaps underestimating the popular, often mass mediated or 
mainstream, nature of this ‘unofﬁcial’ culture.
As with the sociology of knowledge, my concerns will depart from these 
anthropological accounts in methodological terms. While ethnographic work 
used to analyse local, community-based communications and teachings is 
invaluable in understanding and recording cultures, I want to move beyond what 
people say about their culture, or even beyond what we can deduce from what 
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people don’t say about their culture (through interpretative, psychoanalytic 
readings), to an approach which considers, via ‘textual’ manifestations, the 
conditions which enable us to say anything, to know anything, about our culture 
in the ﬁrst place.
Pedagogy and Knowledge
Nowhere is the question of what should occupy position A in Figure 1 as hotly 
contested as it is with regards to education. The organization of knowledge in 
educational contexts (the kinds of knowledges that should be given precedence 
and the amount of time that alternative viewpoints should be given) has 
particularly been a concern for studies in pedagogy and policy making. On the 
conservative side, there is a concern that real knowledge has given way to a 
form of political correctness in schools (see Ravitch 2000) while on the other, 
more liberal side, concern is expressed over what counts as this ‘real knowledge’ 
in the ﬁrst place (see Apple 2003). By no means exclusive to this body of work, 
questions abound concerning the politics of knowledge. As Michael W. Apple 
observes, these questions arise from the fact that, ‘Out of the vast universe of 
knowledge, only some knowledge and ways of organizing it get declared to be 
legitimate or “ofﬁcial”’ (2003: 7). As a telling example, we only need to think of 
the controversy in the UK and the US over teaching creationism (as opposed to 
evolution) in schools.5
In some ways, I am coming at the question of knowledge from a similar 
angle (though with ultimately different concerns). For example this book is 
also concerned with the mechanisms by which some knowledges are deemed 
‘legitimate’ and others ‘illegitimate’. I, too, will be looking at the arrogation 
of power with regards to knowledge production and endorsement. Work in 
education (particularly the sociology of curriculum) is concerned not only with 
a democratic ideal of education (how to empower via knowledge transmission) 
but the idea that power resides in the authority to dictate what knowledge is. 
In other words, it is all very well congratulating ourselves (in ‘developed’ states) 
on having education systems open to all, but it is also necessary to think about 
what kind of knowledge will be taught and what that means to the status of, and 
relationship to, knowledge per se. Hence, as Apple writes:
ofﬁcial knowledge is the result of conﬂicts and compromises both within the 
state and between the state and civil society. This involves complex issues of 
political economy, of cultural politics, of the relationship between cultural 
legitimacy and state regulation, and of the ways in which and through which 
identiﬁable social movements and alliances form.  (2003: 7–8)
In line with Knowledge Goes Pop, Apple recognizes that ofﬁcial knowledge 
should not be focused on to the detriment of popular knowledge:
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To do so would be a very real error, since popular knowledge is crucial in 
the formation and legitimation both of identities and of what counts as “real” 
knowledge. Indeed, popular knowledge serves as the constitutive outside 
that causes other knowledge to be called legitimate. The ability of dominant 
groups and the state to say that something is real knowledge is contingent 
on something else being deﬁned as merely popular. For this very reason, the 
popular itself is actually closely linked to the state in often unseen ways and 
hence cannot be ignored. (2003: 11)
Apple’s observation regarding the relationship between ‘ofﬁcial’ and popular 
knowledges, along with his recommendation to look more closely at popular 
knowledge to understand more fully the cultural and political role of knowledge 
as a whole, will serve as useful prompts (and props) for Knowledge Goes Pop.
Cultural Studies of Knowledge
Raymond Williams’ much-cited deﬁnition of culture as not only ‘the arts and 
learning – the special processes of discovery and creative effort’ but also ‘a whole 
way of life – the common meanings’ ([1958] 1997: 6) announces cultural studies 
as interested in everyday acts of cognition. (What kind of ‘whole way of life’ 
would be devoid of some form of knowing?) This is not to claim cultural studies 
as the only pioneer in the study of popular knowledge (I have already hinted 
at the long history of anthropological studies in folklore and at philosophical 
precursors such as doxa) but it is to recognize that cultural studies, without 
naming its object as such, has always involved itself in the nature of specialist 
and everyday knowledges and how we use them to produce, consume and 
interpret the culture around us. As with sociological perspectives, not only is 
knowledge a form of culture here, but culture itself is a form of knowledge: we 
could say that cultural objects mediate knowledge and confer knowledge upon 
us. As Tim Dant puts it, sociology and cultural studies have produced studies into 
‘the embodiment of knowledge in cultural products’ (1991: 2). Such a concern 
might have only become explicit or apparent in more recent years. Evidence of 
this can be found in the inclusion of an entry for ‘knowledge’ in New Keywords 
(2005) edited by Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg and Meaghan Morris: a re-
writing of Raymond Williams’ classic text in which he passes over ‘K’ without 
pause.
In early cultural studies coming out of a socialist tradition, a Marxist concern 
over false consciousness dominated the discussion. Subjects had, it would 
seem, an inaccurate picture of society; they adopted ‘ofﬁcial’ knowledge (or 
the popular, ‘commonsense’ knowledge – from position B in Figure 1 – which 
supports the ‘ofﬁcial’ knowledge) about their place in the world, naturalizing 
social inequality and the subjugation of the working class. But cultural studies 
has now shifted from the assumption that subjects harbour the ‘wrong’ kind 
 Know It All 17
of knowledge, towards a desire to locate practices which display the ‘right’ (at 
least in progressive terms) knowledge: towards, that is, knowledges displaying 
resistance to the dominant ideology. An interest in subcultures, for example, has 
given cultural studies the occasion to focus on oppositional forms of signiﬁcation 
and knowledge.
This writing about alternative and subcultural practices and ways of know-
ing extends from the sociological work of the ‘Chicago School’, through to the 
cultural studies approach of Birmingham’s Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies, and beyond. Such literature has usefully placed non-‘mainstream’ social 
practices onto the agenda and theorized the relationship between such practices 
and the ‘parent’ culture as well as mass culture. The political meaning and, often, 
resistance to be found in the signified values and alternative consumption 
modes of subcultures have been a guiding theme in subcultural studies since 
the Birmingham School’s collection, Resistance Through Rituals (Hall and 
Jefferson 1976). The dominant mode of analysis, subsequently problematized 
and challenged by later theorists, seemed to begin from the subculture and work 
backwards in order to ﬁnd a socio-political explanation for its emergence.6 In 
this way, subcultures were very much seen as symptomatic of a social ailment: 
racial inequality, say, or an emasculated, unemployed underclass.
Popular knowledges like conspiracy theory or alien abduction narratives 
might once have ﬁt the deﬁnition of a subcultural knowledge. The emergence 
of a conspiracy ‘scene’ that I will detail in Chapter 2 supports this view. And yet, 
seeing conspiracy theory like this – concentrating on its fringe status – overlooks 
the central role conspiratorial fears have played in mainstream political life 
for centuries. This other manifestation complicates the idea of an ‘alternative’ 
subcultural concern. In addition, the increased proliferation and rise in popularity 
of even its ‘fringe’ manifestation calls for a more nuanced conﬁguration of its 
relationship to other discourses. In thinking along a continuum of knowledge 
practices – so that gossip is investigated alongside conspiracy theory – the 
commodiﬁcation of previously ‘fringe’ practices is not the dominant narrative 
here. Some of the knowledges I am interested in have always been popular. 
And yet the development of new communication technologies has perhaps 
intensiﬁed their predominance.
Recent subcultural studies have asked if the category ‘subculture’ should 
even be retained in today’s commodiﬁed, commercialized, pick-and-mix culture 
(see Bennett and Kahn-Harris 2004). Such unease with that category prompts 
me to justify the use of my own – ‘popular knowledge’. I have constructed this 
category ‘popular knowledge’ only in order to deconstruct the opposition often 
created between popular knowledge (even if it is not named as such) and more 
legitimated modes of knowing.
Just as recent work in subcultural or ‘post-subcultural’ studies has called 
for a different approach to be taken – one that pays attention to the myriad, 
complex ways in which subcultural identiﬁcations are experienced, produced 
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and consumed – I would argue that the ‘popular’ of ‘popular knowledge’ 
requires a different set of questions to be asked from those posed by classic 
subcultural studies. That is to say, if the old questions are not even right for 
subcultures anymore, they are even less appropriate for popular knowledges (a 
category that shares some characteristics of the ‘subcultural’, but departs from 
that identiﬁcation in important ways). This is why I will try to move beyond a 
tracing back of each knowledge’s origins (while recognizing that such narratives 
are compelling), and beyond ascertaining the socio-political meaning of each 
instance of popular knowledge (or popular knowledge as a whole).
I could be accused of replicating the binary opposition set up by subcultural 
studies. The fringe and mainstream in this book gets replaced with the popular 
and ofﬁcial. However, I will try hard to show the instability of such binarisms, 
whether based on the idea of a romanticized ‘fringe’ or self-contained ‘ofﬁcial’. 
The popular, after all, confers its own kind of legitimacy, its own (popular) 
cultural capital. Moving away from a romanticized notion of subcultures, other 
studies, like those of fan cultures, have acknowledged the possibility that subjects 
might in fact identify with mainstream, rather than marginal or oppositional, 
ideology and knowledge.7 In addition, the emphasis in cultural studies on 
those knowledges produced by historically ‘marginalized’ or disenfranchised 
groups (whether through their race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity and so on) 
have produced valuable contributions to our understanding of the relationship 
between knowledge, identity, and nationhood. The study of cultural knowledges 
and knowledge cultures, therefore, has evolved through different phases, and has 
been punctuated by various interpretations of what those knowledges might 
mean politically.
In terms of work on speciﬁc popular knowledges, a few are of particular note. 
Andrew Ross’ Strange Weather (1991) and Paul Heelas’ The New Age Movement 
(1996) consider so-called ‘new age’ practices. Jörg R. Bergmann’s Discreet 
Indiscretions (1987), Patricia Meyer Spacks’ Gossip (1985), and part of Patricia 
Mellencamp’s High Anxiety (1992) all approach the phenomenon of gossip. 
Rosemary J. Coombe’s essay, ‘Postmodernity and the Rumor’ (1992) considers 
the challenges rumour can pose to brands; while Patricia Turner’s extended 
study, I Heard it through the Grapevine: Rumor in African-American Culture 
(1993) considers the racial politics of informal modes of exchange and urban 
legends. Conspiracy theory has also received a fair amount of attention: see, for 
example, Peter Knight’s Conspiracy Culture (2000), Mark Fenster’s, Conspiracy 
Theories (1999), and Parish and Parker’s edited collection, The Age of Anxiety: 
Conspiracy Theory and the Human Sciences (2001). Alien abduction narratives 
feature directly in Jodi Dean’s Aliens in America (1998), and as part of a highly 
interesting study of the post-human in Neil Badmington’s Alien Chic (2004). Yet 
these studies do not set out to draw comparisons between popular knowledges, 
as I aim to in this book. Despite its shortcomings, John Fiske’s Power Plays/
Power Works (1993) is the closest cultural studies has come to a theory of how 
popular knowledges work.
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Fiske primarily uses the term ‘popular knowledge’ in Power Plays/Power 
Works to delineate how fan cultures create knowledges and beliefs that deny the 
status of scientiﬁc rationalism as the only way of knowing. Fiske claims:
Despite [its] monopolist ambitions [scientiﬁc rationalism] has to recognise, 
however reluctantly, that other knowledges exist and contradict it, so part of 
its strategy of control is to deﬁne the realities known by other knowledges as 
‘unreal’ and therefore not worth knowing. (1993: 181)
The wide range of beliefs (such as superstition) and experiences (such as déjà-
vu or even coincidence) that scientific rationalism cannot wholly account 
for, maintain a complex relation to it. According to Fiske’s model, scientiﬁc 
rationalism must at once recognize and reject that which it cannot explain. 
Some phenomena, then, is expelled and left to take form in an alternative kind of 
knowing. Fiske is also keen to point out that popular knowledge cannot afford 
to ignore the ofﬁcial knowledge:
A popular knowledge is, then, never essential or self-sufﬁcient, but can exist 
only in relation to ofﬁcial knowledge. This relationship may range from one of 
accommodation or excorporation to one of as great a difference or distance 
as possible. (1993: 198)
Popular knowledges, in this way, ape more legitimated knowledges (mirroring 
their legitimating strategies, for example). Fiske describes scientiﬁc rationalism 
as ‘uni-accentual’, that is to say, ‘it does not serve its interests by accommodating 
subordinate knowledges, but by repressing them’ (1993: 182). According to 
Fiske, popular knowledges, on the other hand, are ‘multi-accentual’ in that ‘they 
cannot escape the knowledge that attempts to repress and invalidate them: they 
can only exist in relationship to it and never exist in autonomous independence 
of it’ (1993: 182). But I want to argue that popular knowledges are not only 
dependent upon the ‘ofﬁcial’ discourses that might seek to repress them in 
various ways, as Fiske claims, but that ‘ofﬁcial’ discourses are also ‘reliant’ upon 
popular knowledges.
As has been pointed out many times before, Fiske’s attendant populism 
can present problems. Jim McGuigan accuses Fiske of focusing ‘more or less 
exclusively on “popular readings”, which are applauded with no evident 
reservations at all, never countenancing the possibility that a popular reading 
could be anything other than “progressive”’ (McGuigan 1992: 72) Indeed, 
Fiske’s insistence on the resistant role that popular knowledges can play in 
transforming the notion of passive consumers into active producers is probably 
over-optimistic, and ignores the more multi-faceted political axis on which 
knowledge operates (popular knowledges can be highly complicit with the 
dominant ideology as well as resistant). Having said that, Fiske’s study does set 
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an important precedent for this book in that it recognizes the way in which 
popular knowledges question paradigms of legitimacy and authority.
DANGER OVERHEAD: DEFINITIONS AT WORK
It becomes clear from the discussion above that it is impossible fully to analyse 
popular knowledge without issues arising that concern knowledge in general. 
In fact, in the sociology of knowledge, there is no special term to delineate 
what I am here calling popular knowledge. Rather, these knowledges are simply 
discussed as one form of socially situated knowledge among others. As Doyle 
McCarthy explains, knowledge in sociology means:
knowledge-of-reality or whatever information and ideas inform what we hold 
to be real and true about our worlds and ourselves. Knowledges are those 
organized and perpetuated ways of thinking and acting that enable us to 
direct ourselves to objects in our world (persons, things, and events) and to 
see them as something. (1996: 22)
Obviously, the ways of knowing that I describe in this book enable us to 
manage and organize the material world – they construct our social reality. 
Knowledge is, then, as Doyle McCarthy writes, ‘any and every set of ideas and 
acts accepted by one or another social group or society of people – ideas and 
acts pertaining to what they accept as real for them and for others’ (1996: 22). 
Likewise for Dant, knowledge is ‘the construal of relations between abstract 
entities that are taken to represent communication and that can be used by 
them both to understand their experience of the world and to guide their 
actions’ (author’s italics) (1991: 5). In light of this levelling of the playing ﬁeld 
(in which popular knowledge is just another socially situated knowledge), why 
would I want to suggest a distinct way of thinking about popular knowledges? 
Why would I insist on the speciﬁcity of popular knowledge? What is popular 
about popular knowledge? How does the ‘popular’ modify what sociologists 
have been saying about different forms of knowledge?
In one sense, there is nothing at odds with the formulation to be found 
in the sociology of knowledge and my term, popular knowledge. My usage 
of ‘popular knowledge’ does not deny that forms of knowledge are socially 
produced and contextualized. But in another sense, I want this term to indicate 
a resistance to a ﬂattening out of all knowledges. I want it to point towards both 
the continuity with knowledge in general (why else use the term ‘knowledge’?) 
and the discontinuities that set it apart and demand a particular mode of analysis 
that can raise questions about the status and authority of knowledge. When a 
notion of knowledge is extended to include popular knowledges (or whatever 
they are called in various disciplines), the idea of knowledge itself is more often 
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than not left unchanged by the encounter. To be sure, thinking about all forms 
of knowledge, including scientiﬁc knowledge, as socially constructed has been a 
radical gesture in epistemological terms. But we would not want such relativism 
to underplay the singularity of particular kinds of knowledge and what they can 
tell us about the whole ﬁeld of knowledge. Knowledge as a concept is forced to 
shift when previously external discourses make claims upon it. If the centre of 
knowledge shifts – if the way it is produced, consumed and legitimated changes 
– it is difﬁcult to see popular knowledge as just one more form of knowledge, 
because knowledge itself will have altered in the process.
In the sociological understanding of knowledges, then, there is perhaps too 
little speciﬁcity. In some ways, the opposite problem is evident in Fiske’s study, 
which risks making popular knowledge seem more subversive, more distinct, 
more singular than perhaps is justiﬁed. Fiske’s concentration on the oppositional 
nature of his version of popular knowledge to scientiﬁc rationalism and ‘the 
establishment’, as Fiske calls it, belies the way in which popular knowledges 
borrow from more established discourses in the attempt to legitimate themselves. 
(Why else would gossips appeal to direct knowledge of the event being relayed 
and conspiracy theorists claim access to an anonymous but authoritative 
source?)
To get to a deﬁnition, I could think about what different popular knowledges 
have in common. Psychologically they may serve different functions. Formally, 
they may employ or display differing discursive traits. Politically, they might 
question or support dominant ideological modes. Nevertheless, they all offer 
understandings of the world not bounded by (although certainly in various 
kinds of relation with) ‘official’, legitimated knowledge. In addition, these 
popular knowledges are often produced outside of (and yet, as we shall see 
in later chapters, surreptitiously used within) the ‘ofﬁcial’ sites of knowledge 
production – the university, government, the law. They are popular, not only 
because many of them are populist in nature, but also because they represent 
attractive ways of knowing that are open to a wide range of people (though 
this is of course dependent on access to media and socio-cultural engagement). 
These knowledges do not require formal training (indeed, we may enjoy popular 
knowledges precisely because we already feel well versed or ‘trained’ merely 
through exposure to particular cultural forms and texts) and form a common 
part of our popular cultural landscape and currency. They are ways of knowing 
that circulate via word of mouth, television, talk radio, the Internet, tabloids, 
magazines and so forth, rather than veriﬁed, peer-reviewed academic journals, 
books or more ‘serious’ or ‘elitist’ forms of cultural output. Such modes of 
exchange and proliferation are not incidental to these knowledges but play an 
integral role as they shape, organize, create, recreate, promote and deliver them.
As a provisional working deﬁnition – one informed by the many disciplinary 
interventions so far discussed – I want to put forward the following (some 
elements of which I have yet to qualify): popular knowledges are discursive 
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forms of popular culture (and all that this term indicates about the complex 
relation between both folk and mass culture) that systematize and contextualize 
ideas about the world and specific events. They often require no specialist 
training, although participants become versed in discursive ‘rules’. They retain 
an ambivalent relationship to more legitimated ways of knowing; and display 
both general and singular properties. More important than producing a working 
deﬁnition, however, and what I want to ﬁnish this section with is the need 
to stress that the issue of what popular knowledge is must remain open and 
undecidable (as must the question of what knowledge ‘is’). A ﬁnal deﬁnition will 
elude us, even at the end of this book, not least because our very encounter with 
popular knowledge will shift any ground from which we might re-cognize it.
SOMETHING DIFFÉRANT
I have deliberately avoided positing a Big Theory about popular knowledge. But 
believe me, there are plenty of them about. Francis Wheen, for example, broadly 
argues that the kinds of knowledges that I am discussing in this book arise out 
of a turn away from Enlightenment rationalism. He writes, ‘By the end of the 
20th century . . . there were countless indications of a general retreat from reason 
– the search for millennial portents, the revival of interest in Nostradamus . . . 
the Gaia craze, the appearance of horoscopes in even serious broadsheets, the 
ﬂood of books about angels, fairies, Inca secrets, Egyptian rituals and secret Bible 
codes’ (Wheen 2004: 12). As I have already mentioned in the Preface, this ‘new 
irrationalism’, as Wheen sees it, results from a feeling of disempowerment: it is 
‘an expression of despair by people who feel impotent to improve their lives and 
suspect that they are at the mercy of secretive, impersonal forces whether these 
be the Pentagon or invaders from Mars. Political leaders accept it as a safe outlet 
for dissent, fulﬁlling much the same function that Marx attributed to religion’ 
(Wheen 2004: 12). Such is the force of this irrationalism that populist politicians 
– those who have a relative amount of power within the system – have begun 
to ape the public’s obsession with irrationalism and the primacy of feeling and 
emotion. The politicians feel that they cannot afford to ignore the dominant 
communicative mode – they want to be a part of this collective experience 
– but in doing so, place at risk the primacy public ﬁgures are supposed to give 
to universal reason or conscience, over egoistic reason or self-love (Wheen 
2004: 17).
And if you don’t like the sound of that, you could read Fredric Jameson’s work, 
which posits conspiracy narrative (and ﬁlm in particular) as taking ‘a wild stab 
at the heart of’ the collective effort ‘to ﬁgure out where we are and what land-
scapes and forces confront us in a late twentieth century whose abominations 
are heightened by their concealment and their bureaucratic impersonality’ 
(Jameson 1992: 3). In a different essay, Jameson stresses that conspiracy ‘is the 
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poor person’s cognitive mapping in the postmodern age’ (1988: 356) induced 
by the insecurities and inequalities of late capitalism. Jameson thinks about 
conspiracy narratives as attempts to represent or map out the ever elusive 
social totality. Whereas for Wheen the turn to popular knowledges is indicative 
of a systematic turn away from rationality, for Jameson, it is a symptom of an 
overwhelmingly complex and subjugating landscape.
Both arguments persuade. Yet, the way in which they present popular know-
ledges as the result of an increased premium on feelings, or a symptom of post-
modern confusion – and more widely as a symptom of disempowerment – is 
only part of the story. As will become a recurring argument in this book, sympto-
matic readings of this kind are guided by an idea or ideal of politics that itself 
often remains unexamined. Wheen and Jameson’s analyses begin from a point 
that ‘knows’ what the political is. The political remains stable, while subjects 
either get distracted from politics by emotionally led irrationality (Wheen), 
or inadequately attempt to map the political landscape (Jameson). If popular 
knowledges are seen only in already decided political terms (and Big Theories, 
by virtue of their size, tend to grapple with big political issues), where the worth 
of the political intervention is pre-determined according to a political ideal, 
there is little room for thinking about our own relation to those knowledges and 
how this in turn might question the tropes of knowledge and politics.
More interesting, in my opinion, is the way in which popular knowledges 
exceed or complicate this (whether positive or negative) narrowly deﬁned 
political interest in popular practices and texts. For popular knowledges can 
appear (to varying degrees in different contexts) both politically engaged and 
deeply ineffectual in the realm of democratic politics. The oscillation between 
the serious nature of popular knowledges and their more ironic and playful 
elements is important to any ‘Theory’ or account of popular knowledges. It 
makes it difﬁcult to pronounce upon their import, role, or function in the world. 
They are constantly shifting.
I think the play between the serious and playful is partly a result of popular 
knowledges being a form of popular culture – something that has gone un-
recognized in the sociological approach, for example. ‘Knowledge’ suggests the 
serious role popular knowledges play; the ‘popular’ points towards an appealing 
entertainment. Placed together, however, we should be reminded that such 
meanings are not mutually exclusive. We can play with knowledge; the popular 
can resonate seriously. Thinking about popular knowledge in this way means 
being concerned not only, as sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann 
claim, ‘with whatever passes for “knowledge” in a society, regardless of the 
ultimate validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such “knowledge”’ (1966: 
3), but also keeping in mind (though not necessarily discussing in ‘traditional’ 
cultural studies ways) the mechanisms by, and circumstances in which such 
knowledges are produced and consumed. In each chapter I spend some time 
outlining the role of my examples as forms of popular culture. What is striking in 
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each case is the way popular knowledges force us to reformulate (by now out-
dated) framings of popular culture as either mass or folk culture. I propose that 
we have to start thinking about popular knowledge at both a local and global 
level; as both ‘home-made’ folk culture and mass-produced culture; and as both 
a pragmatic, social tool and an entertaining, pleasurable practice or product. It 
means keeping such binarisms in tension.
For example, the central position of celebrity gossip within the entertainment 
industry with a burgeoning market in celebrity magazines such as Heat, Hello! 
and OK, and the commodiﬁcation of conspiracy theory as a central trope within 
mainstream television and ﬁlm, both point towards the inadequacy of discussing 
popular knowledge as only a form of latter day home-made folk culture. Rather 
than characterizing the mass media as an industry that appropriates and 
exploits popular knowledge, the impossibility of locating the origin of a popular 
knowledge (where, for example, do urban legends come from?) means that it is 
always already separated from any author it might be thought to ‘belong’ to. The 
romantic characterization of an empowering, localized folk culture is therefore 
radically upset. Equally, however, the commodiﬁcation of popular knowledge and 
the effect of exporting it to new contexts should not be considered as a simple 
act of cultural imperialism or appropriation, but as a process of proliferation 
often secured by the self-replicating structure of popular knowledge itself. 
Gossips, for example, are never sated. The revelation of secrets (true or untrue) 
does not satisfy – the desire to reveal or receive simply gets deferred elsewhere, 
searching for new material in an endless exchange of signiﬁers parading as 
signiﬁeds.
In short, popular knowledge problematizes the terms by which popular 
culture has been discussed and the concept of politics such discussion often 
implicitly relies upon. The emphasis in much cultural studies to read popular 
culture as a site of ideological contestation or identity negotiation – makes a 
number of assumptions about the politics of popular culture, assumptions that 
I think are questioned by popular knowledge in various ways. Not least because 
popular knowledge prompts us to self-reﬂexively consider the conditions of 
our own knowledge-producing discourse of cultural studies and its anxieties 
(including, and this will be important for what follows, the anxiety caused by 
any apparent theory/praxis divide).
To explain what I mean by this, I want to turn to a certain ‘resistance’ in some 
quarters to thinking through the conditions and assumptions of one’s own 
discipline that Wendy Brown identiﬁes in her provocative chapter, ‘Moralism as 
Anti-politics’, from Politics Out of History (2001). Brown describes how both 
leftists and liberals have not been able to give up the ﬁgures of the sovereign 
subject and neutral state: ‘The consequences of living these attachments as 
ungrievable losses – ungrievable because they are not fully avowed as attach-
ments and hence are unable to be claimed as losses – is theoretical as well as 
political impotence and rage, which is often expressed as a reproachful political 
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moralism’ (Brown 2001: 21). One of the culprits often cited by left moralists, 
she claims, is among other things, post-structuralist theory – a theory that, I 
will go on to argue, allows us to ask the questions that popular knowledges 
prompt. Post-structuralist theory is lambasted for its ‘failure’ to tell the left what 
to value and what to ﬁght for (Brown 2001: 29). In fact, she claims, the identity 
of the moralist is ‘staked against intellectual questioning that might dismantle 
the foundations of its own premises’ (Brown 2001: 30). Thus, seemingly radical 
politics including multiculturalism ‘often transmogrify into their opposite, into 
brittle, defensive, and ﬁnally conservative institutions and practices’ (Brown 
2001: 30–1). Which should in no way be mistaken for reactionary, anti-political 
correctness. Her point is much more challenging.
To illustrate her argument, Brown recounts the hostility of her colleagues to a 
radical critique of institutionalized women’s studies. She found her colleagues to 
be entirely resistant to a self-reﬂexivity that fought against the now naturalized 
boundaries of their discipline and newly essentialized identities that they had 
previously fought against, like ‘woman’. Everything that had been such a mark 
of contestation for women’s studies in the ‘beginning’ has now solidiﬁed into 
its conservative opposite. This, for Brown, is because left academics, instead 
of facing the disorientation and loss experienced when trying to analyse the 
sources of social injustice, ‘posture as if we were still ﬁghting the big and good 
ﬁght in our clamor over words and names’ (Brown 2001: 36). In other words, the 
ﬁght is fought over the wrong issues: the ﬁght is kept alive, but the goal is long 
since obscured. Here, moralizing takes the place of mourning or critique.
A similar logic, I want to suggest, is at work in some strands of cultural studies. 
Whether we see it in identity and cultural politics as Brown does, or in the 
recurrent calls to the serious business of ‘real’ politics – through a (re)turn to 
various conﬁgurations of political economy approaches, or demands for urgent 
action. The political imperative prompted by post-September 11 domestic and 
foreign policy in the UK and US (including infringements of civil liberties, 
increasingly hostile attitudes towards immigration and the waging of legally 
unsanctioned war) means that self-reﬂexive theorizing is currently being given 
a short shrift by many factions within cultural studies and beyond. Bruno 
Latour asks in Critical Inquiry, ‘Is it really the task of the humanities to add 
deconstruction to destructions?’ (2004: 225). At the 2004 Crossroads in Cultural 
Studies Conference in Urbana-Champaign, one delegate literally shouted at the 
audience that theory was no longer applicable in this time of war. And while this 
is understandable and mostly forgivable (we all feel an urgency, a crisis even), 
a protection of left-wing ideals and ideas as if they were the same as those pre-
September 11, or pre-Bush, or pre-New Labour, results in unthinking moralism of 
the kind Brown describes.
In this moment, we become frustrated with questions of a meta-nature, we 
become anti-intellectual, anti-speculative and anti-theoretical. There is a strong 
temptation, in this climate, to dismiss speculation as procrastination. I want to 
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suggest that this taking of the ‘moral high ground’ is not the only position to 
adopt in response to the current conjuncture. It may not be the most productive, 
nor even, and I will explain what I mean by this in a moment, the most political.
If cultural studies is to be up to the job of understanding popular knowledges, 
it has to consider the consequences of moralism displacing theory. Some theory, 
what I will later come to think of as ‘radical speculation’, offers a more, not less, 
responsible position from which to ‘do’ cultural studies.
So why isn’t moralism as political as it might feel? Brown writes:
If the contemporary Left often clings to the formations and formulations 
of another epoch, one in which the notions of uniﬁed movements, social 
totalities, and class-based politics were viable categories of political and 
theoretical analysis, this means that it literally renders itself a conservative 
force in history – one that not only misreads the present but instils tradi-
tionalism in the very heart of its praxis, in the place where commitment to 
risk and upheaval belongs. (2000: 26)
Moralism is nostalgia: it performs a politics appropriate to a different age. This 
does not mean that left politics are defunct but it does mean that we need to be 
constantly vigilant about stagnation and obsolescence. It means that we cannot 
take our ‘politicalness’ for granted. It is not always clear in this context what 
‘being political’ means. If we say that a ‘political’ approach is supposed to ground 
one’s analysis in a materialist concern with history, we could question the 
‘political-ness’ of an approach that fails to closely examine the material, historical 
conditions of politics today. Politics, in this revised sense, is a commitment 
to re-examining the context, and if that context demands a reconﬁguration of 
‘the political’, then that is the most ‘political’ thing to do. Brown points out that 
traditionalism pre-empts any possibility of risk, and it is the risk of admitting our 
closeness to popular knowledge that I want to think through in this book. For it 
is risk – a speculative gesture that cannot guarantee a return and thus resists a 
neo-liberal discourse of utility – that might prove more ‘political’.
How has this turn towards political and cultural economy come about in 
cultural studies? In recent years, there has been a move nearer to questions of 
the economy as a way to better understand the political, and indeed cultural, 
moment. Whereas once the expressive texts of popular culture seemed to offer 
sites of contestation and struggle, today that cultural struggle is found in more 
explicitly political and economic spheres. And so, cultural studies practitioners 
like Lawrence Grossberg are no longer looking towards popular culture – 
towards rock music, television, Hollywood ﬁlm, dance culture and so on – for the 
agent of change because it ‘does not appear to be playing the same central role. 
It is not where change is being organized and experienced, and it is certainly 
not where resistance is being viably organized’ (Grossberg 2004). Culture itself 
is going through a major shift, it ‘is rearticulated and relocated, in which the 
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“center” of culture itself – its work as it were – has moved’. This cultural shift, 
he proposes, means that ‘people are experiencing politics and economics as 
the primary ﬁeld of change, and as the primary experience of change itself.’ 
While Grossberg is careful to point out that these two realms, the cultural and 
the politico-economic are not distinct entities (the latter is articulated to the 
former, he writes), he does think that cultural studies should turn its attention 
to political economy, albeit a political economy connected to culture in intricate 
ways.
This move away from the culture of the popular to that of politics and econ-
omics has been accompanied by a wider shift in cultural studies generally 
towards sociology and political economy and what Paul du Gay and others 
have called ‘cultural economy’ (see Amin and Thrift 2004; Du Gay and Pryke 
2002; Merck 2004; Hesmondhalgh 2002) as an attempt to relocate politics in 
the new modernity. This increasing socio-economic drive is characterized by a 
move away from ‘Theory’ in general and so-called ‘post-structuralist’ theories like 
deconstruction in particular in a mistaken belief that they are concerned with 
textuality as opposed to the lived material culture of politics. The speculative 
workings of theory are often seen as an indefensible luxury in the current 
conjuncture. The apparent attention to textuality misses the action.
If deconstruction needed ‘defending’, I would start by pointing out that it is 
in no way interested simply in ‘textuality’ as opposed to ‘material reality’, in the 
way detractors accuse. In fact, deconstruction allows for a more productive way 
of understanding this opposition, because it doesn’t take for granted or leave 
unquestioned oppositions like text versus materiality, ﬁction versus reality, culture 
versus economics, theory versus politics. That is to say, such ideas of doing ‘real 
practical politics’ are not outside theory; they are just poor theory because the 
theoretical dimension – the fact that ‘practical politics’ is always already in some 
sense made possible by theories of the political – is left unacknowledged and 
so un-addressed. Such a defence, however, might lead me into problems. I could 
myself be accused of opposing one set of ideas and approaches (deconstruction, 
post-structuralism, theory) to another (sociology, politics, ethnography) in a way 
I am accusing others of doing with regards to oppositions like textuality versus 
materiality. This would replicate the closure(s) and corners of moralism that I see 
some strands of cultural studies facing.
Thus, a turn simply to theory would not have the politically and disciplinary 
disruptive effect I think is needed here. To have some chance of success in this 
respect I want to explore the possibilities of athetic speculation, the chance of 
moving beyond the praxis versus theory divide without positing just another 
theory (which would fall down on the side of theory and fail to question the 
‘versus’), or equally without putting forth just another call for action. I want 
to look at popular knowledges in order to interrupt this process. For we can 
see popular knowledges at the heart of both important contemporary political 
events and the academy also.
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Through attention to popular knowledges, I hope to explore forms of ques-
tioning that are intellectually, institutionally and politically challenging. The point 
of such work is to keep the question of knowledge, and therefore of politics 
– of what it is, of what it can do, and all of its associated questions about power, 
authority, legitimacy, responsibility, and representation – open. This means that 
the question of what the politics of cultural studies is will also remain open, 
offering an alternative to the closure(s) and corners of moralism. For popular 
knowledges prompt self-reﬂexive questions about what legitimates cultural 
analysis or interpretation. They make it difﬁcult, I argue, for us to assume what 
the political is and to take for granted the solidity of our own position from 
which we might make judgements or analyses (in other words, the solidity of 
the position from which we produce knowledge).
I want to look at popular knowledges, rather than say concentrating on 
theory, then, because of the former’s explicitly uncertain, unstable status. Theory, 
while lambasted by some, would still perhaps ﬁt into the category of ‘legitimate’ 
discourse, and, as I have already pointed out, championing theory could lead 
us into as many closures as moralism.8 I need something far from moralism if 
I am going to disrupt, pause, question. And while in terms of content, popular 
knowledges can be moralism par excellence – gossip and conspiracy theory, 
after all, often contain expressions of moral outrage – in terms of form, as will 
become clear throughout this book, it disrupts the kind of political moralism 
Brown has described through an inherent undecidability.
It is with similar concerns to my own that Gary Hall writes:
It is noticeable that whereas so-called ‘legitimate’ discourses and forms 
of knowledge, those that either fall within or can at least be ascribed to 
recognized disciplines – literary studies, sociology, social policy, politics, 
economics, philosophy, history, communication and media studies, etc. – have 
been privileged and included in cultural studies’ interdisciplinary canon, 
those ‘less legitimate’ discourses and forms of knowledge – hypnosis, for 
example – that have not been encapsulated by the ‘established’ disciplines 
have tended to be excluded or ignored. (2002: 15)
I would place popular knowledges like conspiracy and gossip alongside Hall’s 
example of hypnosis as a form of knowledge that has been excluded from 
the cultural studies canon (not as objects, maybe, but certainly as forms of 
knowledge that already work ‘within’ cultural studies). Hall calls for us to open a 
space for thinking about ‘what Derrida at one point calls “less visible, less direct, 
more paradoxical, more perverse” discourses – discourses that cultural studies 
can begin to appreciate only if it is prepared to radically rethink its identity’ (Hall 
2002: 15, quoting Derrida 1992a: 198). He chooses new media technologies as 
one of these discourses, but my example of popular knowledges also works here 
and requires the radical rethink he has identiﬁed.
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Of course a question needs to be answered here. Why would I want to bring 
cultural studies and popular knowledges closer together at all? Well, for a start, 
although this may at ﬁrst glance appear a circuitous route to answer the question, 
it’s surprising how often the problems of cultural studies and cultural critique 
are articulated in relation to popular knowledges. For example, in his essay ‘Why 
has critique run out of steam?’ Bruno Latour airs his concerns regarding the state 
of critique through the terms of conspiracy theory:
what’s the real difference between conspiracists and a popularized, that is 
a teachable, version of social critique inspired for instance by a too-quick 
reading of, let’s say, a sociologist as eminent as Pierre Bourdieu . . . In both cases, 
you have to learn to become suspicious of everything people say because ‘of 
course we all know’ that they live in the thralls of a complete illusion [as 
to] their real motives. Then, after disbelief has struck and an explanation 
is requested for what is ‘really’ going on, in both cases again, it is the same 
appeal to powerful agents hidden in the dark acting always consistently, 
continuously, relentlessly. Of course, we, in the academy, like to use more 
elevated causes – society, discourse, knowledge-slash-power, ﬁelds of forces, 
empires, capitalism – while conspiracists like to portray a miserable bunch of 
greedy people with dark intents, but I ﬁnd something troublingly similar in the 
structure of the explanation . . . Of course conspiracy theories are an absurd 
deformation of our own arguments, but, like weapons smuggled through a 
fuzzy border to the wrong party, these are our weapons nonetheless. In spite 
of all the deformations, it is easy to recognize, still burnt in the steel, our trade 
mark: MADE IN CRITICALLAND. (2004: 229–30)
Here, conspiracy theory is positioned as a parodic repetition of cultural critique. 
In Latour’s scenario we experience it like the uncanny: it is both familiar and 
unfamiliar, it returns to us as simultaneously ours and not ours, it’s presence 
disturbs because it delivers, as Nick Royle puts it, ‘homeliness uprooted’ (2003: 1). 
But rather than use the analogy to discredit critique, we should use this uncanny 
encounter with our own ‘weapons’ to consider the ‘fuzzy border’ that separates 
them. Such fuzziness might suggest, not that those weapons are ﬂawed in some 
way; instead, the possibility that popularized, ‘teachable’ versions of critique can 
give rise to popular knowledges like conspiracy thinking merely puts their close 
relationship on display – a relationship that consequently clearly needs to be 
thought through. Latour worries that critique has gone too far; that, to put it in 
the language I will be using in relation to gossip and theory later, our speculations 
have produced a return that we did not anticipate. Now, it may well be that 
theory’s tools have been taken up by the right and used against us (Latour gives 
the example of US Republicans emphasizing the scientiﬁc instability of global 
warming to excuse their damaging environmental policies), but if we respond to 
this by reiterating the difference, by reinforcing the border between ‘legitimate’ 
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and ‘illegitimate’ critique, we will have lost what is potentially subversive, radical, 
or ‘political’ about this relationship.
NO BUSINESS LIKE KNOW BUSINESS
In this book, I turn to thinkers like Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard 
because they provide a rigorous means of analysing how discourses and forms of 
knowledge are marginalized by dominant forces in a way that exposes the self-
authorizing structure of all narratives and knowledges. Rather than accept and 
propagate rules and criteria for distinguishing between knowledge and gossip, 
or ‘real’ politics and theory, Derrida’s work looks towards a priori conditions 
that precede such locally derived and enforced distinctions. Rather than being 
judgmental itself, deconstruction seems to allow us to focus on, as Derrida writes, 
‘judging what permits judgment, of what judgment itself authorizes’ (2002: 231). 
This is why deconstruction will accompany me in a discussion of what it is 
about knowledge per se that makes popular knowledges possible. This, in turn, 
will enable me to think through the question of cultural analysis – of how we 
should approach culture.
Although I call upon post-structuralism more than existing work in cultural 
studies to help me read popular knowledges, this book is nevertheless also 
intended to encapsulate the spirit of cultural studies. I mean this not in the sense 
of sitting easily within a cultural studies oeuvre or recognized methodology but 
in the way Gary Hall describes it: that the most cultural studies thing to do is 
to question the decision of what both politics and cultural studies are (2002: 
6). I don’t want to be made to ‘do away’ with cultural studies just because my 
questions are slightly different from those that are usually posed; rather, I want to 
ﬁnd out what these questions mean for popular knowledges and cultural studies 
both. In its openness to cultural phenomena and willingness to challenge the 
dominance of particular knowledges, cultural studies is exactly the ‘place’ for 
the current study to live (even if my landlord might grumble a little about the 
mess and noise). Crucially, I want to ask not only what cultural studies can tell 
us about popular knowledges but what popular knowledges can tell us about 
cultural studies. I have therefore set out to show
 why popular knowledge is important to look at in the twenty-ﬁrst century;
 why cultural studies is well-placed to address this phenomena; and
 that what is known as ‘Theory’ has an important role to play in cultural 
studies’ analyses of not only popular knowledges, but all cultural practices, 
products and artefacts.
The self-reﬂexive element of my analysis raises some important issues for us. Self-
reﬂexivity might always appear as an appeal to ‘legitimacy’ – and risks replicating 
a strategy I will be challenging in the chapters that follow. However, by placing 
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ourselves in the ﬁeld of knowledge – thinking about the status of cultural studies, 
for example, as a form of knowledge – the hope, of course, is that we will have 
learned something from popular knowledges rather than just about popular 
knowledges.
Self-reﬂexivity, at least the kind that goes beyond situating oneself in the ﬁeld 
to think about the conditions of possibility of that ﬁeld, is a way of making one’s 
project more robust, more situated and more interesting, but not necessarily 
more legitimate. When I read work that employs self-reﬂexivity and considers 
the conditions of possibility of their own project, it might make it more appealing 
to me, and yes, it might mean that I take more note of it than a study that fails 
to address these questions. But what is more ‘legitimate’ for me (if we insist on 
using this term) is part of a strategy to expose and question the arrogation of 
power rather than perpetuate it.9
I therefore want to defend self-reﬂexivity as more than box-ticking on our 
way to producing a ‘legitimate’ project. I want to stress the very real dangers of 
not being self-reﬂexive, particularly when dealing with the subject of this book 
– knowledge.
What would it mean, for example, if I were to talk about popular knowledge 
without thinking about its relationship and implications for my own ﬁeld of 
knowledge – cultural studies and theory? It would mean, I think, underestimating 
not only the people who turn to popular knowledges, falling foul of accusations 
of false consciousness and the like, but also, as I will argue, the conditioning role 
that popular knowledges play in more legitimated knowledges. If I ignore the 
relationship between my own knowledge and the ones I am looking at here, I 
will not have understood either fully. So it is not a question of legitimating the 
project through self-reﬂexivity – not least because attention to the content of 
my argument will redeﬁne the role and possibility of legitimacy itself. There is no 
contradiction here. The self-reﬂexivity employed in this book (and I can’t vouch 
for all uses of self-reﬂexivity) can only seem like an appeal to legitimacy if the 
way in which that self-reﬂexivity forces us to rethink legitimacy has not been 
heeded.10
Besides, the criteria by which academic projects are deemed ‘legitimate’ or 
not are far from stable. Enough expressions of frustration with theoretical ‘navel 
gazing’ instead of ‘real’ political action have been aired for me to believe that self-
reﬂexivity could also be the opposite of a legitimating strategy for many within 
cultural studies and other disciplines. If legitimacy is that which is lawful, right 
or proper, self-reﬂexivity has an uncertain, highly context-speciﬁc relationship 
with those signiﬁers (as do theory and speculation, for that matter). It is this 
somewhat relative, or at least, locally produced status, that has led me to prefer 
the terms ‘legitimated’ and ‘legitimized’ at various junctures in this book, or else 
to use quotation marks to suggest the same effect: reminding us that institutions 
or discourses confer legitimacy, that legitimacy is reproduced and ratified 
culturally, and that it is in process, something that is never ﬁxed or ﬁnished, but 
which constantly has to be constructed and produced.
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Cultural studies, as an interdisciplinary discourse that often finds itself 
marginalized by more ‘legitimated’, ‘privileged’, or ‘traditional’ discourses, is 
well placed to raise the question of legitimacy. It can only do this, however, 
if it is prepared to put at risk any investment it has in the continuing notion 
of the legitimate. This means, not only risking any hard-won legitimacy or 
institutionalization within the academy, but also opening up the notion of politics 
that underlies the project to investigation. Above all, it means, recognizing its 
own use of legitimating strategies (the appeal to ‘real’ political action, say), and 
the complex relationship between modes of knowing. Such work may involve 
admitting that knowledge does not enable us to know very much at all. We may, 
that is, be so concerned with legitimating one project or another via the status 
of ‘knowledge’, that we fail to see what exclusions occur for that status to be 
attained. Defenders of knowledge might try to exclude non-knowledge, but 
cannot: I will show throughout this book that they have always already failed in 
the endeavour to maintain purity in this respect.
In the following chapters, responding to conspiracy theory and gossip in 
turn, I want to both acknowledge the singularity of the popular knowledge 
under study, and discuss each knowledge in relation to not only other popular 
knowledges and knowledge in general, but cultural studies in particular.11 In 
considering this relation to cultural studies, it will become apparent that I am 
using the terms ‘conspiracy theory’, ‘gossip’ and even ‘popular knowledge’ 
strategically. That is, they become avatars for the undecidability of knowledge, for 
the instability of knowledge, for the alterity that resides ‘within’ knowledge. They 
are ways of thinking through the excess that knowledge cannot contain but 
such strategic naming can never be sealed off from this process. We cannot, that 
is, fully know these popular knowledges: something will escape them, exceed 
their own logic and our cognitive apparatus. That is what keeps analysis and 
knowing open.
CHAPTER 2
Just Because You’re Paranoid, Doesn’t Mean 
They’re Not Out to Get You
I closed the last chapter by claiming that I intend to acknowledge the singularity 
of popular knowledges. In this chapter I want to look at conspiracy theory as a 
particularly interesting example of popular knowledge. To do this adequately, I 
will examine conspiracy theory in several stages. Initially, I want to look at the 
contemporary conspiracy scene and its recent history. I will then address the 
commodiﬁcation of a particular ‘pop cultural’ manifestation of conspiracy theory 
and the level of investment it invites. This contextualization will give way to two 
case studies of events that prompted many conspiracy theories – the death of 
Diana, Princess of Wales, and the events that took place on the 11 September 
2001 in New York and Washington (commonly referred to as simply ‘September 
11’). I want to consider the press’s response to the conspiracy theories ﬁrstly 
in order to ﬁnd out how the idea of the legitimate and illegitimate is played 
out in the public realm; secondly, to see how popular knowledges produce and 
negotiate the stories that nations tell about themselves; and thirdly, to detect 
a shift in the place of conspiracy theory in the post-September 11 cultural 
climate.
YOU CAN RUN, BUT YOU CAN’T HIDE:  
CONSPIRACY’S CONTEXTS
As popular knowledges go, conspiracy theory is certainly a resilient example. 
Fears of conspiratorial events have arisen with surprising regularity. Today, it is 
hard to picture a contemporary scene, particularly in American and ‘Americanized’ 
contexts, in which conspiracy theories (whether they prove true or false) do not 
feature. This is certainly true in post-September 11 America in which paranoia 
has become a political tool for George W. Bush and a mode of (at least symbolic 
resistance) for those who oppose him. Events on September 11 and since have 
provided more than enough grist to the conspiracy mill, ensuring the continued 
presence of conspiracy theories from every faction imaginable: from the Middle 
East concerning the ‘West’; from Bush concerning al-Qaeda, bin Laden, Saddam 
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Hussein and ‘terrorists’ in general; and from global citizens sceptical about the 
Bush government’s role in and reaction to September 11. Jodi Dean thinks that 
the ubiquitous nature of conspiracy theory is because its two central ideas 
– ‘that things are not what they seem and everything is connected’ – are also ‘the 
primary components of how we think about and experience the information 
age’ (2002: 48). Peter Knight echoes this, but thinks that the links are much 
wider: ‘Everything Is Connected could function as the operating principle not 
just for conspiracy theory, but also for epidemiology, ecology, risk theory, systems 
theory, complexity theory, theories of globalization, boosterism for the Internet, 
and even poststructuralist literary theories about intertextuality’ (2000: 205).
Though the high ‘pop cultural’ moments of conspiracy (exempliﬁed by 1970s 
ﬁlms such as Alan J. Pakula’s All the President’s Men (1976) and The Parallax 
View (1974)) and conspiracy theory (particularly television shows such as The 
X-Files (1993–2002) and ‘Dark Skies’ (1996–7) in the 1990s) might have waned 
(at least in terms of ﬁctional representations), it is clear that conspiracy theories 
are now part of our collective response to local and global events.1 The X-Files, 
and its imitators, may have stopped running – we may have stopped watching 
conspiracy being plotted every week – but conspiracy theory still has currency. 
In fact, it is more available as a knowledge having been through a period of 
intense exposure and a process of commodiﬁcation (about which I will say more 
below). Conspiracy theory’s ways of knowing, if Dean is right, are supported by 
our encounters with information ﬂows. This technological reinforcement of an 
alternative paradigm of knowing presents new challenges for how we think 
about knowledge, and how we think about our own investments in knowledge.
Because of the popularity of conspiracy theory, we more than likely already 
have a sense of what it is. Nevertheless, before I venture further, I want to pro-
vide a working deﬁnition. In its simplest terms, conspiracy theory refers to a 
narrative that has been constructed in an attempt to explain an event or series 
of events to be the result of a group of people working in secret to a nefarious 
end. Though we often associate the signiﬁer ‘conspiracy theory’ with apparently 
‘crazy’ Internet rants, it is important to keep in mind the truism, ‘Just because 
you’re paranoid, doesn’t mean they’re not after you.’ In other words, conspiracies 
do happen – sometimes the theories prove correct. This relationship between 
conspiracy theory and, say, investigative journalism – between conspiracy theory 
and theories of conspiracies – must be thought together, for any distinction I 
might set up at this point will later prove unsustainable. But in keeping with 
the wider concern with popular knowledges in general in this book, I also 
want to position conspiracy theory as a knowledge-producing discourse – 
characterized by a collection of statements and texts shaped within and by 
different (para)institutional contexts which promote a particular knowledge 
about the world.
Conspiratorial acts and theories about them have, as I’ve already said, often 
been a part (overtly or covertly) of many societies. So while I will limit myself 
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to a contemporaneous configuration of conspiracy theory I want to also 
acknowledge the arbitrary nature of this choice. I should also make it clear at the 
outset that it is impossible to provide a deﬁnitive account of conspiracy theory’s 
development.
Indeed, writing an account of conspiracy theory is fraught with problems. 
(These problems are worth meditating on because they point us towards what 
is unsettling and distinct about many popular knowledges, particularly when 
we try to chart them in the same way as more legitimated, established know-
ledges.) Ironically, conspiracy theory is itself a practice based upon the distrust 
of ofﬁcial histories even if it does not question the basic linear premise of 
historical narratives. A methodological problem arises from a parallel irony: that 
many of the ‘underground’ zines and publishers are sceptical of the usual outlets 
for distribution. For example, one conspiracy zine, Steamshovel Press, makes a 
virtue out of the fact that it is hard to obtain (its website reassures its prospective 
readers that it is ‘not available in bookstores where the conspiracy prevails’).2 
And the slogan for the website, Conspiracy Planet, reads ‘Your antidote to media 
cartel propaganda’.3 This resistant strand to mainstreaming makes any plotting 
of a conspiracy milieu a difﬁcult endeavour. But there are other problems with 
such an undertaking. First, any claim of an origin can be usurped by previous 
examples because the boundaries of where this history begins are never secure.4 
Second, the many inﬂuences that fed into what can contemporarily be thought 
of as conspiracy theory – such as cyberpunk, hacking, UFOlogy and the legacy 
of the counter-culture,5 as well as reactionary, survivalist Militia rhetoric – also 
problematize a genealogical endeavour because of the taxonomic challenges 
such disparate threads pose. While plotting a subcultural ‘history’ of conspiracy 
theory would be bound to leave important gaps, I will, however, aim to present a 
series of cultural markers that will help to identify the accumulative character of 
a subcultural concern, stance, or practice, and later, the emergence of a distinct 
but disparate commercial conspiracy industry. It is, of course, important to note 
that these two strands are not in any way exclusive realms, but are interrelated 
in complex ways.
ZINE AND NOT HEARD
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the production of zines6 – small-scale pub-
lications devoted to esoteric topics and counter-hegemonic sentiments – were 
facilitated by technological developments that made personal computers, laser 
printers, and desktop publishing software more readily available.7 While zines are 
a particular form of print media, we should note, as Mark Fenster does, that ‘the 
history of the distribution of conspiracy theory in America through broadsides, 
pamphlets, periodicals, [and] books . . . stretches back to the earliest years of the 
United States’ (1999: 183). Fenster posits the publications by the anticommunist, 
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McCarthyite John Birch Society and the left-wing publication, The Realist, run 
by Paul Krassner, as important inﬂuences on the conspiracy community. Kenn 
Thomas, editor of Steamshovel Press, one of the ﬁrst conspiracy theory zines, 
cites other, counter-cultural publications as the precursor to his own:
Steamshovel began in 1988 as a small book review newsletter. In 1992 it 
became a news-stand magazine. Previous to ‘88 I had been a consumer of 
conspiracy literature and sometime contributor/correspondent with pub-
lishers like Jim Keith, who did the old zine Dharma Combat, and Bob 
Banner’s old journal, Critique. I turned Steamshovel into a conspiracy 
magazine after Mae Brussell (mother of all conspiracy ‘theorists’) died and 
Banner joined a self-help cult and renamed his zine Sacred Fire and stopped 
doing conspiracy writing. It seemed important to keep the whole conspiracy 
research movement together.8
Al Hidell of Paranoia, established slightly later in 1993, describes his inﬂuences 
as being those of established conspiracy researchers John Judge9 and, like Kenn 
Thomas, Mae Brussell,10 as well as established conspiracy theory networks:
Our influences were researchers like John Judge, who in turn had been 
inﬂuenced by Mae Brussell, a short-lived conspiracy publication by Larry Flynt 
(of the porn magazine Hustler), an organization known as a-Albionic,11 and an 
organization known as Prevailing Winds.12 Also, we had our own conspiracy 
discussion group, the Providence Conspiracy League.13
In a similar vein, publisher Ron Bonds provides background information to 
account for the success of his specialist press, IllumiNet, explaining the move 
from bulletin board to publishing:
IllumiNet was originally a computer BBS system (computer bulletin board) 
started in approximately 1982. I wanted to provide an on-line source for 
Conspiracy information. It featured message bases on several subject areas: 
Conspiracy; Occultism; UFO’s (of course!); Paranormal phenom [sic] . . . etc. 
We were the ﬁrst to offer conspiracy discussions, ﬁles and information of 
this type online in the US and I believe in the world. We decided to begin 
publishing so that we could reach a wider audience. My relationship with 
Jim Keith14 and John Keel stimulated the process and we have experienced a 
decent amount of success since.15
Crucially, Bonds, writing at the turn of the millennium goes on to claim that 
‘conspiracy theory came into its own in the last six years or so’, positing 1993/94 
as a turning point in conspiracy theory’s appeal. He also claims that IllumiNet was 
‘perfectly positioned to take advantage of the new-found interest’. He appears to 
acknowledge the misleading or problematical nature of classiﬁcations based on 
 Just Because You’re Paranoid . . . 37
ideas of marginal interests – how specialist publishing, that is, can still be highly 
proﬁtable – when he writes, ‘we have always been a “small” publisher,’ adding, 
‘but that’s all relative today.’ Al Hidell provides his own view on why 1993 was 
ripe for the publication of Paranoia. He claims that not only did the energized 
zine and publishing scene provide a cultural and economic context, but that 
1993 was the 30th anniversary of the assassination of Kennedy, renewing interest 
in this area. He also cites the Waco siege as coinciding with Paranoia’s ﬁrst issue, 
generating conspiracy theories in the public sphere.
Conspiracy theory is still disseminated through ‘alternative’ media: small-scale 
zines are produced and distributed via traditional postal networks and news-stand 
outlets but this cottage industry production also includes the creation of websites 
and maintenance of discussion boards on the Internet (see Duncombe (1997: 
197) on the emergence of electronic zines or Fenster (1999: 185–8) discussing 
conspiracy newsgroups in relation to a conspiracy community). This enables 
even ideas expressed through small-scale production (with low overheads) to 
be widely disseminated, albeit in limited circles (access to a computer being an 
obvious prerequisite in the example of the Internet conspiracy sites). Indeed, 
conspiracy theory commentator Jonathan Vankin suggests that, ‘one effect of the 
Internet boom has been the dismantling of the conspiracy-theory star system . . . 
Now everyone with a modem’s an information conduit’ (1996: xvii). As well as 
providing the means for investigators in the style of Mae Brussell and John Judge, 
the Internet has increased knowledge of and aided subscription to magazines 
such as Paranoia, Steamshovel Press, The Skeptical Inquirer and the Australian 
Nexus and made books from specialist presses such as IllumiNet, Feral House and 
Prometheus Books more widely available. But it would be a mistake to consider 
this ‘alternatively’ mediated conspiracy theory as entirely in opposition to its 
mainstream counterpart. Many fanzines of Fox’s The X-Files, for example, have 
been produced beyond the control of the Network. A phenomenally successful 
and proliﬁc strand of this includes ‘slash’ ﬁction – fan erotica – which ﬂourishes 
on the Internet. Additionally, commercial products often generate an Internet 
interest in conspiracy theory. Moreover, the mainstreaming of conspiracy 
theory has undoubtedly increased interest in small publications, talk radio and 
independent bookshops.
CONSPIRACY A GO-GO
In his commentary on the commercialization of conspiracy theory, Al Hidell 
considers Richard Linklater’s Slacker (1991),16 Oliver Stone’s JFK, and The X-
Files as major factors in bringing conspiracy theory to the attention of the wider 
public. This mainstream guise inspired other forays into conspiracy TV and ﬁlm 
later in the 1990s such as the short-lived television series Dark Skies and Roswell 
High (1999–2002), the ﬁlm Roswell (Kagan 1994), and the bigger budget Men in 
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Black (Sonnenfeld 1997) and Enemy of the State (Scott 1998).17 At the same 
time when cultural products like The X-Files were widening knowledge of a 
conspiracy theory discourse, numerous business ventures capitalized on this 
interest, making a loosely identiﬁable conspiracy industry more prominent. 
Displaying a timely marketing move, a mainstream summer of 1997 Hollywood 
blockbuster, starring Mel Gibson and Julia Roberts, appropriated the very 
signiﬁer – Conspiracy Theory (Donner 1997) – for its title, in an attempt to 
attract audiences through generic appeal. Mainstream book distributors such as 
the Internet traders Amazon.com have acknowledged conspiracy theory and the 
paranormal as a distinct and proﬁtable category.18
Conspiracy theory also provides a televisual theme, which has become man-
ifested in a wide spectrum of guises. Countless documentaries detail individual 
conspiracy theories as wide-ranging as those concerning September 11, Princess 
Diana’s death, various aviation disasters, Bible codes (indeed, all kinds of codes, 
particularly since the success of Dan Brown’s bestseller, The Da Vinci Code 
(2003)), and the moon landings. Magazine format conspiracy shows have been 
attempted, two of the most prominent in the UK being Fortean Times (C4) 
and Disinfo Nation (C4). As well as spawning imitators, The X-Files itself has 
generated its own wide array of merchandise, including clothes, watches, videos, 
DVDs, games, CD-ROM, books, calendars, mugs, mouse-pads and lunch boxes.19 
Conspiracy theory is, as I have already suggested, a proﬁtable ﬁlmic genre. Men 
in Black (1997) for example, grossed US$84 million at the box ofﬁce in ﬁve 
days, making it the biggest non-sequel opening to that date. Conspiracy theory 
also provides less conspicuous revenue in the form of tourist attractions such as 
Dealey Plaza’s Sixth Floor Museum or Roswell’s International UFO Museum and 
Research Center. Additionally, it is the rallying banner behind conferences such 
as the annual November in Dallas Conference held by JFK Lancer, and events like 
the UFO convention held in Roswell to commemorate the ﬁftieth anniversary of 
the alleged crash of a UFO there in 1947, which have substantially increased 
local revenue.20
Though the high pop-cultural moment of conspiracy theory may have 
passed, it has ensured conspiracy theory a stable presence on the cultural scene. 
And so a plethora of conspiracy books continue to be published, television 
production companies continue to make documentaries, and the conspiracy 
theory presence on the Internet seems undiminished. It is debatable whether 
a ﬁlm like Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004) can be considered on the 
spectrum of conspiracy theory (and this is something I will return to in my 
case study of September 11) but it certainly shares features common to other 
conspiracy theory products. What is certain is that traces of conspiracy theory’s 
previous, and sometimes contradictory, cultural identities and roles continue 
to inform its current, multifaceted form. That is, its identity as highly political 
paranoia, as counter-cultural practice, as cool, hacker/slacker aesthetic and as 
highly commercial, mainstream product, continue to shape conspiracy theory’s 
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cultural role, though it is difﬁcult to reduce it to any one of these. It is, then, a 
highly versatile and resilient knowledge.
BUYING (INTO) CONSPIRACY
The commodiﬁcation of conspiracy theory has established a common, popular 
vocabulary. The ‘fringe’ ideas (‘fringe’ because of low circulation before Internet 
and television interest) expressed in zines and small publisher’s titles that have 
formed the core of UFOlogy folklore (Roswell, Area 51, The Majestic Twelve), 
JFK conspiracy theories (the grassy knoll, the magic bullet), and Militia anti-
New World Order rhetoric, are now common currency for a wider audience. 
More signiﬁcantly, texts that have helped popularize conspiracy theory can 
be considered as cultural texts which circulated and still circulate not only 
the individual hypotheses presented through their narratives, but a particular 
knowledge-producing discourse that determines those hypotheses.
Arjun Appadurai convincingly argues that commodities should be thought 
of not in the purely Marxist sense but as ‘things with a particular type of 
social potential, that . . . are distinguishable from “products”, “objects”, “goods”, 
“artefacts,” and other sorts of things – but only in certain respects and from a 
certain point of view’ (1986: 6). This risks positing commodiﬁcation not only as 
a factor in the process of fetishization, but as itself fetishized – divorced from its 
conditions of production to emphasize exchange – but it usefully focuses on the 
‘commodity potential of all things’ and extends the focus from just production 
to the commodity’s ‘total trajectory from production, through exchange/
distribution, to consumption’ (Appadurai 1986: 13). Appadurai’s emphasis 
on the ‘commodity situation in the social life of any “thing”’ (1986: 13) being 
deﬁned by the dominance of its exchangeability is helpful in our discussion of 
conspiracy theory that, as a knowledge, has only been dominated and deﬁned by 
the exchange value of its textual manifestations relatively recently. Additionally, 
Appadurai’s conﬁguration of a commodity as ‘not one kind of thing rather than 
another, but one phase in the life of some things’ (1986: 17) can help us to think 
through the disparate group of texts and communities that can be identiﬁed 
with conspiracy theory.21 Yet understanding that commodiﬁcation is just one 
stage in the social life of things should not render us indifferent to the speciﬁcity 
of this stage, or what is at stake in the increased commodiﬁcation of conspiracy 
theory – the aestheticization of accusation and the production of an ironic-
sceptical stance.
A commodiﬁed conspiracy theory is one that invites knowledge without 
belief or commitment. When conspiracy theory is commodified, I want to 
suggest, we are invited to consider it as a knowledge that can be bought (into) 
when others seem insufﬁcient. In an interview about his work, Don DeLillo 
comments:
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I think I tried to get at the slickness connected to the word paranoia. It was 
becoming a kind of commodity. It used to mean one thing and after a while 
it began to mean everything. It became something you bought into, like Club 
Med. (DeLillo in conversation with Begley 1993: 287)
DeLillo succinctly captures the generalization of paranoia and its escalating 
play as a signiﬁer. As I have pointed out above, conspiracy theory, connected 
to but not synonymous with paranoia, has undergone a similar process of 
commodiﬁcation since the early 1990s. The way in which the ﬁlm Conspiracy 
Theory enlists the signiﬁer, for instance, assumes that audiences can be attracted 
through generic appeal. ‘Conspiracy theory’ thus starts to signify a marketable 
category rather than a subterranean activity. In The X-Files, Agent Mulder has a 
poster in his ofﬁce that resonates ironically in light of the depleted investment 
consumers of conspiracy display; it reads ‘I want to believe’, in reference to the 
existence of extra-terrestrials. The way in which desire to believe displaces belief 
as the object of the sentence indicates the ever-receding or deferred position of 
belief if we are to think of it as an unobtainable desired object (or stance from 
which a subject might speak). The audience, in fact, is being asked to suspend 
its disbelief, rather than to believe. Our investment in the narrative is always 
negatively deﬁned. Like Mulder’s scientiﬁcally grounded partner, Agent Scully, 
the audience does not have to wholly relinquish its dominant discourse in order 
to align itself with Mulder. Mark Fenster reads such a situation as allowing an 
aestheticized relationship between conspiracy theorists and theory to dominate 
the scene (1999: xxi). All of which suggests that we can employ a kind of 
knowledge as just another fashion accessory, for the sub- or popular-cultural 
capital it might bestow upon us.
Taking ‘belief’ out of the equation means that conspiracy theory can be 
marketed to, and parodically adopted by, those concerned with a generalized, 
rather than speciﬁc, conspiracy or injustice. On a potentially positive note, 
conspiracy theory can come to signal a healthy scepticism towards ofﬁcial 
accounts and encourage active readers without requiring an investment in each 
conspiracy narrative. Because of the way in which power is organized, this ironic 
stance suggests, these stories might as well be true, or it might serve us well to act 
as if they are. This logic recalls a remark by one of Don DeLillo’s characters in his 
conspiracy saturated novel, Underworld: ‘Believe everything. Everything is true’ 
(1997: 801); or another’s: ‘[a conspiracy theory is] easy to believe. We’d be stupid 
not to believe it. Knowing what we know’ (1997: 289). According to this rationale, 
the redundancy of belief has not led to its eradication, but generalization. If we 
believe everything it will be because certain covert acts of aggression that have 
subsequently come to light (like those conducted under America’s infamous 
Counterintelligence Program) will have meant that the possibility of conspiracy 
has been irrevocably posited. Douglas Kellner echoes this position when he 
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writes: ‘distrust in the face of science, technology, government, and conventional 
attitudes forces an individual to penetrate beneath the lies and illusions, to seek 
the truth’ (1999: 170). He thinks that this quest might take the form of a search 
for new modes of representation and enquiry. A pragmatic cynicism towards 
ofﬁcial narratives might result from a commercially mediated conspiracy theory, 
and this could prompt a deeper questioning of epistemological apparatuses, but 
such optimism is usually quelled in the face of assumptions about conspiracy 
theory’s lack of political resonance.22
There is a risk that the aestheticization of conspiracy theory only serves to 
depoliticize any challenging or radical potential it might have had (we could, 
however, think this is a good thing in relation to right wing Militia groups). 
A commodiﬁed version of conspiracy theory must be seen to highlight the 
way in which conspiracy theory provides us with no line of action, or renders 
impotent its disruptive potential. Such criticisms have been lodged against 
conspiracy theory by many cultural commentators. For example, Mark Fenster 
recognizes that ‘conspiracy as play may at its best represent a productive and 
challenging cultural and political practice’, but feels that it is more often ‘a 
cynical abandonment of profound political realities that merely reafﬁrms the 
dominant political order’ and ‘substitutes fears of all-powerful conspiratorial 
groups for political activism and hope’ (1999: 219). However, what I will go on to 
suggest in the next chapter is that the way in which conspiracy theory exceeds 
or complicates a (whether positive or negative) narrowly deﬁned political invest-
ment is far more informative. For conspiracy theory appears (to varying degrees 
in different contexts) both politically engaged and deeply ineffectual in the 
realm of democratic politics. Knight (2001) helpfully relates this apparently 
contradictory status to the way in which conspiracy theory is employed in both 
an ironic and earnest fashion. In this way, conspiracy theory is characterized by a 
continual oscillation between the ﬁgural and the literal. For example, because the 
effects of institutionalized racism, make it look as if there has been a conspiracy, 
exactly how these theories are being invoked by African American communities 
becomes undecidable. Do such conspiracy theories refer to an actual conspiracy 
or merely something like conspiracy?
As I go on to look at my two case studies, I want to keep the ambivalences 
identiﬁed above in mind – the ambivalent status of both conspiracist belief, and 
conspiracy theory’s claims. For I think ambivalence accounts for the anxiety 
which attends conspiracy theories in the public realm and an attitude that 
sees conspiracist ideas as a rational reaction to the current political climate. 
Ultimately, however, as I will go on to consider in the next chapter, the inability 
of the ‘ofﬁcial’ accounts of each event to contain interpretation and prevent a 
turn to popular knowledge, will challenge any optimistic or pessimistic reading 
of these conspiracy theories.
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TWO EVENTS, COUNTLESS THEORIES
The ﬁrst case-study I want to consider might at ﬁrst seem outdated. And yet, 
in the year I started writing this book (2004), new developments in the case 
concerning the death of her ex-Royal Highness, Diana Princess of Wales in Paris, 
1997, were still coming to light, further fuelling the conspiracy mill. In fact, the 
British inquest was only opened in January 2004 some seven years after the 
car crash in which Diana and her lover, Dodi al-Fayed, were killed; and it was 
only in 2003 that Diana’s butler, Paul Burrell, made public a letter she had sent 
to him in which Diana made the startling claim that someone was planning a 
car ‘accident’ in order to ‘make the path clear for Charles to marry’ (see Kerr 
2003). In addition, the belief of some wrongdoing seems to have increased, not 
lessened, in the years since her death. For example, a front-page headline in the 
UK’s Daily Express in 2005 claimed: ‘94% of You Believe Diana Was Murdered’ 
(Palmer 2005: 1). It is true to say, however, that as the conspiracy theory event 
du jour, it has been surpassed by my second case study – the theories that 
accompanied September 11. Yet, it is the persistence of Diana conspiracy theories 
and the ongoing distrust of any ofﬁcial line on her death that should testify to 
conspiracy theory’s enduring status as an important cultural phenomenon. Just 
when you thought it was safe to retreat back into the world of contingency and 
happenstance, another Diana conspiracy theory documentary airs, raising more 
questions.
My two case studies share some similarities. Both events that prompted the 
theories were accompanied by national mourning; both were seen to be of 
enough national signiﬁcance to interrupt normal television scheduling (and 
given that the television industry in both the US and Britain is big business, this 
is no small matter); both required heads of state to make public announcements; 
both created physical, and virtual, sites of public mourning (the physical sites 
being, of course, Ground Zero for New York, the Point de L’alma in Paris and 
Kensington Palace Gardens for Diana); both events became part of the way a 
nation understood itself; both were opportunities (whether they were taken 
up or not) for national self-reﬂexivity; both happened in an Internet-literate age; 
both continue to be a source of much speculation. The differences, however, 
are perhaps even more signiﬁcant. The human death toll for September 11 is 
incomparable to the events in Paris. The different geographical location of the 
events is, of course, notable (although the clear distinction between an American 
and European event is far from clear-cut given the multitude of nationalities that 
perished in the World Trade Center, and that the effects of mourning were felt 
far beyond the geographical location in both cases). The ramiﬁcations for global 
stability and loss of human lives in military reprisals is only relevant to the case 
of September 11. Both the similarities and differences make these events and 
the conspiracist responses to them important. They enable us to see conspiracy 
theory as an identiﬁable knowledge, but force us to take on board the singularity 
of each response.
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The Paparazzi/British Intelligence/Knights of the Templar/the Yakuza/inter-
national arms cartels/the CIA/the Trilateral Commission/aliens (delete as 
applicable) killed Diana, Princess of Wales. All of these factions have been cited 
as responsible on a website, blog, or discussion board ‘near’ you (which, provid-
ing you have access to the Internet, means all of them). Not all posters, bloggers 
and writers put forth theories as such. Soon after the crash, many simply pointed 
out the contradictions in media reportage: ‘a CNN eyewitness report that a blonde 
woman stumbled out of the car . . . differs widely from the report depicting [an] 
unconscious blonde at the scene of the incident.’24 Others concentrated on the 
possible motives behind a planned killing: ‘How convenient it would be if Diana 
was out of the way. Her millions would go back to the royal family . . . Her sons 
would be the sole custody of Prince Charles where he could mould them into 
the unfeeling world of a royal’;25 ‘I understand that the English Secret Services 
and Buckingham Palace could not have this . . . the mother of the future king a 
Moslem!!! No way . . . so they killed them both.’26 A number of theorists simply 
point towards the appearance of a cover-up: ‘Don’t you think that the surviving 
man’s injuries are a little too convenient? His jaw and tongue were apparently 
ripped off and mangled so he will never be able to speak.’27 Indeed, suspicious 
circumstances and incongruities form the basis of many conspiracist sentiments:
The driver was drunk three times [over] the limit and the bodyguard, Trevor 
Reese-Jones, who was sitting in the front seat did not warn the Princess . . . 
Mopeds or motorbikes are favoured vehicles for assassination as they are 
very manoeuvrable. A car cannot outrun or evade a motorbike . . . It has been 
rumoured that Diana’s seat belt was left undone even though Reese-Jones 
would have told her to do it up in the event of a high speed chase . . . Some 
sources (unknown) report high radio activity from British Authorities around 
that time. What was the nature of this radio activity, detonation via electronic 
means?28
Latterly, attention has focused on the incongruities between what the con-
spiracy theorists believe and what the ofﬁcial French Inquiry has come up with: 
that it was an accident caused by a drunken driver. And, of course, that letter, 
already cited, from Diana to her butler in which she predicted the circumstances 
of her own death, remains a sticking point for many conspiracy theorists 
unwilling to accept such a strange revelation as an uncanny co-incidence.
Ian Jack and Peter Marlow note that Diana’s death prompted the national 
memory to be awoken, that memory being ‘the story that the nation tells about 
itself’ (1997: 10). If conspiracy theories are to be acknowledged as part of the 
discourse that surrounded the death of Diana, that story needs to be renegotiated 
to include a questioning and reinterpretation of the way in which a nation tells, 
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and is told, the story of itself (such discussion of national storytelling will be 
important for the September 11 conspiracy theories too). The numerous con-
spiracy theories that are still being exchanged display an attempt to become 
involved in the continued construction of this story. However, the treatment 
of conspiracy theories by some accepted ‘rational’ discourses of enquiry 
highlights a preference at work for only certain knowledges and their strategies 
of legitimation, prompting the question: what causes the selective acceptance 
of the ‘acceptable’? The way in which the ofﬁcial media reported the Internet 
Diana conspiracy theories highlights a concern over who is interpreting and 
how. Several attempts to limit interpretation, and regulate the knowledge that 
produces it, have been made – Tony Blair’s plea to end speculation on Diana’s 
death (see Wintour 1998: 1) or Reverend Ian Cundy’s release of Diana’s burial 
certiﬁcate to quash rumours of a more private burial site (see Harding 1998: 4) 
come to mind. Such appeals to decorum and decency are obviously intended 
to endorse a tasteful and respectful response to a very public death. But the 
conspiracy theories that proliferated and which persist to this day show how this 
prescriptive approach to mourning and tragedy – and to ofﬁcial stories – does 
not answer to or reﬂect the experience of people and the kind of knowledges 
they employ when making sense of events.
My aim therefore is to examine a narrative construct that allows readers 
to rewrite or re-cognize events, and perhaps more importantly, to reconﬁgure 
context (by bringing apparently peripheral narrative threads to bear on the 
death of Diana and the attacks on the World Trade Center) and the boundaries 
of contextualization (when the knowledge employed to interpret and cognize a 
story becomes an integral part of that story).
alt.conspiracy.princess-diana
The death of Princess Diana only becomes suspicious if an excess that the ofﬁcial 
story or history cannot explain is acknowledged. To many, her death was simply 
the outcome of a fatal car accident and the climax of a ‘tragic’ life, but others, 
many of whom found an audience on the Internet, were not satisﬁed with this 
account. When Diana died, unlike at the time of JFK’s assassination, the apparatus 
for the widespread production, exchange and circulation of ‘unofﬁcial’ theories 
was already in place. Indeed, the lone dissenting voice of say, Jim Garrison (the 
New Orleans district attorney who attempted to expose a conspiracy concerning 
the assassination of JFK) can today only be a romantic model for the regular 
contributor to one of the many conspiracy newsgroups on the Internet (of 
course, since Garrison, JFK conspiracy theories and theorists have proliferated 
beyond count, but it was not an immediately mediated phenomenon).29 The 
First Diana Conspiracy Site was set up in Australia within hours of the event 
and many were to follow.30 Sun Tzu’s Newswire service claimed on their 
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Internet site that ninety-three new or updated documents were found by the 
Alta Vista search engine early the day after Diana’s death (1 September 1997) 
and was distributing a story under the headline ‘Diana conspiracy talk spreading 
fast’ (Rongstad and St John-Smith 1997). A subsection of the newsgroup alt.
conspiracy was devoted entirely to Diana conspiracy theories – alt.conspiracy.
princess-diana – by February of 1998 it was reported that 7,673 websites 
concerning Diana conspiracies could be found on the Internet (Ellis 1998: 15–
16), and by 2001 that number was estimated to be at 36,000 (Parsons 2001). The 
Diana theories (along with the responses to September 11, as I shall later show) 
reveal contemporary conspiracy theory to be an instantaneous response reliant 
upon an already established knowledge network.
The conspiracy theories posted on the Internet range from Francophobic 
sentiments to papal conspiracies against the British royal family spanning 
hundreds of years. The way in which these theories become predictable is 
particularly notable. Although set up as ‘alternative’ theories, they soon become 
the accepted and expected product of conspiracy theory’s own brand of logic. 
Consider the following excerpt from an Internet website:
Princess Diana’s new found independent ﬁnancial power through her rich 
boyfriend became a political hazard. Diana was becoming more and more 
political in her visits to promote peace efforts in Bosnia, etc. This became a 
threat to The New World Order objective of a destabilized Soviet Union and a 
threat to the lucrative arms exporting business; England is the world’s largest 
exporter of mines. The Royal Family had motive, resources, and opportunity 
and is a key member of the New World Order organization; anything affecting 
the Royal Family is seldom an accident but rather meticulously planned and 
orchestrated. Operations such as this one are most likely carried out by an 
Intelligence Organization, with the prime suspect being British Intelligence. 
(New World Network)
Once ‘The New World Order’ (a supposedly secret organization fronted by the 
UN, seeking to take control of all nations) is invoked, and the royal family 
connected to it, threats to a preordained political status quo can become a 
motive for murder. Once you believe in an alien government, The New World 
Order, or any secret cabal having ultimate power over world events, there is 
nothing beyond their realm of inﬂuence. All events can be connected to which-
ever organization is your chosen conspirator. The advantage of believing in 
The New World Order is that it is not one of many conspiratorial groups, but 
the conspiratorial force: the umbrella under which many factions operate. The 
citation characterizes the royal family as a near omnipotent force through its 
connections to The New World Order. The conspiracy theorist assumes that an 
organization that plans and orchestrates does not let accidents happen to it. 
Random events (accidents, love interests) are translated into components of 
46 Knowledge Goes Pop
far-reaching schemes. The website continues by insisting that ‘the odds of all 
of these things happening is beyond random chance.’ It is not necessarily the 
narrative details of these theories that are signiﬁcant to the enquiry at hand, 
but how they display a particular method of analysing events and arriving at 
knowledge; how contingency is dismissed in favour of conspiracy.
Other Diana conspiracy theories centre on the recurring trope of ‘un-
answered questions’ contradictions in reportage of the event, and a motive for 
murder. In this way, the conspiracy theories attempt to question the ofﬁcial 
narratives presented by the mainstream press and television coverage. One 
conspiracist commented: ‘I was awake until 5:30 am (in the UK) and there 
wasn’t a word about [Diana’s death] on the BBC (even though the news reader 
became visibly upset at around 5:15 am).’31 A writer for the online version 
of Conspiracy Nation claims that journalists have anonymously revealed to 
him proof that Diana was assassinated by British Intelligence. He foregrounds 
the information by mistakenly claiming that the UK’s Ofﬁcial Secrets Act is 
a mechanism that prevents the media from discussing any possible foul play 
in the Diana case. Moreover, he adds, ‘any discussion is forbidden about 
how the Ofﬁcial Secrets Act exactly works’ (Skolnick 1997). Suspicion of the 
mainstream British press and its perceived failure to reveal the truth legitimates 
the presence of Internet conspiracy theories for subscribers (to the Internet 
and theories both). New World Network states that ‘corporate funding and 
Government regulations have successfully insured that the media reports only 
superﬁcial stories meant to entertain and not analyse or expose the truth’ (New 
World Network). These sentiments are only conﬁrmed when dietrologia – an 
Italian term that Don DeLillo employs to denote ‘the science of what is behind 
something’ (1997: 280) – is employed: when ‘news’ is divided into surface and 
depth, or in front and behind, the media not reporting the latter type of news 
is read to be part of the conspiracy. The notion of a cover-up, here associated 
with the press, can always be suspected under the logic of conspiracy, which 
demands conclusions that the mainstream press is not generally interested in 
providing. For a conspiracy theorist, the ‘cover-up’ acts as an homogenizing 
agent to present the image of a corrupted ‘them’ and romanticized and radical 
‘us’, as well as a lived socio-political reality. In this type of oppositional scheme, 
events are inevitably attributed to ‘them’ rather than put down to chance or 
coincidence.
The Internet is particularly suited to the presentation and endorsement of 
this romanticized image of the radical theorist for several reasons. First, although 
initially a military and academic mechanism, the Internet has also been fashioned 
by early bulletin boards. These bulletin boards are part of hacker mythology: 
used by maverick computer users to disseminate information about phreaking 
(telephone fraud) and hacking (database exploration). As such, the Internet 
has increasingly become characterized (and I am making no claims for what 
actually is the case) as a relatively unregulated and non-corporate sphere for 
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the exchange of ‘underground’ ideas.32 Second, the immediacy of the Internet 
as a medium aids the fast circulation and response to ideas. In newsgroups 
(online discussion forums), users are invited to post their own theories and 
others can reply to them. The idea of a collective enemy can therefore be rapidly 
endorsed and mythologized. Third, while a particular newsgroup may un-
ofﬁcially establish its own standards of discussion and initiate self-regulation 
in the form of derision,33 participants can post entries which have few, if any, 
veriﬁable sources. This provides the perfect forum for hyperbolic and rousing 
accusations against a conspiring other.
DIANA: WHOSE STORY?
With the death of Diana, a public outpouring of grief sat alongside widespread 
distrust of the ofﬁcial account and frustration with the main narratives. The 
story of a modern and poignant tragedy; an ethical and political discussion 
centring on privacy laws and the conduct of the paparazzi; a debate concerning 
royal etiquette and the future of the monarchy: these were all ofﬁcial narratives 
which couldn’t seem to ﬁll the gap left by ‘unanswered questions’. In this section, 
I want to consider the gulf that emerged between the very different stories 
about and responses to Diana’s death.
Compared to the activity online, there were relatively few articles charting 
the interest in Diana conspiracy theories in the mainstream press. This absence 
did not go unnoticed by the Internet conspiracy theorists themselves. The 
mainstream press’s understandable inability to allow for the possibility of a 
different type of reportage left a gap for the hypotheses generated by other 
knowledges. One contributor expressed dismay at what s/he perceived to be 
the total absence of alternative stories: ‘I ﬁnd it unusual that the mere mention 
of the possibility of foul play is totally non-existent in media coverage.’34 This 
absence did not, as I have already noted, quell conspiracy theories but prompted 
more. The existence of a whole area of speculation not monopolized by the 
broadsheet press, or even the more speculative tabloids, opened the way for a 
popular knowledge to take hold.
One contributor questioned the status of ‘stories’, acknowledging that when 
an ofﬁcial body endorses a claim, the question of credibility can be suspended:
‘The driver was drunk’ story was released by French police, after blood 
samples. The ‘anti-depressant’ story was credited to supposed ‘sources’. No 
ofﬁcial status, but it is reported with the same amount of credibility as a real 
NEWS STORY. The whole thing might have been made up by someone on 
this BOARD. But there have been heaps of great stories on this board, and not 
ONE has been reported. [Capitals are the author’s own.]35
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I want to note the surprising faith placed in a ‘real news story’, and the claim 
that conspiracy theories are ‘just’ good stories. However, once these apparently 
conservative reactions are sifted through, what is striking is the questioning of 
why some speculations were reported and some were not, when at that point all 
hypotheses regarding the crash were equally unsubstantiated. The contributor’s 
remarks imply that all stories or possibilities should be reported if one is.
Conspiracy theories were, then, conspicuous by their absence. The absence 
may have been more notable to a conspiracy theorist scouring the press for 
reports but a lack of speculation must also have been evident to a wider public. 
When conspiracy theories did begin to materialize in the broadsheet press 
they were framed in signiﬁcantly different ways from other speculations (such 
as the uncorroborated claims made regarding the role of the paparazzi in the 
crash). Indeed, when a newspaper shares the ideological concerns of what it is 
reporting, ‘the reported discourse is not generally demarcated from the report 
itself, and there is generally a focus upon the ideational meaning (the “content”) 
of the reported discourse and a neglect of its interpersonal meanings and its 
context’ (Fairclough 1995: 25). If, however, the discourse being reported is at 
odds with the logic upon which the reporting mechanism is based, the report 
must create a distance between the primary and secondary discourse. Two 
journalistic approaches to conspiracy theory that do create this distance include 
a focus on the spread of conspiracy theories (an infection which apparently 
hasn’t affected the journalist him/herself), and a humorous engagement with 
conspiracy theory.
To give an example of the former, the extension of conspiracy theory 
beyond the Internet into less virtual (and stigmatized) spaces, such as dinner 
tables and pubs, became the focus of an article in the Independent on Sunday 
by Chris Blackhurst. To begin with, Blackhurst situates the death of Diana 
within a conspiracy discourse: ‘The [Fiat] Uno is Diana’s grassy knoll (the site 
of Kennedy’s alleged second assassin)’ (1997: 1). The direct reference to the 
Kennedy assassination and the proliferating theories about it acknowledges 
not only that the Diana theories are produced within a discursive history of 
conspiracy theory, but also hints at the way in which ofﬁcial stories (such as 
the one expressed in The Warren Report) offer little chance of closure. (I will 
consider this non-depletable opening that produces hypotheses in detail at 
the end of this chapter and throughout the next.) Blackhurst continues by 
making explicit this simple but crucial breach into which a conspiracy theory 
can take up residence: ‘We think Diana was killed through drunken driving. We 
think Henri Paul was so tanked up when he drove her away from the Ritz hotel 
that he wanted to show the paparazzi what for, with terrible results. We think. 
I think. But we do not know. I do not know’ (1997: 1). The collective ‘we’ and 
individual ‘I’ cannot ‘know’ while ‘unanswered questions’ continue to plague 
the investigation. But there will always be ‘unanswered questions’ because 
new questions can always be asked when old ones are answered. Even when 
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a question is answered, a conspiracy theorist does not have to accept that it is 
the ‘right’ answer (for conspiracy theorists, questions are rarely answered by the 
ofﬁcial story – only by themselves). A discourse is precisely that which enables 
us to think we know: a mechanism that allows knowledges to be produced and 
answers to be arrived at. If I choose to read an event through the discourse of 
conspiracy theory, this will determine my agenda: I will ﬁnd a sinister rather than 
structural reason for unanswered questions.
Blackhurst’s Independent on Sunday article initially contrasts the Internet 
conspiracy theories, written by ‘students in anoraks – desperate like the fund-
amentalist Muslims, to pin something on the Satans of the Western security 
services,’ to the conjectures made by ‘people who read serious newspapers and 
watch serious television programmes’ (1997: 1). He lists a range of ‘acceptable’ 
professions – ‘a public relations advisor, an academic, a City banker’ (Blackhurst 
1997: 2) – as a way into discussing the ‘democratization’ of conspiracy theory 
after Diana. He wants to know why the anoraked students and fundamentalists 
have been joined by the white-collar workers in questioning the ‘ofﬁcial’ version, 
even though they belong to ‘ofﬁcial’ professions and are aligned with ‘rational’ 
belief systems. The initial oppositional gesture situating Muslims and Internet 
‘geeks’ on the one side and ‘serious’ people on the other, demonstrates the ways 
in which conspiracy theory is given pejorative connotations. Similarly, the ﬁrst 
references by the BBC to an alternative reading of events were in reference 
to Colonel Gaddaﬁ’s claims of an assassination. As Ian Hamilton in the London 
Review of Books points out, the presentation of this viewpoint through Gaddaﬁ, 
who holds a ‘crackpot’ status in the Western media, instantly positions conspiracy 
theories against the mainstream (1998: 16).
Hamilton rightly, in my opinion, observes this type of condemnation to be 
racist in its implications. Even Tony Blair had to address this connotation after 
denouncing the Diana death industry and conspiracy theorists. Downing Street 
issued a statement denying that ‘its criticisms of conspiracy theorists are a 
coded attack on Mr Fayed’ (Wintour 1998: 1), who was reported in the Mirror 
to have claimed he was 99.9 per cent sure that the deaths were not an accident. 
In a UK Channel 4 documentary, You’re Fayed (2005), Mohammed al-Fayed 
was not shy to express his views on the royal family, calling Prince Phillip a 
‘gangster’ responsible for the ‘murder’ of his son, Dodi, and Diana. On a visit to 
Egypt soon after the Paris deaths, Hamilton was exposed to a wholly different 
way of approaching the news. He reports that, in Egypt, conspiracy theories 
concerning the deaths of Dodi and Diana are mainstream ideas (voiced by the 
press and state ofﬁcials) and that proponents of such ideas in public are greeted 
with respect. While British shops placed tributes to Diana in their windows 
– a photograph, a commemorative mug, ﬂowers – a travel agency in Alexandria 
displayed a doctored wedding photograph of Diana and Dodi and a sign asking 
‘Who Killed Diana?’ Hamilton comments that ‘far from being thought of as 
spooky or sensational, the [display] merely summarized a general, and wholly 
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settled, conviction in the Middle East: that accident was no accident’ (1998: 16). 
The ‘acceptable’, ‘accepted’, ‘tasteful’ and ‘tactful’ are revealed to Hamilton as 
arbitrary and culturally speciﬁc.
While the broadsheet press appeared comfortable devoting large amounts 
of column inches to Diana in the week of her death, it seemed uneasy with the 
same amount of space being devoted to the possibility of a conspiracy that was 
entertained on the Internet. If this situation is read through the terms set out by 
Stuart Hall in his seminal essay ‘Encoding/ Decoding’, the press’s concerns reveal 
a tension over a reader’s failure to pick up, or deliberately overlook, intended 
meanings: ‘what they really mean to say’, Hall writes, ‘is that viewers are not 
operating within the “dominant” or “preferred” code’ ([1980] 1993: 100). The 
press, in the case of Diana, initially appeared to have little time for readers who 
interpreted the events that led to her death in an oppositional way. Humour 
was used as a framing device for pointing out the differences between the way 
in which the Internet and the print press have responded to Diana’s death. 
And while humour is very much a part of conspiracy theory’s discourse, it is 
one point on an oscillation between the playful and serious. Articles in the 
mainstream press that took a humorous approach did nothing to acknowledge 
this ambivalence.
An article in the London Evening Standard Magazine, for example, intro-
duced a lengthy list of conspiracy theories as follows:
For the nerdish, nervous and plain nutty around the world, Diana’s death 
has been the JFK assassination to the power of inﬁnity. In Kennedy’s case, of 
course, the rumour milling and conspiracy hatching were done underground. 
But today, lucky us, we have the Internet, and the conspiracy machinations all 
take place in public. (Ellis 1998: 15)
The article – a double spread – is laid out as a mock-up of a website, com-
plete with tool bar and Internet address: http:www.es.magazine/page.16-
17~issue.6.2.98. The conspiracy theories are literally framed by a specific 
context. Coupled with the use of words such as ‘nerds’, ‘nervous’ and ‘nutty’ to 
indicate the type of people who endorse these ideas, this framing invites readers 
to distance themselves from conspiracy theorists. Clear boundary maintenance 
operating between primary and secondary discourses can be detected here. 
This encourages readers to consider their speculations as unconnected to those 
found on the Internet. Setting is clearly all important: this, as Norman Fairclough 
tells us, ‘is concerned with the extent to which and ways in which reader/
listener interpretation of secondary discourse is controlled by placing it in 
particular textual context’ (1995: 60). The Evening Standard article provides 
just one example of how conspiracy theorists’ speculations were framed as 
entertainment and presented at a distance from the event of Diana’s death. The 
light-hearted presentation of these theories allowed unsubstantiated stories to 
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be relayed without the risk of libel. It gave ‘reputable’ newspapers the chance 
to continue writing about Diana when all the ‘news’, as such, had been told. This 
type of complicity has been noted by News of the World editor, Patsy Chapman:
There is a veritable growth industry of so-called quality newspapers re-
gurgitating sensational stories by reporting what the tabloids did with them. 
‘In-depth recycling’ I call it. (Quoted in Snoddy 1992: 187)
If a story has been subjected to a certain standard of critique, the broadsheet 
press will repeat it; if it has not, they will often attempt to subject it to one. This 
is, of course, an important difference. However, it displays the double standard 
that Chapman emphasizes: it is acceptable for the broadsheets to remove a 
story from one context and place it into another, but they criticize genres such 
as conspiracy theory and the tabloids for initially decontextualizing facts and 
stories.
Almost one year after the crash, John Litchﬁeld, writing in the Independent, 
observed that ‘No road accident has been the subject of so much speculation, 
distortion and outright invention.’ He asks why ‘so many of the facts of the 
case [are] still disputed or confused by the world’s press’, adding ‘let alone 
the dottier theorists on the Internet’ (Litchﬁeld 1998: 9). Litchﬁeld goes on 
to acknowledge the complicity of the press in the process of speculation – 
admitting that speculation may spring from the same structural combination of 
factors – but distances the conclusions they come to from those of the ‘dottier 
theorists on the Internet’. He blames the combination of the French judicial 
system – ‘exhaustive but secretive, and yet riddled with selective leaks – and 
the impatient Anglo Saxon press, used to ofﬁcial co-operation and more reliable 
channels of information’ (Litchﬁeld 1998: 9). Litchﬁeld considers speed to be 
of paramount importance to the British press. Lack of information, or secrecy, 
encourages speculation in this equation. While Internet conspiracy theorists 
self-reﬂexively discuss this state of secrecy using the trope of the cover-up and 
by pointing out contradictions in reportage, the broadsheet press showed no 
interest in such reﬂections unless they were presented through editorial pieces 
such as Litchﬁeld’s.
Litchﬁeld does acknowledge a lack of closure but only so that he can position 
conspiracy: he writes, ‘What is less likely [than a conspiracy] is that the full truth 
of what happened in the approach to the Tunnel de l’Alma will ever be known’ 
(1998: 9). Litchﬁeld cites the dominance of speculation surrounding the case 
as the reason for closure being ‘less likely’ than conspiracy. For Litchﬁeld, then, 
one possible conclusion – that there was a conspiracy – left open by the lack of 
closure inherent in the investigation is compared to the structure of that closure. 
That is to say, Litchﬁeld tries to delegitimize one conclusion in comparison with 
others by invoking the very structure that ensures its possibility.
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Mark Lawson attributes the belief in conspiracy theories to the ‘collapse in 
editorial authority’ (1998: 21). He elaborates:
Increased commercial competition has brought pressure for rapid printing 
or transmission and the resultant spreading of information – half-fact, no fact, 
innuendo, gossip – which has nothing to commend it as journalism other 
than the fact that no other news outlet has got it. (Lawson 1998: 21)
Again, speed is considered to be all-important. If speed and a resultant exclusivity 
are privileged over veriﬁcation, Lawson fears a decline in journalistic standards. 
As a result, he considers the gap between the broadsheet press and the tabloids 
to be closing. Evidence of this is to be seen, according to Lawson (1998: 21), in 
the serialization of sensationalist books by both the Daily Mirror and The Times, 
showing an afﬁnity with the ‘low-fact culture’ of which conspiracy theories are 
a product. Lawson sees this as the ‘most tawdry form of mourning’ in an attempt 
to keep Diana alive. While the paparazzi are ‘unable to disguise her absence’, 
editors and writers can, Lawson remarks wryly, ‘just fake it’ (1998: 21). Again, it 
is uncertain how Lawson’s commentary distances itself from this situation 
when it clearly enters into a debate concerning the way in which Diana is 
represented.
Lawson wants his observation – that the gap between the broadsheet and 
tabloid newspapers is reducing – to support his call for a restoration of reporting 
‘standards’. However, it inadvertently shows that gossip and speculation are a 
part of all press and that a call to ‘standards’ may be exposed as nostalgia, failing 
to reﬂect the public interest in iterative reports (which can repeat statements 
from another context while acknowledging the difference inherent in that 
endeavour) rather than repetitive news. The serialization in The Times is not an 
aberration in an otherwise ‘respectable’ press, but the continuation of a trend, 
the possibility of which has perhaps always resided within a notion of journalism 
as a storytelling occupation. It would, in this way, be hard to trace exactly when 
reportage becomes speculation and how we are to judge the reportage of 
speculation itself. The practice of reporting statements made in certain contexts 
is not deemed to be good journalism under Lawson’s logic. Whereas the 
conditions of an enunciation are the focus when reporting conspiracy theories 
by al Fayed or from the Internet, it is the content that is of importance when an 
‘ofﬁcial’ statement is released.
READINGS: IN EXCESS
I want to return to Blackhurst marvelling at the inﬁltration of conspiracy theory 
into ‘serious’ circles. It is a gesture repeated elsewhere, such as in Frank Furedi’s 
Independent commentary in which he writes: ‘There was a time when only 
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eccentrics were interested in conspiracy theories. However, in recent times 
conspiracy has gone mainstream’ (2004). There is here a concern over ‘reality’. 
It is expected of those who are derided by our mainstream press (Blackhurst’s 
anoraked Internet users and the Muslim fundamentalists) to haggle over ‘reality’ 
in the form of conspiracy theory, but it is less acceptable for those involved in 
the production and maintenance of ‘reality’ (the PR advisor, the City banker, the 
academic) to do so. Indeed, to ‘keep a grip on reality’ is to subscribe to a certain 
performance or production of ‘reality’. Blackhurst is concerned (following the 
logic of violence and media debates) that due to a constant diet of ﬁlms and 
novels that depict the secret services as capable of anything, ‘when something 
happens in real life, we turn to a plot from ﬁction. Occasionally, ﬁction becomes 
reality’ (Blackhurst 1997: 2). Blackhurst’s acknowledgement of how the 
oppositions he sets up – ﬁction/reality, conspiracy theories/serious conjecture 
– become obscured, points towards the crux of the Diana theories.
Diana conspiracy theories have arisen because the official story cannot 
achieve closure: it is necessarily subject to breaches in the narrative that can only 
be bridged temporarily. The paradigmatic ‘ofﬁcial report’ – The Warren Report 
– contains ﬁfteen volumes of testimony and eleven of exhibits all detailing 
‘evidence’ pertaining to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. DeLillo points to 
the Joycean quality of The Warren Report: he describes it as ‘a masterwork 
of trivia ranging from Jack Ruby’s mother’s dental records to photographs of 
knotted string’ (quoted in DeCurtis 1991: 54). ‘Evidence’ in the form of testimony 
and exhibits prompts, rather than prevents, more conjecture. Each narrative 
detail is the springboard for further speculation. Ambitions to be comprehensive 
seem to lead a report further from its goal of closure. The attempt to ﬁnalize 
an account, to forge an ending (the lone gunman theory in the case of JFK, 
for example) is a move that can prompt suspicion and endless questioning. 
The French report on the Paris deaths of Diana and Dodi did little to alleviate 
suspicions. And while the new British Inquest promises to investigate every 
thread, it will be interesting to note which conspiracy theories are investigated 
and which are not (those accusing the late Queen Mother of being an alien will 
presumably not ﬁnd their way into the ﬁnal report).
The Diana conspiracy theories are excessive in that they highlight the excess 
produced by any reading that claims full knowledge or attempts closure. In 
this way, conspiracy theory challenges context: returning upon the discourse 
or ‘official story’ that attempts to exclude it, forcing it to widen its scope. 
Newspapers eventually acknowledged this contextual challenge. They began 
to report Internet conspiracy theories and have continued to do so. Thus, 
the mainstream press report the Internet Diana theories while the Internet 
comments on the press coverage. In this way, media reportage becomes part 
of the Diana story. Knowledge and interpretation become narrative elements, 
guaranteeing that the nation’s story – ‘the story that the nation tells about itself’ 
– will never be subject to closure.
54 Knowledge Goes Pop
It would not be sound to suggest that conspiracy theory itself is a discourse 
free from reliance upon certain exclusions. Conspiracy theories may challenge 
one totalizing narrative, only to propose another. Indeed, I wouldn’t want to 
overstate the subversive potential of Diana conspiracy theories or any others, 
only to recognize the challenges they present to an implicit regulation of 
knowledge and interpretation. The Diana theories display a re-negotiation of 
interpretative prerogatives. Despite resistance, interpretation of Diana’s death 
is shown by conspiracy theories to exceed issues of authority as the nation’s 
conjectures become part of the official history. If the nation’s story is an 
economy of the ‘langue of the law and the parole of the people’ (Bhabba 1990: 
2), the Diana theories, as counter-narratives, to some extent, will eventually affect 
the general structure and meanings of that story. Though clearly not in reference 
to conspiracy theories, the potentially progressive implications of this process 
of challenge and change are succinctly worded by Homi K. Bhabba: ‘Counter-
narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries 
– both actual and conceptual – disturb those ideological manoeuvres through 
which “imagined communities” are given essentialist identities’ (1990: 300).
The Diana theories certainly ‘evoke and erase’ totalizing boundaries: they 
evoke and attack ‘Britain’ as if it were a coherent notion and yet erase this totality 
by suggesting that it is always already inﬁltrated by subversive elements. Britain’s 
boundaries are at once invoked and complicated by this model. The possible 
‘disturbance’ produced by counter-narratives is a subtle seismic movement: the 
shift remains unperceived until the landscape has been recognizably transformed. 
Conspiracy theories are, then, not just an instance of Fredric Jameson’s ‘cognitive 
mapping’ – ‘an unconscious, collective effort at trying to ﬁgure out where we 
are and what landscapes and forces confront us in [the] late twentieth century’ 
(1992: 3) – but, also, an active element in the alteration of that landscape they are 
said to map. Writing and interpreting in this case are not exclusive activities. The 
Diana theories cannot be thought of as one concrete alternative to the ofﬁcial 
story, or to one articulation of the nation’s story, because what is ofﬁcial and what 
constitutes the nation is always already being redeﬁned and recontextualized by 
them and other narratives.
One newsgroup posting states: ‘I suspect that the Diana assassination is big, 
but it’s a cover for something even bigger.’36 The deferral of closure implied by 
this statement – the idea that even the revelation of a conspiracy is suspected 
to be part of a wider conspiracy – demonstrates the necessary possibility of a 
conspiracist reading, even when the subject is conspiracy. I will go on, in the 
next chapter, to show how theories that claim Diana was abducted by aliens 
and substituted by a replica; that the car’s passengers were killed in advance 
and later planted in an already crushed Mercedes by arms dealers angered by 
Diana’s anti-landmine campaign; or that Henri Paul was brainwashed by British 
Agents on behalf of the monarchy and force-fed sacs of pure alcohol that slowly 
disintegrated, are necessary possibilities. This is not to say that they are possibly 
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‘true’. These theories are necessary possibilities of interpretation in the same 
way that Derrida ([1972c] 1993) deems a letter going astray – the chance that it 
might not arrive – to be a necessary possibility and structuring element of what 
is thought of as an ‘arrival’. Geoffrey Bennington describes this economy: ‘what 
makes possible immediately makes impossible the purity of the phenomenon 
made possible’ (1993: 277). After looking at September 11, this economy will 
lead me to suggest that academic discourses perhaps revile conspiracy theories 
because these conjectures make explicit an implicit structuring element of 
traditional interpretation and cognition. Conspiracy theories put on display a 
possibility of reading, or rather, a perceived ‘impurity’ of reading. This can place 
into question the production of statements and procedures of interpretation 
associated with ‘accepted’ knowledge. We may well choose not to take on board 
the individual hypotheses of what ‘really’ happened at the Pont de l’Alma, but 
cannot afford to ignore the contemporary epistemology that produces them.
‘WHAT AN ABSOLUTE CROCK OF HORSE PUCKY!’  
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
The anxiety that Diana conspiracy theories were met with in the public sphere 
is also evident in the reception of September 11 conspiracy theories. However, 
I want to argue in this section that they were produced by, and within, a 
signiﬁcantly different climate to that within which the Diana theories were 
produced. This different climate has affected the reception of conspiracy as an 
explanation.
September 11 has understandably been posited as an epochal event by many 
commentators (although Derrida (2003), in an essay I will turn to at the close 
of this chapter, has challenged such assumptions). It has initiated heightened 
feelings of insecurity in America; articulated a split between the Middle East and 
the ‘West’ along cultural and religious lines, and shaped US and British foreign 
policy, as well as that of other nation states (whether in support or deﬁance 
of the US-British stance). The scale of both the event and the political-military 
ramiﬁcations mean that it is difﬁcult not to see it as a deﬁning moment. Given 
that it was the ﬁrst attack on home territory for America since Pearl Harbour 
in 1941 (or the War of 1812 if Hawaii doesn’t quite count as ‘home territory’), 
one apparently concocted through Arabic conspiratorial networks, one might 
reasonably think that it would quell rather than prompt domestic conspiracy 
theories (conspiracy theories that cite the US government as the conspirators). 
But even a cursory look at the Internet conspiracy theory sites and message 
boards concerning September 11 reveals an ongoing (if not heightened) distrust 
of government agencies undiminished by September 11 in conspiracy theory 
‘circles’ despite a reported rise in trust in government immediately afterwards 
(see Morin and Dean 2001). Indeed, some conspiracy theorists refer to the ofﬁcial 
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explanation of September 11 as the ‘conspiracy theory’ itself, in an attempt to 
appropriate the pejorative connotations of the phrase (see Dowbenko 2003).
That is not to say that September 11 hasn’t affected the register and concerns 
of conspiracy theorists. Of note, rather, is the persistence of conspiracy rhetoric in 
the face of potentially paradigm-shifting events. In this way, September 11, rather 
than instigating great domestic change, becomes part of an already established 
logic: people ﬁnd familiar ways of knowing to understand and discuss it perhaps 
because not in spite of its potentially disruptive nature. (One could think about 
this not only in terms of the employment of conspiracy theory, but the rhetoric 
of patriotism or sentiment that also took hold in the days and months following 
September 11.) September 11, then, must be thought about as much in terms of 
continuity as disruption.
The proliferation of conspiracy theories after September 11 becomes less 
surprising in these terms. They range, as with the Diana theories, from playful 
ideas to inﬂammatory sentiments. Some do not attempt to substantiate their 
theories, while others elaborately source and contextualize their claims. Despite 
these differences in approach and commitment, many of the conspiracy theories 
suggest some level of US government complicity in the events of September 
11, ranging from forewarnings of a terrorist attack, to outright orchestration of 
it to justify any number of actions (war against Afghanistan and Iraq; control of 
the oil market; the implementation of the Patriot Act and its infringement on 
civil liberties). The energy for such theories can be found in the absence, more 
than the presence, of evidence or answers: the lack of a published photograph 
of Flight 77 after having crashed into the Pentagon arouses suspicion; the late 
mobilization of scrambler planes raises eyebrows; the President’s lack of reaction 
to the news that America was under attack during a low-key visit to a school 
suggests to some that this news was ‘no news’ to him. Alternatively, conspiracy 
theories abound that consider the available evidence ‘too present’, or to put 
it another way, implausibly convenient: like ﬁnding the passport of suspected 
hijacker Mohammed Atta (reported as Satam Al-Suqami by some reports) at the 
bottom of the World Trade Center37 or the discovery of Arabic ﬂight manuals and 
a copy of the Qur’an in Atta’s hire car.
The focus of one conspiracist ﬁlm distributed free of charge over the Internet 
– Darren Williams’ 9/11: Pentagon Strike (www.pentagonstrike.co.uk) – is 
precisely the lack of answers and dearth of public evidence surrounding the 
Pentagon strike in Washington, DC. The ﬁlm suggests that rather than Flight 77, it 
was a small military plane or missile that struck the Pentagon. The implications 
of this alternative version of events are far reaching. Was the ﬂight intercepted 
by scrambler planes? Was there a Flight 77 at all? An article by Carol Morello in 
the Washington Post picked up on the astonishingly fast circulation of Williams’ 
ﬁlm: ‘Now urban legends have become cyberlegends, and suspicions speed their 
way globally not over months and weeks but within days and hours on the Web’ 
(2004: B01). When Williams’ site crashed from the number of visitors attempting 
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to view the ﬁlm, others who had downloaded it provided access. ‘Demand for the 
video was so great’, Morello reports, ‘that some webmasters solicited donations 
to pay for the extra bandwidth.’
Having reported the popularity of these ideas, Morello goes on to present the 
problems conspiracy theories posed for the bipartisan 9/11 Commission. She 
quotes the commission’s executive director, Philip Zelikow:
When we wrote the report, we were . . . careful not to answer all the theories. 
It’s like playing Whack a Mole. You’re never going to whack them all . . . What 
we tried to do instead was to afﬁrmatively tell what was true and tell it adding 
a lot of critical details that we knew would help dispel concerns.
Morello follows her interview with Zelikow by one with a political scientist, and 
then an ‘expert’ on cults, in order to explain the social function of conspiracy 
theories. Morello also gives space to some of the conspiracy theorists themselves. 
And although the article gives the last word to Zelikow dismissing conspiracy 
on the grounds that the government simply isn’t organized enough, its tone is 
surprisingly neutral, particularly in comparison to some of the reports I have 
already looked at with regards to Diana. Without the framing and distancing 
devices noted in most of the mainstream press responses to the Diana conspiracy 
theories, it was left to the Washington Post’s own Internet discussion board to 
restate the critical distance and express distaste and disgust for the conspiracy 
theories reported in the paper.
Interestingly, the online community associated with Williams’ ﬁlm (www.
Cassiopaea.org and their website Signs of the Times) reproduced the Washington 
Post’s discussion forum and the disparaging comments about the conspiracy 
community’s beliefs. The Signs of the Times editorial responded thus:
By reaching a large audience, the Post story will give those people who have 
doubts about the ‘ofﬁcial version’ of 9/11, an opportunity to examine many of 
the unknown or suppressed facts surrounding the ‘alleged’ terrorist attacks at 
the Pentagon and the WTC.
 On the other hand, it will also galvanize those who have a vested interest in 
keeping these facts hidden from public view, to begin a deliberate campaign 
of ridicule, name-calling and debunking in order to marginalize our efforts as 
‘conspiracy’ or ‘fringe’.
 A good example of this comes from the Washington Post discussion forum, 
that in less than 24 hours after printing the story, has already collected over 
130 posts.
 Seems we have touched a nerve.
 Here are some samples of comments posted . . .
– The Internet just gives every NUT a larger voice. Ordinarily you would 
never hear from these nutjobs. There will always be fruitcakes that think 
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the government did this to itself. These folks should start their day with 
0.5 mg of Haldol.
– The Post isn’t under any obligation to investigate every fruitcake’s 
conspiracy theory.
– Even goof balls with a computer and time on their hands can act like they 
are contributing something.
– The conspiracy theory story and pentagon 9/11 theory is pure trash.
– What an absolute crock of horse pucky!
– Hey, the Post runs an article and all the nuts coming running. I think they 
might have given a furlough at the asylum today. 
– Shame on you (and the other conspiracy theorists) for making a mockery 
out of their loss.
– You truly are a dolt. Don’t you have to be back at the institution???
– I want GWB out of the White House badly, but I’m not about to result to 
tomfoolery to do so, and I advise you to consider the same. This is just 
foolishness.
– Virtually everything you think or believe could be garbage. You must be 
very very insecure.
– Back in pre-history before the Dawn of the Internet, these Ten Percenters 
were scattered and dispersed. Forced to wear tall pointy caps, objects 
of village ridicule, wandering the streets muttering to themselves in self-
deluded mania, we all knew them for what they were – KOOKS! [. . .] 
Moreover, cleverly constructed Internet sites give the air of legitimacy to 
the unadulterated conspiracy lunacy disseminated by these Ten Percenters.
– Well duh! It’s obvious the plane was sucked up by the Bermuda Triangle, 
where the passengers were kidnapped by aliens. This was all organized by 
the Israelis. (Sign of the Times Editorial 2004)
The Washington Post readers’ Internet postings quoted here – whether through 
allusion to psychological normalcy, appeals to reason, the use of denigrating and 
disparaging remarks, or the employment of humour – resemble the discursive 
formations employed by the press in relation to the Diana theories. While the 
response of Signs of the Times to the aggressive postings is too simplistic 
(the editorial claims that these posters are unwilling to face the truth and are 
threatened by the potential disruption to their understanding of the world) it 
nevertheless picks up on an anxiety the postings express regarding the symbolic 
order of acceptable acts of cognition and their close relationship with codes 
of ‘taste’. Despite these attempts by Washington Post readers to maintain the 
boundaries between knowledge and popular knowledge, it is important to 
recognize a shift in attitude towards conspiracy to be found in (at least some) 
sectors of the press.
An article by Jonathan Raban in the Guardian goes further than the neut-
rality of the Washington Post article. Raban actually calls for the reasonableness 
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of, if not the conspiracy theories outlined above, then certainly a widespread 
paranoia concerning the conduct of the government in response to the secrecy 
of the Bush administration and its peddling of ‘generalised, promiscuous anxiety 
through the American populace’ (2004: 7). Raban writes, ‘Conspiracy theorising 
is fast becoming a legitimate means of reporting on a government so secretive . . .’ 
(2004: 6). He fashions secrecy as responsible for conspiracy theory: a mode 
he sees on the rise in American journalism, citing an article in the New York 
Times, which, while distancing itself from a theory by labelling it ‘far-fetched’, 
nevertheless ‘went on to expend 40 serious column inches to the far-fetched 
story’ (Raban 2004: 7). Conspiracy theories are being reported this time around 
because the political climate characterized by secrecy and security alerts makes 
conspiracy seems more ‘reasonable’ and less ‘fringe’. Conspiracy theory becomes 
popular across the board rather than just populist. In an article sceptical of the 
evidence produced by the US government after September 11, Anne Karpf, again 
in the Guardian, echoes the thoughts and doubts expressed on websites such 
as Signs of the Times outlined above. Karpf writes:
You could detect in [the convenient discoveries of evidence concerning al-
Qaeda] the clear hand of American propaganda. This isn’t, of course, to claim 
a dirty tricks department somewhere in the heart of Washington. That would 
have you immediately accused of peddling conspiracy theories, though I’m 
coming to think that conspiracy theories have had a bad press. What are they, 
after all, but ‘joined-up government’ by another name? (2000)
The concern at being branded a conspiracy theorist lingers, but the links be-
tween different practices, between the methodology of conspiracy theory and 
other, more ‘legitimate’ strategies, is recognized.
Michael Moore’s ﬁlm Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004) entered this scene, drawing on 
the mood of distrust and exacerbating it. The documentary ﬁnds links between 
the Bush family and the Saudi royals including the bin Ladens, and concentrates 
on positioning George W. Bush as the villain. As with the Diana conspiracy 
theories, a decisive negotiation of national and global identity can be seen in 
evidence in Fahrenheit 9/11. In a move that oddly reﬂects a trend found in 
right-wing American Militia rhetoric, Moore tries to reclaim the meaning of 
American patriotism for the left. Rather than it being unpatriotic to question 
the government, for example, Moore’s documentary posits such challenges as 
precisely the most American thing to do (in line with an ideal of free speech and 
revolutionary beginnings). If Bush et al. position themselves as patriotic, those 
in opposition have to ﬁnd new spaces and inventive ways of being ‘patriotic’. 
Moore carefully avoids condemning the troops that have found themselves 
in Iraq; rather, he exposes army recruitment procedures that heavily target 
the economically underprivileged and undereducated, and more generally, an 
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exploitative military industrial complex. In making these links, Moore presents 
an entertaining and persuasive (if factually problematic) conspiracy theory.
I do not mean to imply that conspiracy theory has suddenly become ‘accept-
able’ (Moore’s ﬁlm was met with anything but consensus regarding its merits, for 
example). A review by Mark Lawson of a television programme on UK’s Channel 
4 detailing a number of September 11 conspiracy theories again expresses the 
pervasive concern that conspiracy theories are in poor taste (in fact, Lawson is 
often wheeled out to air this view): ‘The alternative hypotheses for September 
11. . .have more in common with Holocaust denial: you gasp that people can be 
so dismissive of body-counts and substantial documentation’ (Lawson 2004). 
Additionally, ‘conspiracy theory’ still seems to function as a term of denigration 
for many prominent ﬁgures. For example, a report in the Guardian tells us that 
‘Tony Blair today derided as “conspiracy theories” accusations that a war on Iraq 
would be in pursuit of oil, as he faced down growing discontent in parliament at 
a meeting of Labour backbenchers and at [Prime Minister’s Questions]’ (Tempest 
2003). Nevertheless, the notable shift in the discursive positioning within certain 
sectors of the media is an indicator, I think, of how the status of knowledge 
changes according to political climate and other factors. There are climates of 
‘crisis’ that make an otherwise ‘irrational’ mode of cognition more ‘rational’. 
The popular-cultural moment of conspiracy may have passed, but its socio-
political formations are still with us, perhaps increasingly so. What we see here 
is a dialectical movement whereby conspiracy theory shifts more to the centre 
while other kinds of cognition (such as telepathy, say, or ‘new’ ways of knowing 
that haven’t yet been identiﬁed) remain ﬁrmly on the margins or even out of 
sight. The structure doesn’t change in this scenario, only the players.
THE WORST IS YET TO COME
How might we think outside this dialectical movement? Well, I want to reach 
this point via an essay on September 11 by Derrida in which he reformulates 
the temporal conﬁguration of trauma in a way that holds back any promise of 
synthesis. Such ideas might go some way towards accounting for the abundance 
of conspiracy theories in response to September 11 and the attendant tolerance 
of these theories in some cultural sectors, while not relying on the dialectical 
logic outlined above.
In his discussion of September 11 with Giovanna Borradori, Derrida says, 
‘what is terrible about “September 11”, what remains “inﬁnite” in this wound, is 
that we do not know what it is and so do not know how to describe, identify, or 
even name it’ (2003: 94). The trauma is not just played out through the repetition 
of a past event but is experienced as a proleptic paralysis. Derrida says, ‘the 
wound remains open by our terror before the future and not only the past’ 
(2003: 96). Trauma, in its psychoanalytic guise, is generally understood to be, as 
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Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis describe it, ‘[a]n event in the subject’s 
life deﬁned by its intensity, by the subject’s incapacity to respond adequately to it, 
and by the upheaval and long-lasting effects that it brings about in the psychical 
organisation’ (1988: 465). In other words, the reference point for trauma is in the 
past, however subsequently psychically repressed and deferred that past ‘event’ 
is. But Derrida suggests, in relation to September 11, that what is traumatic 
about this trauma (it should be clear that Derrida is talking about trauma in a 
philosophical, as well as psychoanalytic, register) is the way in which it opens up 
and keeps open the possibility of unknowable, future (perhaps worse) traumas. 
Trauma comes about when we cannot tolerate or master an inﬂux of excitations. 
However these excitations might come not only from the ‘experience’ of what 
has happened, manifested as a repetition compulsion of this past experience, 
but as the anticipation of what is still yet to ‘happen’. September 11 inﬂicts 
a more radical trauma because, unlike during the Cold War when the threat 
came from two superpowers poised for and capable of mutual annihilation, 
this threat comes from ‘anonymous forces that are absolutely unforeseeable and 
incalculable’ (Derrida 2003: 98). A disrupted balance of world power means that 
we cannot locate the source of (nor contain) our fear. Indeed, ‘It is the future 
that determines the unappropriability of the event, not the present or the past’ 
(Derrida 2003: 97).
The open wound makes mourning impossible: closure evades; conscious 
working through, or durcharbeiten as Freud called it,38 will not be effective. 
Derrida explains:
Imagine that the Americans, and through them, the entire world, had been 
told: what has just happened, the spectacular destruction of two towers, the 
theatrical but invisible deaths of thousands of people in just a few second 
[sic], is an awful thing, a terrible crime, a pain without measure, but it’s all 
over, it won’t happen again, there will never again be anything as awful as 
or more awful than that. I assume that mourning would have been possible 
in a relatively short period of time. Whether to our chagrin or our delight, 
things would have quite quickly returned to their normal course in ordinary 
history. One would have spoken of the work of mourning and turned the 
page, as is so often done, and done so much more easily when it comes to 
things that happen elsewhere . . . But this is not at all what happened. There 
is traumatism with no possible work of mourning when the evil comes from 
the possibility to come of the worst, from the repetition to come – though 
worse. Traumatism is produced by the future, by the to come, by the threat of 
the worst to come, rather than by an aggression that is ‘over and done with’ 
(2003: 97).
This structure of trauma is perhaps played out in some of the discourses that 
surrounded September 11, including conspiracy theory. For conspiracy theory, it 
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seems to me, at least attempts to articulate this ‘threat of the worst’. Conspiracy 
theories flood in to fill the void of a nebulous, dispersed terror or fear. Of 
course, in Derrida’s terms, such imaginings would fail to deplete or manage this 
traumatic anteriority because the trauma lies in the fact that the ‘worst’ will never 
arrive and we cannot but fail to predict ‘it’ completely. Nevertheless, conspiracy 
theories, as well as trying to make sense of an event, draw a line from that event 
into the future: if the government/the CIA/the New World Order can do this, 
imagine what they can do in the future! Equally, the centralized conspiracy 
rhetoric from the White House uses a similar logic with respect to the generalized 
enemy in the ﬁgure of the terrorist. Events like September 11 are usually seen by 
conspiracy theorists as just one element in an ongoing, much larger plot that 
will only fully come to light in the future. Unlike the rhetoric of patriotism and 
emphasis on individual and collective acts of heroism that were apparent in the 
aftermath of September 11, conspiracy theories (including the rhetoric of terror 
that emanated from the White House) addressed this fear of, and threat from, the 
‘worst to come’. The centralized, governmental conspiracy rhetoric focused on 
the future threat of terrorism became a mechanism for sanctioning all kinds of 
repressive and aggressive measures (ranging from infringements of civil liberties 
for US citizens, and loss of life for those deemed to be the closest representatives 
of such a threat, like al-Qaeda, Afghans or Iraqis).
The future threat, when it is spoken for, when it is translated into something 
tangible, when it is brought into a knowable horizon, can act as a licence to exert 
control and menace. But for those without access to power, the articulation of 
the threat to come in conspiracist terms represents something of a check against 
the governmental monopoly on fear. That is to say, in meeting the structure 
of trauma evidenced in the centralized, governmental rhetoric of threat and 
conspiracy, conspiracy theory at least does not give the government a monopoly 
on how the symptoms of trauma should be acted upon and dealt with. While 
conspiracy theorists suspicious of government actions risk becoming locked 
in a game of accusation and counter-accusation, they do provide alternative (if 
equally apocalyptic) futures: futures in which America itself is called upon to re-
examine its place and conduct in the world – futures of self-reﬂexivity, no matter 
how redundantly expressed. If nothing else, these conspiracy theories go some 
way to creating a level playing ﬁeld: attempting to prevent the government from 
being the only faction translating the radical future threat into knowable targets. 
There is ‘violence’ in these ideological acts of translation or materialization 
(performed by either ‘side’) – there is ‘violence’, as I will explore further in 
relation to gossip, whenever what is indeterminable is forced into the realm of 
the determinable – but a greater ‘violence’ would be apparent if the White House 
were the only faction able to perform this ‘violence’ on meaning.
While conspiracy theory’s ‘fourth estate’ and levelling roles are important, I 
want to move on in the next chapter to concentrate more on the conditions that 
generate theories. Rather than analyse the content of the conspiracy theories 
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that ﬂood in to ﬁll this radically open, traumatic, ‘future’, I want to think more 
about the structure that makes conspiracy theories necessary possibilities. In 
Chapter 3, I will still be concerned with the cultural politics of conspiracy 
theory, but I will do so by looking closer to home: considering the ambivalent 
relationship between academic interpretation and conspiracy theory rather 
than competing national narratives. Obviously, it is common for knowledges 
to be mutually hostile because one meta-narrative claim is threatened by the 
presence of another; yet what I want to consider is the speciﬁc treatment of 
the knowledge-producing discourse of conspiracy theory by more traditional, 
established and ‘rational’ discourses. Through such an enquiry, I will explore 
further what I have already detected in this chapter (whether in the response of 
the press to Diana conspiracy theories or the Washington Post readers’ disgust 
at September 11 theories): that is, the ideological anxiety that attends knowledge 
production and access to it. For through closer attention to this relationship I 
can begin to learn what conspiracy theory has to teach me as a cultural theorist. 
From there I can look towards a cultural studies able to take on board adequately, 
rather than dismiss, conspiracy theory. But, as I hope the detail of this chapter 
has shown, conspiracy theory is not merely a convenient trope in this book, not 
just a stepping-stone on my way to saying something about cultural studies. I am 
very much interested in both cultural studies and popular knowledges. In order 
to consider the singularity of a popular knowledge, I think it is necessary to look 
to cultural manifestations of it. In the process, some general qualities have been 
revealed: qualities that have implications both for an idea of ‘knowledge proper’, 
and therefore a cultural analysis still invested in that idea.

CHAPTER 3
Cultural Studies on/as Conspiracy Theory
In an online plea to save Birmingham University’s Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (the ﬁrst cultural studies centre of its kind), Paul Gilroy wrote:
Conspiracy theorists may present the Birmingham closure as a matter of 
settling scores by colleagues envious of the reputation of its cultural-studies 
brand; or it may be seen as belated punishment for radicalism. Indeed, earlier 
incarnations of the unit had a history of conﬂict with administrators who 
found its innovations hard to accept and its political positions unpalatable.1
Having raised the spectre of conspiracy Gilroy hastily goes on to stress that 
the closure has less to do with a plot against cultural studies and more with 
the ‘immediate pressures on higher education in Britain’. Despite this denial, 
I think it is worth investigating the layers of paranoia hinted at a little further 
(the paranoia of those working ‘in’ cultural studies about their own position, the 
paranoia of those from other disciplines about student interest in cultural studies, 
and an institutional or managerial paranoia about the politics and aims of cultural 
studies). To do this, I want to look at the relationship between conspiracy theory 
and cultural studies: not just, as I keep stressing, to learn what cultural studies 
has to teach us about conspiracy theory; but also to consider what conspiracy 
theory might have to teach us about cultural studies – a ﬁeld that can itself be 
seen to be subject to, and structured by, the possibility of a number of (internal 
and external) conspiratorial narratives.
At issue here is the problem of approach. Doesn’t conspiracy theory, as a 
form of (albeit popular) interpretation and knowledge, have implications for 
how we interpret and produce knowledge about it? Perhaps this is nothing 
new; after all, at one time or another in the history of cultural studies various 
cultural forms and practices (for example, subcultures, fans, the ‘everyday’) have 
been presented as requiring a unique frame of reference or analysis. To give 
a recent example, Jeremy Gilbert (2004) has identiﬁed music as ‘exceeding’ 
a notion of culture as a set of signifying practices. But although I think that 
there are certainly cultural practices and texts that present more problems to 
the way in which we approach them than others, they may reveal a difﬁculty 
at the heart of cultural analysis in general. Consequently, although I have been 
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emphasizing the speciﬁcity of conspiracy theory, I also want to consider how 
it highlights a general problem with the position from which cultural analysis 
occurs. In this way, we can appreciate conspiracy theory as a unique form of 
popular knowledge or interpretation, and address what this might mean for any 
knowledge we produce about it or how we interpret it.
Ultimately, I want to propose: ﬁrst, that as a mode of interpretation or knowing 
itself, conspiracy theory might raise questions about cultural analysis, about 
interpretation and knowing per se; and second, that as a mode of interpretation 
or knowing accused of being ‘illegitimate’ or marginal in some way, and as a 
synthetic, interdisciplinary knowledge, conspiracy theory might have much in 
common with cultural studies (at least in terms of the perception of cultural 
studies by others, or cultural studies’ own internalized paranoia about how it 
is perceived). I want to argue that what might be unusual about conspiracy 
theory (why it is such an interesting, ‘singular’ case study when it comes to 
thinking about popular knowledge) – namely, the way it is regarded as excessive 
or paranoid interpretation – is also precisely that which makes it signiﬁcant for 
other discourses or disciplines including (and, I will suggest, especially) cultural 
studies.
As a way of thinking through these issues I will draw on another mode 
of thought that occupies a precarious position with regards to legitimacy: 
deconstruction. Deconstruction is particularly interesting and useful in this 
context, not least because it has explicitly and rigorously turned its attention to 
the aporias that lie at the heart of legitimacy, knowledge and interpretation.
CULTURAL STUDIES ON CONSPIRACY THEORY
My intention in the rest of this chapter is to demonstrate how the analysis 
of conspiracy theory hitherto practised by cultural and literary studies can 
be seen as an indicator of a more general weakness – one that I will suggest 
could be a productive ‘weakness’ if such analyses are seen, not so much as the 
end point of cultural analysis, but as more of a beginning. I’m going to start by 
mapping out some of these various analyses, before going on to think about 
conspiracy theory, and from there cultural studies, in a different, what we might 
call ‘deconstructive’, way.
The academic approaches to conspiracy theory broadly fall into three camps: 
those that claim conspiracy theory to be a form of latent insurrection; those that 
deplore it for its lack of political seriousness; and those that wish to monitor 
and correct its ‘worst’ (‘irrational’, ‘illegitimate’) excesses. Each is problematic. 
The ﬁrst is a form of ‘cultural populism’. Without aligning myself with those 
critics, like Jim McGuigan, who characterize some work in cultural studies as an 
uncritical celebration of culture, it is important to question the analysis of culture 
that relies on measuring a practice like conspiracy theory (whether positively or 
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in fact negatively) against a pre-given ideal of political intervention. John Fiske, 
the usual suspect when it comes to castigating cultural studies for producing 
overly optimistic readings of popular culture, claims that popular knowledges 
like conspiracy theories allow disenfranchised subjects an opportunity to narrate 
their place within a system that renders them powerless. Fiske asserts that 
‘skepticism is a way of coping with the inescapable contradictions between top-
down and bottom-up power and the ways of understanding social experience 
which each produces’ (1993: 199). He looks towards conspiracist or sceptical 
narratives and ﬁnds a method by which the negative experience of capitalism 
can be, if not rectiﬁed, then at least articulated.
The other side of the analytical coin would be to chastise conspiracy 
theory for being a poor or inadequate engagement with politics. Karl Popper’s 
denouncements of ‘the conspiracy theory of society’  (1966: 94–9) as a naive 
way of accounting for history is a common sentiment in academic discourses. 
Frederic Jameson picks up on this tradition when he describes conspiracy 
theory as ‘a poor person’s cognitive mapping’ (1988: 356). More recently, Daniel 
Pipes and Hilal Khashan prove that this sentiment is still strong:
Arabs must leave behind a worldview dominated by conspiracy theories. 
This means distinguishing between serious analysis and fantasy, fact and 
rumor, reality and wishful thinking. But this change may be slow in coming, 
for insecure and repressive regimes have nurtured conspiracy thinking 
through their media and by suppressing basic liberties, especially freedom 
of expression. Worrying about possible schemes to overthrow their illegit-
imate regimes, the rulers have created an atmosphere of perpetual fear 
that has helped to institutionalize conspiratorial thinking. Moving on to a 
more responsible and mature form of politics means leaving behind the 
conspiratorial mindset. (1997)
The academic distaste for conspiracy theory is not a recent trend but the unease 
at being associated with this apparent ‘para-scholarship’ is perhaps more acute 
since the form itself has become more commodiﬁed in ways recounted in the 
previous chapter.
In the mid-twentieth century, historians could be concerned that their work, 
via Karl Popper, might be accused of being a conspiracy theory, signalling a 
weak and monolithic form of analysis; just as public speakers wanted to avoid 
the label for fear of being associated with populist politics. But today the term 
‘conspiracy theory’ has many more connotations. Now that the term refers to 
a wide-reaching, commodiﬁed culture, the fear of being associated with con-
spiracism today could be exacerbated by the proximity with commodified 
popular culture.
To be sure, the academic texts that express unease about conspiracy theory 
often focus on its widespread appeal. Concerns like Elaine Showalter’s (from 
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a study that I will place into a category of its own below) highlight an anxiety 
over epistemology and the public sphere. How can intellectuals appeal to a 
public that processes information through a different epistemological model? 
Showalter seems to fear a mass epidemic. Conﬁgured as a mass, conspiracy 
culture is presented as an obstruction to the rule of reason. Showalter comes 
from a very different political identiﬁcation but this kind of argument is a staple 
of reactionary rhetoric. For example, Gustave Le Bon conceived of the masses in 
a similar manner in order to frame his theories of anti-mass based democracy. Le 
Bon posited the individual against the crowd, seeing the latter as less rational and 
sophisticated than the former: ‘In the collective mind the intellectual aptitudes 
of the individuals, and in consequence their individuality, are weakened. 
The heterogeneous is swamped by the homogenous’ ([1895] 1977: 29). The 
‘homogenous’ crowd accumulates ‘stupidity’, operating, he thought, according 
to the lowest common denominator. The crowd, in contrast to the individual, is 
irresponsible (Le Bon [1895] 1977: 30), impetuous (Le Bon [1895] 1977: 31), and 
irrational (Le Bon [1895] 1977: 112). As we shall see, Showalter’s study suggests 
that public narratives obstruct the ‘real’ truths – truths that, if given precedence, 
would reconﬁgure the mass as a series of individuals. The inﬂux of conspiracy 
theory related Internet sites, television drama serials such as The X-Files and 
chat shows, as well as talk radio, have transformed concerns like Showalter’s into 
an anxiety over the way in which knowledges are circulated and established 
outside, or on the margins of, the traditional site for knowledge-production: the 
academy. The commodiﬁcation of conspiracy theory makes the way in which 
academics and the press deal with conspiracy theory a more pressing issue 
for those concerned with how popular cultural texts and practices come to be 
conﬁgured.
Although Fenster usefully details many contemporary manifestations of 
conspiracy theory and considers some of its semiological and rhetorical char-
acteristics (1999: xvii), he eventually criticizes conspiracy theory for not being 
a politically viable outlet. Fenster writes, ‘totalizing conspiracy theories suffer 
from a lack of substantive proof, dizzying leaps of logic, and oversimpliﬁcation 
of the political and economic structures and power’ (1999: xvii). For Fiske, of 
course, this act of simpliﬁcation is precisely the point – it allows those unversed 
in the sophisticated rhetoric of politics to engage with issues of power and 
their experience of subjugation. But for Fenster, the inequalities conspiracy 
theorists read as proof of conspiracy are, rather, the deﬁning characteristics 
of capitalism and would be more fruitfully addressed as such. Fenster claims 
that while apparently showing increased public participation in political 
spheres, ‘conspiracy theory ultimately fails as a political and cultural practice’ 
because it does not constitute or encourage political action in democratic terms 
(1999: 225). Fenster is concerned at how studies like Fiske’s (1993) praise the 
empowering effects of conspiracy theory without pushing the logic of this far 
enough to acknowledge who is dis-empowered by it. While a diagnosis such as 
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Fenster’s assumes a model of a political cultural text that conspiracy theory fails 
to live up to, Fiske’s praises the resistance conspiracy theory can provide for 
historically disenfranchised groups such as African Americans, while overlooking 
(as Fenster in fact himself points out) the racist tracts that can also be termed 
conspiracy theory.
In his book Conspiracy Culture (2000), Knight helpfully resists the pull to 
make political judgements about conspiracy theory. He summarizes the problem 
with such approaches thus: these studies ‘end up insisting that other (usually 
less sophisticated) people’s everyday cultural practices fulﬁl one’s own political 
agenda – and then chastising them for failing at what they never intended in the 
ﬁrst place’ (Knight 2000: 21). Like conspiracy theory itself and accusations of 
conspiracy theory, the academic study of conspiracy theory has been employed 
to various political ends. While these analyses have much to offer in the way 
of situating a practice like conspiracy theory within its socio-political context, 
the idea of politics itself is never addressed. Gary Hall, drawing on the work of 
Geoffrey Bennington, explains:
Politics here is the one thing it is vital to understand, as politics is that by 
which everything else is judged . . . politics is at the same time the one thing 
that cannot be understood; for the one thing that cannot be judged by the 
transcendentally raised criteria of politics is politics itself. Consequently, the 
last question these ‘political’ discourses can raise is the question of politics. 
(2002: 66)
As a transcendental signiﬁer, ‘politics’ organizes and limits the kinds of questions 
that can be asked of conspiracy theory and even of politics itself. If made to 
respond only to this agenda, if mobilized only within this discourse, many aspects 
of conspiracy theory remain unthought.
Outside of this issue of the directly political, Showalter gives a different 
spin to the second more pessimistic account of conspiracy theory in a way 
that exacerbates the problem of addressing one discourse according to the 
concerns of another. On ﬁrst impressions, it might seem that Showalter does 
justice to the idea of conspiracy theories and other alternative ways of know-
ing in Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture. She claims, for 
instance that, ‘Modern forms of individual and mass hysteria have much to 
tell us about the anxieties and fantasies of western culture’ (Showalter 1997: 
12). Indeed, Showalter takes on board the complaints and struggles within 
the ‘hysteric’ narratives that she considers, and even acknowledges the some-
times ambiguous position these discourses of complaint assume in relation to 
scientiﬁc, political and medical discourses. Showalter postulates that classical 
hysteria can be seen collectively re-emerging as recent phenomena like Gulf 
War syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome (ME), or alien abduction narratives, 
which she calls ‘psychogenic syndromes’ (Showalter 1997: 12). Far from using 
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this to delegitimize the symptoms such ‘epidemics’ produce, Showalter is 
commenting on how psychological problems are denigrated and denied in 
modern culture. The resistance of sufferers, support groups and some therapists 
to acknowledge the neurological origin of such complaints derives from the 
negative connotations ascribed to hysteria, not least because of its association 
with the feminine. From within the discourse of psychoanalysis, Showalter asks 
us to explore what ‘symptoms’ such as conspiracy theory can tell us about the 
‘real’ psycho-social demands of the turn of the century.
Throughout the book, Showalter positions conspiracy theory as a symptom 
of contemporary hysteria that should be dealt with in private as individual 
psychological ailment rather than in public as social narrative ‘reality’. Her 
compassion should not distract us from her explicit objective: to get her readers 
to ‘interrupt or halt these epidemics’ (Showalter 1997: 12). Any understanding 
of these so-called ‘epidemics’ is to be only a step towards the strategic erasure 
of them. We can secure this, she suggests, with the very media – television and 
the press – that have helped create them: she writes ‘We can . . . use the media to 
ﬁght rumors as well as to spread them’ (Showalter 1997: 12).
Showalter’s quest to counter the message of conspiracy theories is a familiar 
trope. In their Times Higher Education Supplement book review, Peter Knight 
and Alasdair Spark describe how the authors of a spate of studies concerned 
with conspiracy and conspiracy theory, including Showalter, present their sense 
of duty as alarmism about popular paranoia (Knight and Spark 1998: 22). The 
authors cited by Knight and Spark perhaps unsurprisingly ‘identify paranoia 
as pseudo-scholarship’ but, more signiﬁcantly, they ‘feel they have to correct 
[paranoia’s] inaccuracies’ (1998: 22). Knight and Spark explain the general tone 
of these works:
It is not enough to examine and interpret conspiracy theories, these writers 
seem to suggest. Responsible writers must also take a stand, push back the tide 
of increasing gullibility by presenting What Is Really Going On in simpliﬁed 
form; in short, they must correct and instruct. (1998: 22)
Very much within this vein, Showalter claims that:
the hysterical epidemics of the 1990s have already gone on too long, and they 
continue to do damage: in distracting us from the real problems and crises of 
modern society, in undermining a respect for evidence and truth, and in help-
ing to support an atmosphere of conspiracy and suspicion. They prevent us 
from claiming our full humanity as free and responsible beings. (1997: 206)
Showalter’s text obfuscates social conditions in favour of psychological ex-
planations. Or rather, social narratives and practices are valuable only for what 
they can tell us about how hysteria manifests itself, rather than as objects of 
study that might problematize the way in which Showalter mobilizes one 
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knowledge system (based on an Enlightenment ideal) to curb another. She tries 
to draw paranoia back into the speciﬁc, as it were, away from its generalized, 
mass appearance. Paranoid discourses and conspiracy theory are reduced to a 
logic of psychological symptomatology. This pathologizing of conspiracy theory 
has a long history in the literature on paranoia. It has been reinforced relatively 
recently by a number of studies including Daniel Pipes’ Conspiracy: How the 
Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From (1997) and Robert S. 
Robins and Jerrold Post’s Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred 
(1998). Ironically, as Jodi Dean points out, in
trying to demonstrate the abnormality of political paranoia . . . those who view 
conspiracy as pathology have to concede that sometimes there really are 
conspiracies afoot and sometimes paranoia in politics makes good sense . . . 
Were they to follow through with this concession, their diagnoses would be 
premised on establishing whether or not a conspiracy exists, thereby trans-
forming the critics themselves into conspiracy theorists. (2002: 51)
At a conference concerned with conspiracy cultures, Showalter fell into 
just such a trap when she ridiculed the discourse of Gulf War syndrome and its 
associated fears of government conspiracy, set out to counter the claims with 
hard evidence, and appealed to fellow academics to be ‘guardians of reason’.2 
Though reason is placed in the transcendental position rather than politics, it is 
to a political end. ‘Reason’, here, is more a shibboleth for authority or academic 
prudence. (I should say that it is the way the idea of reason is mobilized as a 
redeeming academic ideal that is questionable, rather than the complex concept 
of reason itself, of course.) I would suggest that it is more productive for cultural 
theorists to question why this conﬁguration of reason needs to be guarded than 
to guard it themselves. With Showalter’s ‘call to arms’, she grounds her work in 
the assumption that academics share a notion of ‘reason’ never questioned in her 
study. For example, some people, as we have seen in relation to post-September 
11 feelings about conspiracy theory, do not necessarily feel that paranoia is 
always unreasonable: sometimes paranoia is the most reasonable response to a 
political situation (see Marcus 1999).
Showalter’s thesis implies that not only should academics ‘know better’ 
(as Knight and Spark point out), but that they should guard the organizing 
signiﬁers that secure this ‘better knowing or knowledge’. By translating the 
conspiracist experiences described in her study into a knowable and appar-
ently comprehensive scientiﬁc discourse, and in claiming this to be the work 
of academics, there is no place to consider what the experiences she wants to 
explain away can tell us about the very academic discourses she wants to do 
this explaining away. Showalter does not entertain the possibility that to ask 
these narratives to prove themselves ‘legitimate’ by the very criteria that root her 
discourse rather than theirs might constitute a Lyotardian differend:
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As distinguished from a litigation, a differend would be a case of conﬂict 
between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a 
rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. One side’s legitimacy does 
not imply the other’s lack of legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of 
judgement to both in order to settle their differend as though it were a mere 
litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both if neither side admits 
this rule). (Lyotard [1983] 1988: xi)
Lyotard asserts that each genre of discourse supplies a set of possible phrases 
following its last (so that conspiracy theory might link the Roswell incident 
to a government cover-up of alien life, whereas a historian might look to 
military weapons testing). That conspiracy theory prescribes a different phrase 
regimen to that of an academic discourse should not ipso facto delegitimize it. 
A differend occurs when there are no procedures to present the different in the 
contemporary sphere of discourse. Rather than judge the individual hypotheses 
that are produced under the name of conspiracy theory from within a discourse 
by which it has already been deemed illegitimate, might it not be more helpful 
to consider conspiracy theory as a ‘genre of discourse’ that does not play by 
the same rules as the one from which I am writing? Especially if I do not want 
my very address to silence that which I hope to observe, question, and self-
reﬂexively consider.
CULTURAL STUDIES AS CONSPIRACY THEORY
While I think that the issues raised by the approaches outlined above – the way 
in which we experience and articulate politics in apolitical or non-traditional 
ways; alternative attempts at ‘cognitive mapping’; and the legitimation of 
psychological problems – are important, they leave open a number of questions 
about the act of analysis or interpretation, and the mobilization of knowledge 
itself. Instead of being disappointed in conspiracy theory’s failure to formalize 
discontent, critique its reactionary tendencies, celebrate its disruptive potential, 
or correct its inaccuracies, I want to explore, as Lyotard terms it, the ‘wrong’ 
([1983] 1988: 9) that occurs when attempts are made in academia to denounce 
or distance themselves from conspiracy theory, or when conspiracy theory is 
written about as if it had nothing to do with what founds being able to know 
or interpret in the ﬁrst place.3 In addition, I will look for ways of addressing the 
apparent opposition between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ knowledges, between 
Showalter’s discourse, for example, and the one she critiques.
What we quickly discover on doing so is that it becomes impossible to map 
conspiracy theory and academic discourse onto a clear illegitimate/legitimate 
divide. For not only does the differend expose the way in which difference is 
‘violently’ reduced to something within an already knowable horizon that can 
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then be judged; but we begin to see how there could be illegitimate legitimacies 
(such as Showalter’s combative response to conspiracy theory), legitimate 
illegitimacies (such as justiﬁed paranoia), and also illegitimate illegitimacies that 
do not simply become legitimate. Any simplistic distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate is thus dislodged. And with this the possibility is opened up 
of beginning to read cultural studies itself as an illegitimate illegitimacy (as an 
unacknowledged conspiracy theory). This is a helpful gesture if we want, as I 
will towards the end of this chapter, to take on board something that is very 
much at stake within cultural studies when it comes to its analysis of conspiracy 
theories – namely, cultural studies’ own unstable, ambiguous and sometimes 
‘paranoid’ relationship with ‘legitimacy’.
HYPERREAL KNOWLEDGE
First, however, a theoretical detour is needed in order to explore the relation-
ship between legitimized and non-legitimized knowledges further. Though some-
what dated now, I want to (selectively) employ Jean Baudrillard’s formulation 
of the hyperreal because it will help to conceptualize legitimized and non-
legitimized knowledges on what I described earlier as a continuum. Follow-
ing Baudrillard’s contention that hyperreal images become ‘more real than the 
real’ (1987: 28), we might say that conspiracy theory is ‘more knowledge than 
knowledge’. For instance, Baudrillard describes how: ‘Cinema plagiarises and 
copies itself, remakes its classics, retroactivates its original myths, remakes silent 
ﬁlms more perfect than the originals, etc.’ (1987: 28). Post-modern cinema thus 
becomes more cinema than cinema, obsessed with producing the perfect replica 
of itself. With this model in mind, we could think of conspiracy theory’s difference 
from and similarities to other (more legitimated) knowledges as a heightening of 
the latter’s narrative concerns, an acceleration of their mode of signiﬁcation and 
semiosis, and as putting on display their conditions of possibility. This hyperreal 
operation is, like all simulation, subversive in its implicit suggestion that all 
knowledges ‘might be nothing more than simulation’ (Baudrillard 1983: 38). 
In other words, conspiracy theory can suggest that all knowledge is only ever 
‘theory’; that the relationship between a sign and its referent is necessarily 
inﬂected by imaginary processes; and that any transcendental truth claims rely 
on contingent strategies of legitimation.
I should make it clear that I am citing Baudrillard’s term in an isolated sense. 
With regards to the way in which the hyperreal puts on display the workings 
of the ‘real’, such a formulation is only helpful if we complicate the apparent 
privileged status given to the ‘real’. In order to avoid the undue nostalgia that can 
be seen to permeate Baudrillard’s thought, we must think of the ‘real’ as having 
retained the possibility of the hyperreal, and as being in some ways constituted 
by it. Baudrillard’s theory of the sign is best viewed on a representational level: 
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certain socio-economic and aesthetic contexts, that is, may make it seem as if the 
symbol is emancipated from its referential obligation, yet, it is a freedom that was 
always already there, enabling it to function as a symbol.
To a certain degree, Baudrillard invites such an understanding. He writes that 
his ‘design of classiﬁcation’ with regards to modes of representation ‘leading’ to 
the hyperreal is:
certainly formal, but it is a little like the situation among physicists who each 
month invent a new particle. One does not dispel the other: they succeed 
one another and increase in number in a hypothetical trajectory. (Baudrillard 
1990: 13, translated by and quoted in Genosko 1994: 44)
Gary Genosko comments on this passage and how it encourages us to read 
the orders of simulation as an ‘abstract problematic’; he thinks that this should 
deter us from a ‘strictly phasal and subsumptive reading’ (Genosko 1994: 44). 
Upsetting a logic of identity or causal temporality by this idea of simultaneity 
at least hints at the mutual contamination of the real and hyperreal proposed 
above. Rather than resulting in a lack of meaning, the hyperreal can expose 
a condition of the ‘real’ – that it must be able to be simulated, to be iterated 
in a different context – that allows for its exaggerated ‘other’. Herein lies the 
tension. And a similar tension, I want to suggest, can be located in the relation 
between academic discourses (such as, but not exclusively, cultural studies) and 
conspiracy theory. For what we see is that conspiracy theory puts on display a 
possibility of reading, the invisibility of which (achieved through processes of 
non-recognition or delegitimization) other knowledge-producing discourses rely 
upon. The conditions that enable knowledge-producing discourses to function 
can also be used to question their very foundations; and the close proximity 
between academic discourses and conspiracy theory places this risk in a public 
context.
However, while I think this is true for academic discourses in general, there 
is something speciﬁc that cultural studies can learn from conspiracy theory, 
not least because cultural studies is probably the discourse or knowledge most 
suited to analysing contemporary phenomena of this sort. We could, for example, 
see conspiracy theory’s self-legitimating structure (the ‘truth’ is in the telling, and 
the telling is often claimed to be ‘dangerous’) as similar to what physicist Alan 
Sokal, who submitted a hoax to the cultural studies journal Social Text, ﬁnds so 
distasteful about cultural studies. Sokal ﬁnds the apparent ‘epistemic relativism’ 
(2000: 51) he sees at work in much cultural theory highly problematic. He 
thinks the argument of his ‘fake’ cultural studies paper (that quantum gravity has 
progressive political implications) was accepted precisely because it afﬁrmed 
the attitude of the editors towards social (and scientiﬁc) constructionism and an 
uncritical populism. His essay slipped through the net not only because Social 
Text was sympathetic to the apparent politics of Sokal’s essay but also because, 
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unusually for a cultural studies journal, it is not peer-reviewed (see Robbins and 
Ross 2000: 55). In other words, the journal could be seen as self-legitimating. 
Quoting Larry Laudan, Sokal claims that his hoax revealed the misguided nature 
of modern critical and cultural theory that ‘appropriate[s] conclusions from 
the philosophy of science and put[s] them to work in aid of a variety of social 
cum political causes for which those conclusions are ill adapted’ (Larry Laudan 
quoted in Sokal 1996: 93). However, the focus of the emergent anxiety evident 
in Sokal’s hoax and response (to which I will return below) extends beyond a 
concern over the borrowing and decontextualization of terms, to the systematic 
questioning via critical and cultural theory of the boundaries between science 
and other kinds of knowledge.4
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
To assess fully the implications of a close, perhaps hyperreal relationship 
between conspiracy theory, knowledge in general, and cultural studies in 
particular, we must recognize that as part of its work as a popular knowledge, 
conspiracy theory is a form of interpretation; and that as such it raises important 
questions about this aspect of knowledge production itself: about interpretation 
per se.
The novelist and semiotician Umberto Eco may not at ﬁrst appear like an 
obvious person to turn to in order to think these issues through at this stage. 
Yet his work on interpretation can be illuminating here, not only because he 
indirectly discusses conspiracy theory but because he provides another example 
of the anxiety already displayed by Showalter and Sokal. Addressing this anxiety 
adequately will take us closer to deconstruction and a ‘deconstructive’ cultural 
studies.
Concerned, as he is, with establishing the limits of interpretation, Eco wants 
to claim that some interpretations can be classed as ‘overinterpretation’. He 
is never fully able to deﬁne the difference between interpretation and over-
interpretation but relies on the idea that overinterpretation cannot be checked 
against the coherence of a text as a whole and is not supported by community 
consensus. He claims that a community provides a ‘factual guarantee’ (Eco 1992: 
144). In the end, he resorts to claiming that although it is often difﬁcult to 
recognize a good interpretation; one simply knows when one encounters bad 
or over interpretation. Eco is focusing on interpretations of literary texts rather 
than historical events so he does not use the name ‘conspiracy theory’. But from 
his novel, Foucault’s Pendulum (1988), the link between overinterpretation and 
conspiracy theory is clear – his novel is the dramatic exposition of what it means 
to overinterpret as the protagonist/narrator creates and lives by a conspiracy 
theory he and his friends construct. In Foucault’s Pendulum, overinterpretation 
takes the guise of a Hermetic reading or what we would contemporaneously 
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think of as conspiracy theory. In Eco’s theoretical writings, overinterpretation 
includes deconstruction.
Eco would have us believe that the link between Hermeticism/conspiracy 
theory and deconstruction is one that discredits deconstruction. In order to 
do this, Eco (in a gesture similar to that of Sokal’s reductive characterization 
of cultural theory) has to soften deconstruction and refashion it as a reader-
oriented relativism that seeks to validate any and every interpretation. Eco 
considers deconstruction to be a continuation of the Hermetic project – one 
that is informed by principles of:
universal analogy and sympathy, according to which every item of the furn-
iture of the world is linked to every other element (or to many) of this 
sublunar world and to every element (or to many) of the superior world by 
means of similitudes or resemblances. (1990: 24)
The objection to Hermetic drift and deconstruction as interpretative 
methodologies focuses on the logic of resemblance that supposedly guides 
them both. Eco points out that conclusions cannot be made from a set of 
circumstances just because those circumstances might remind us of others 
and their corresponding results: he insists that ‘one must distinguish between 
a relationship of causality and a relationship of similarity’ (1990: 29). Eco also 
criticizes deconstruction for encouraging the idea that ‘every expression 
is a secret, or an enigma that evokes a further enigma’ (1990: 27). This, Eco 
writes, results in there being ‘no way to test the reliability of an interpretation’ 
(1990: 27). He fears the subsequent translation of the whole world into a ‘mere 
linguistic phenomenon . . . [that] devoids language of any communicative power’ 
(Eco 1990: 27).
Eco’s disagreement with deconstruction hinges on what he considers to be 
Derrida’s misreading of Peircean ‘unlimited semiosis’ (the process by which an 
interpretant’s reading of a sign can always be taken up by another interpretant 
ad inﬁnitum). Eco insists that the difference between ‘unlimited semiosis’ and 
Hermetic/deconstructive drift (which he reads as being equivalent) is that the 
former still allows for some readings to be discounted, whereas the latter has 
to allow for every interpretation to be valid. Such a logic, his theoretical and 
creative writings suggest, is dangerous in the extreme.
For example, in Foucault’s Pendulum, the opinions of Lia are set up as the 
yardstick of common sense against which other interpretations can be measured. 
When the protagonist/narrator, Casaubon, approaches Lia with a supposedly 
encrypted text, she takes a few days to reach her own interpretation. She claims 
that the message is a merchant’s delivery list, a kind of ‘laundry list’ (Eco 1988: 
534). She berates Casaubon for overlooking quotidian explanations in order to 
translate the text into what he wants it to say. In his theoretical writings, Eco 
refers to this behaviour as ‘using’ rather than critically ‘interpreting’ the text. 
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Eco claims: ‘To critically interpret a text means to read it in order to discover . . . 
something about its nature. To use a text means to start from it in order to get 
something else’ (1990: 57). Lia is commended for ‘just knowing’ what is right in a 
way that Eco, in an essentialist gesture, suggests is tied to her active experience 
of life through the body, as opposed to Casaubon’s which appears mediated by 
the mind. The difference arises in a number of situations: for instance, when 
trying to explain why Hermetic interpretation is wrong, Lia says: ‘people with a 
brain in their head, if they’re shown an alchemist’s oven, all shut up and warm 
inside, think of the belly of the mama making a baby, and only your Diabolicals 
think that the Madonna about to have the Child is a reference to the alchemist’s 
oven’ (Eco 1988: 364–5).
Lia is concerned with the function of metaphor, indicating that only one 
trajectory works, leading to a reproductive/religious image that is central, 
she believes, to human experience. At the end of the signifying chain stand a 
Madonna and child. She considers it wrong to ‘use’ them as a means to get to 
‘something else’.
The target of Lia’s derision is essentially the logic of conspiracy and Hermetic 
analogy – forms of overinterpretation that are guided by the assumption that 
‘tout se tient’ (Eco 1988: 179), which translates as ‘everything is connected’. 
While Casaubon aims to expose the arbitrary nature of the connections 
between events that form a conspiracy theory through a parody of his own, Eco 
dramatizes the seductive power of a discourse disregarding whether or not one 
‘really believes’. Once connections have been made, and a context established 
to support them, they cease to appear arbitrary. At this point, a particular logic 
has ‘seduced’ and been subscribed to. Casaubon describes this seduction as a 
decreasing distinction between the object of parody and the parodist: ‘Among 
the Diabolicals, I moved with the ease of a psychiatrist who becomes fond of 
his patients . . . After a while, he begins to write pages on delirium, then pages of 
delirium, unaware that his sick people have seduced him’ (Eco 1988: 370).
Casaubon tells us how ‘wanting connections, we found connections – always, 
everywhere, and between everything’ (Eco 1988: 463). Casaubon has produced 
such a convincing account of history that he becomes lodged in its methodology 
and can now see no alternative: what began as ﬁction has become truth, even if 
truth is a ﬁction which has very ‘real’ effects.
Eco fashions deconstruction as similarly seductive but the characterization 
of deconstruction as Hermeticism stumbles early on. Hermeticism leads us 
on an identiﬁable (if maddeningly plotted) journey of connections whereas 
deconstruction radically upsets how that journey can be perceived (we might, 
for example, be encouraged to think about that which separates as well as joins 
in a chain of meaning). Indeed, it is not on a promise (which can be fulﬁlled) of 
knowledge or meaning that deferment works. Cognition is not simply present in 
and of itself; processes of knowledge are, rather, deferred or differentiated by a 
non-coincidence of the subject. In his well-known explication of Husserl, Derrida 
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explains how the ‘I’ that speaks or writes ‘I am mortal’ is never purely present 
to itself as it relies on the possibility of being repeated in the radical absence 
– death – of that ‘I’: an absence which will complicate the idea of a thinking 
subject based on ideals of presence (see Derrida [1967b] 1973). Meaning does 
not come ‘nearer’, it has not slipped through our ﬁngers, but is structurally 
differentiated. It cannot be thought of as an object to be discovered.
Mirroring Lia’s derision in Foucault’s Pendulum, Eco reduces the question 
of interpretation to one of ‘common sense’, claiming that much deconstructive 
theory ‘disregards very obvious truths that nobody can reasonably pass over in 
silence’ (1990: 36). Peirce may have endorsed a semiotics which emphasizes 
how signs refer to other signs rather than to ‘a presence’ or ‘the thing itself’ (Eco 
1990: 37), and one in which ‘the transcendental meaning is not at the origins of 
the process,’ but this meaning ‘must be postulated as a possible and transitory 
end of every process’ (Eco 1990: 41). This agreed privileged meaning, as Eco 
points out, sits uncomfortably with the approach of deconstruction but not 
because of a relativism lacking in rigour as he suspects, but because for Derrida 
meaning is always subject to deferral and differentiation. Derrida formulates 
meaning as indeﬁnitely deferred by différânce and dispersed by ‘dissemination’. 
The more radical implications of Derrida’s thought are obscured in Eco’s 
misrepresentation of these quasi-concepts. ‘Dissemination’, for example, suggests 
an unlimited dispersal, or scattering of meaning: indeterminable, and impossible 
to predict or anticipate. A play on the arbitrary etymological link between semen 
and semantics, dissemination can be seen to disperse meaning like ‘the seed 
that neither inseminates nor is recovered by the father, but is scattered abroad’ 
(Spivak 1976: xi). Meaning is always already lost to an imaginary moment of 
production, never to lead to insemination and fertilization. Writing does not 
end in the unproblematic conception of meaning, or find its meaning in a 
united bond, but is left to fend for itself, always already orphaned by this radical 
reformulation of the authorial role.
In Eco’s conﬁguration, dissemination is confused with polysemia. What Eco 
fails to acknowledge is that deconstruction does not encourage or lead to a 
countable number of readings – even if this is an inﬁnite multiplication of ‘one’ – 
but fundamentally problematizes numerical imaginings of this sort and how they 
privilege the idea of an ‘original work’, which is seen to have endless resources 
for interpretation. Derrida clearly states: ‘It is [the] hermeneutic concept 
of polysemy that must be replaced by dissemination’ ([1972b] 1981: 262). 
Dissemination does not exclude the possibility of determinate meanings being 
produced in context. Indeed, what Eco misses out of his account of Derrida is 
the aporetic tension between determinacy and indeterminacy. Meanings can be 
posited, drawn towards speciﬁcity, but this speciﬁcity is enabled or structured 
by indeterminacy.
I will consider this double bind (what makes meaning possible, also makes 
it impossible) at several junctures in this book but what should be clear at this 
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stage is that Eco’s characterization of deconstruction as a form of nihilism is 
misleading. Eco’s critique of deconstruction will only work along the lines of a 
crude comparison with Hermeticism. I would suggest, as with cultural studies 
above, that the link between deconstruction and Hermeticism/conspiracy theory 
exists, but not to the ends that Eco assumes. The link does not delegitimize 
both conspiracy theory and deconstruction, but rather shows deconstruction 
to be the mode of thought that (like conspiracy theory and potentially cultural 
studies) highlights an aporia of legitimacy, knowledge and interpretation. We will 
return to this shortly after questioning the safeguards Eco claims protect us from 
overinterpretation and unsound knowledge, for such policing has implications 
for any demarcation between popular and other kinds of knowledge.
COMMUNITIES OF DISSENSUS
An ‘overinterpretation’, according to Eco, employs Hermetic association and, by 
doing so, moves interpretation beyond a boundary of reading that the text itself 
suggests, and is endorsed by an interpretative community. In other words, a bad 
interpretation exceeds the boundaries of the community consensus.5 While Eco 
suggests that an interpretation can be ‘[checked] against a text as a coherent 
whole’, the ability to detect bad interpretations is, he implies, instinctive. He 
writes, for example, that ‘it is impossible to say what is the best interpretation 
of a text, but it is possible to say which ones are wrong’ (1990: 148). To the 
question, ‘what kind of guarantee can a community provide?’ Eco conjectures, ‘I 
think it provides a factual guarantee’ (1992: 144). Eco substantiates this ‘factual 
guarantee’ by citing the example of how children learn not to touch ﬁre or play 
with knives. Identifying a bad interpretation becomes linked to experiential 
instinct. Such a link is dramatized through the death-bound plot of Foucault’s 
Pendulum in which physical danger is the result of overinterpretation.
Eco does not claim that a community should privilege one reading above 
others, but that it can privilege one kind of reading. Some texts are ‘open texts’ 
that can support a number of readings, but even in these cases, the community 
of knowers can agree upon their ‘open nature and the strategies that make 
them work that way’ (Eco 1990: 41). Eco supposes that while a community 
can agree that multiple readings are supported by certain texts, its members 
must also recognize when an ‘unreliable’ methodology has been employed to 
arrive at an interpretation. Consensus provides a way to identify readings that 
are not contextually legitimate rather than helping to decide ‘the best’ or ‘most 
accurate’ reading. The community polices the limits of interpretation rather than 
commends or venerates one single interpretation. Knowing which texts support 
multiple readings introduces problems of arbitration as does the undecidability 
of what is and what is not contextually legitimate. Where do the boundaries 
of context lie and what happens when those boundaries are constantly being 
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challenged by interpretations relegated to the ‘outside’? The ‘overinterpreters’ 
can constitute a community of their own and have interpretative criteria that are 
at odds with other cognitive-interpretative communities but can also inﬂuence 
and challenge the ‘main’ interpretative community or rational paradigm. The way 
in which interpretative communities are not exclusive realms but are constantly 
being negotiated by challenges to them serves as the basis of Lyotard’s refutation 
of Habermasian consensus as the ultimate goal of discourse. A consideration of 
this will problematize Eco’s reliance upon ‘community consensus’ as a check 
upon interpretation.
Lyotard claims that ‘the principle of consensus as a criterion of validation’ 
is ‘inadequate’ ([1979] 1994: 60). He sees consensus as assuming two forms. 
First, the Habermasian ideal: ‘an agreement between men, deﬁned as knowing 
intellects and free wills [. . .] obtained through dialogue’ (Lyotard [1979] 1994: 60). 
Consensus, then, is a concept tied to a narrative of emancipation. This becomes 
problematic when the possibility of emancipatory rhetoric being employed 
to nefarious ends becomes apparent (the rhetoric of National Socialism being 
the most obvious example). Second, consensus is seen as a politico-economic 
instrument: Lyotard states that the system ‘manipulates [consensus] in order 
to maintain and improve its performance’ ([1979] 1994: 60). Lyotard’s second 
model fashions consensus as an ideological tool that can be ‘used toward 
achieving the real goal, which is what legitimates the system – power’ ([1979] 
1994: 61). Lyotard therefore sees the disruptive potential of paralogic ‘moves’ to 
be beneﬁcial to the interpretative community. Paralogic moves, that is, are seen 
to be helpful for the very reason that the community rejects them. He explains 
how
Countless scientists have seen their ‘move’ ignored or repressed, sometimes 
for decades, because it too abruptly destabilized the accepted positions, not 
only in the university and scientiﬁc hierarchy, but also in the problematic. The 
stronger the ‘move,’ the more likely it is to be denied the minimum consensus, 
precisely because it changes the rules of the game upon which consensus 
had been based. (Lyotard [1979] 1994: 63)
Those readings or ﬁndings that upset the system in which consensus is privileged 
are not granted consensual acceptance. This kind of regulation, however, merely 
observes science behaving like any other ‘power center whose behaviour is 
governed by a principle of homeostasis’ (Lyotard [1979] 1994: 63). Lyotard calls 
this behaviour ‘terrorist’ in the sense that the system gains efﬁciency by the 
threatened elimination of a ‘player from the language game’ ([1979] 1994: 63). 
Individual aspirations need to fall in line with the needs of the system.
According to Lyotard, accepting Habermas’s idea of consensus would entail 
making two assumptions. First, that ‘it is possible for speakers to come to agree-
ment on which rules or metaprescriptions are universally valid for language 
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games, when it is clear that language games are heteromorphous, subject to 
heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules’ (Lyotard [1979] 1994: 65). Second, it 
assumes that consensus is the goal of dialogue whereas it ‘is only a particular 
state of discussion, not its end’ (Lyotard [1979] 1994: 65). Lyotard calls for a 
justice that is not based on consensus. He stresses the heteromorphous rather 
than isomorphic nature of language games and privileges dissensus and paralogy 
over consensus, challenging the emphasis Habermas places on a statement’s 
ability to contribute to an emancipatory ideal. When the role of consensus is 
questioned in this way, Eco’s notion of a ‘bad’ interpretation clearly becomes 
problematic. While Eco’s configuration of consensus indicates that a ‘bad’ 
interpretation can injure the community in some way, I would want to consider 
what ‘injury’ or ‘violence’ is done when an interpretation or way of knowing – a 
‘move’ in the language game – is denied a hearing or is not allowed to enter into 
an arena in which it can generate other ideas and responses.
Eco’s formulation, like Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, assumes 
that there is a common goal in interpretative and cognitive endeavours. Eco’s 
recognition of the lure of knowledges other than those rooted in scientiﬁc 
rationalism should suggest to him the difﬁculty of such an assumption. What 
role, for example, can desire or pleasure play in interpretative practice? 
What needs are fulﬁlled by creating ‘alternative’ interpretative communities?6 
Eco fails to recognize either the three editor cum conspiracy theorists in 
Foucault’s Pendulum, or those other conspiracy theorists the editors name 
the Diabolicals, as communities. Rather, these factions are characterized as 
exceeding a community. Explicating Eco’s theories, Peter Bondanella states that 
‘overinterpretations or paranoid interpretations will eventually be refused by 
the community’ (1997: 289). Yet, if those ‘overinterpreters’ can be recognized 
as constituting interpretative communities of their own, they in turn develop 
their own ‘refusals’ and contextual criteria. The co-existence of a number of 
communities, the internal consensus of each being constituted by dissensus, 
complicates the employment of community consensus as an anchor of 
interpretation.
Eco’s texts obscure the way in which overinterpretation inheres in the very 
principle of interpretation: that for there to be an idea of what interpretation 
is, there must be overinterpretation. Overinterpretation is a constitutive 
factor in interpretation before an exclusionary gesture can then be made. 
Overinterpretation, in other words, is already ‘there’. In the following citation, 
Derrida complicates the relationship between thought, speech and writing, but 
his formulation can help critique any simple notion of interiority and exteriority 
implicit in a notion of the boundary, including Eco’s distinction between 
interpretation and overinterpretation: ‘The outside bears with the inside a 
relationship that is, as usual, anything but simple exteriority. The meaning of the 
outside was already present within the inside, imprisoned outside the outside, 
and vice versa’ (Derrida [1967a] 1984: 35).
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Reading this ﬁguratively, as soon as a line is drawn – a boundary designated 
– there is no ‘pure’ interior because the same line that delineates this also 
demarcates the outside. The inside has to ‘get outside itself’ for the outer edge 
of the boundary to be drawn and this is what lets the outside in or the inside 
out.7 The boundary is a border to both interpretation and overinterpretation and 
as such implicates each in the constitution of the other. This complex economy 
must cause us to question any simple notion of Eco’s interpretative community. 
It must be asked how exclusions will be arbitrated. The idea of community 
consensus implies that a community of knowers will have to exclude not only 
those interpretations that exceed their criteria, but also the interpreters that 
produce them. It becomes a question of plural ‘communities’ rather than a 
singular ‘community’. Once communities are deﬁned against each other, the 
boundary joins as well as separates.
There is nothing unusual about Eco’s desire to make judgements about 
interpretations. Cultural theorists have to measure the soundness of an inter-
pretation every time they look for information on the Internet, every time they 
read the newspaper or listen to someone speak on television, whenever they 
review the research of peers or examine student work. But Eco’s attempt to 
devise a system to demarcate the limits of interpretation is unsustainable. Because 
of iterability, an interpretation free from the possibility of misinterpretation 
or overinterpretation is impossible. Separating interpretation from overinter-
pretation ignores how all interpretation is fuelled, and made possible by, the 
repetition, grafting, quoting of the text to be interpreted in the radical absence 
of its author. Derrida writes: ‘This citationality, duplication, or duplicity, this 
iterability of the mark is not an accident or an anomaly, but is that . . . without 
which a mark could no longer even have a so-called “normal” functioning’ 
([1972a] 1982: 320–1). This radical absence, this quasi-metaphorical ‘death’, 
means that while one can appeal to authorial intention and historical context, 
they provide no ﬁnal determination nor end to interpretation. Iterability means 
that an interpretation can never be saturated, complete; it can never preclude 
the need for other interpretations. Bennington explains that ‘the unity of the act 
of writing and/or reading is divided’:
the gap thus introduced between the agencies of ‘sender’ and ‘addressee’ 
(but also within each of these agencies) implies, at the least, that writing 
can never fully ‘express’ a thought or realize an intention . . . The necessary 
possibility of the death of the writer . . . opens writing to the general alterity 
of its destination, but simultaneously forbids any sure or total arrival at 
such a destination: the presumed unity of a text, marked in principle by its 
author’s signature, thus has to wait on the other’s countersignature . . . But 
every determinate addressee, and thus every act of reading is affected by the 
same ‘death’, it therefore follows that every countersignature has to wait on 
others, indeﬁnitely, that reading has no end, but is always to-come as work of 
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the other (and never of the Other) – a text never comes to rest in a unity or 
meaning ﬁnally revealed or discovered. (1993: 55–6)
If we accept what Eco says about overinterpretations being excessive failures, 
this is only useful if (rather than marginalize, ridicule, dismiss or demonize them 
as he does) it allows us to see them on a continuum with other failures (of 
communication) in Derrida’s thought (like unhappy performatives, or letters 
gone astray). These ‘failures’ of course are not failures in the strict sense, 
because without them there could be no possibility of ‘success’, rendering the 
success, in our case, interpretation, contaminated in advance. With reference to 
performatives, Derrida observes how J. L. Austin recognizes that
the possibility of the negative . . . is certainly a structural possibility, that failure 
is an essential risk in the operations under consideration; and then, with an 
almost immediately simultaneous gesture made in the name of a kind of 
ideal regulation, an exclusion of this risk as an accidental, exterior one that 
teaches us nothing about the language phenomenon under consideration. 
([1972a] 1982: 323)
In a similar vein, Eco and Showalter exteriorize overinterpretation as though 
it has nothing to do with what allows them to interpret overinterpretation at 
all. Derrida asks, ‘What is a success when the possibility of failure continues 
to constitute its structure?’ ([1972a] 1982: 324). What, we might ask, is an inter-
pretation when ‘overinterpretation’ constitutes its structure?
How exactly does deconstruction problematize interpretation that idealizes 
the text, object or event to be interpreted? Derrida has shown how such idealiza-
tion is ﬂawed because no text, no event to be interpreted, is fully present to itself. 
There will always be a hidden, occluded ‘element’ that cannot be revealed and 
resolved within a text because it is its undepletable, inexhaustible condition of 
possibility. This element, for want of a better word, is not a mysterious secret that 
a hermeneutic approach could reveal; it is a conditioning absence. Paradoxically, 
the implications of this absence – namely that interpretation is impossible – does 
not stop us from interpreting. In fact it enables anything called interpretation 
to take place again and again. Interpretation is never complete because of a 
profound absence in the text being interpreted, and because that same absence 
conditions any subsequent interpretative text.
Here, I have to face the implications of failing to take into account that over-
interpretation, rather than subtending or deviating from interpretation, actually 
conditions it. For me to be able to interpret anything – analyse it away from its 
original context – and to enjoy the freedom that interpretation brings with it, I 
must in principle be able to enjoy that freedom indeﬁnitely in a radical de- and 
re-contextualization. Therefore, overinterpretation is a vehicle of interpretation’s 
freedom. What limits interpretation is not any natural principle of interpretation 
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but only those institutions that have the authority to rule interpretations in or 
out of court.
To dismiss or disqualify these readings is to overlook the way they already 
reside within and make possible other more ‘acceptable’ readings. If interpretation 
ﬁnds itself inhabited and conditioned by this ‘excess’, it can be limited only by 
secondary legislative, positive, empirical acts. This regulation raises important 
issues for interpretation in general, and cultural studies in particular. First, it 
puts on display an aporia of legitimacy (what founds the discursive authority to 
regulate interpretation in the ﬁrst place?). Second, it enables us to ﬁnd a prior 
‘politics’ that comes ‘before’ any cultural studies reading of a practice or text that 
deems it politically successful or unsuccessful. In this way, cultural studies might 
come to look more, I would argue (rather than less), like the radically open 
‘discipline’ it began as and has the potential to become.
CULTURAL STUDIES ON/AS CONSPIRACY THEORY
Though cultural studies professes to ask questions of a self-reﬂexive nature 
– indeed is in some ways predicated on the desire to examine the political 
implications of university disciplinarity, canonization, and processes of legit-
imation – the kind of fundamental self-reﬂexive questions that are revealed 
by a deconstructive reading of conspiracy theory seem to have been largely 
overlooked by the majority of previous studies. What I am talking about here 
is not the familiar gesture of placing oneself within the interpretative ﬁeld, to 
acknowledge how our agenda and prejudices shape interpretation (though this 
is of course important) but rather a self-reﬂexivity about the very possibility of 
interpretation, of being able to say anything about one’s positionality, agenda, 
prejudices. The apparent reluctance within some cultural studies approaches to 
conspiracy theory to take on board fundamental questions of this sort (about 
the conditions of possibility for interpretation and for politics, about the logic 
of supplementarity, about the kinds of issues raised in different ways by not just 
deconstruction but also conspiracy theory) suggests a blind spot. I am using this 
term ‘blind spot’ carefully here. Unlike something that only needs to be revealed 
once, a blind spot requires attention every time we drive. What it hides at one 
moment will not be the same the next. All this can suggest a response to a strain 
of cultural studies that feels that we’ve been down the deconstruction or theory 
‘road’ in the 1980s and 1990s, been there, done that and don’t need to ‘go there’ 
or ‘do it’ again, and which I’m aware may be the response of many in cultural 
studies to my engagement with Derrida in this chapter and elsewhere. Equally, 
this ever-shifting blind spot affects every countersignature: We can provide a 
theoretically challenging framework within which cultural practices and texts 
can be read, but must accept that they will always exceed this framework in 
ways we should not be able to anticipate.
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Such a blind spot may stem from a certain paranoia within cultural studies 
about its own legitimacy; but it may also arise because, as I will explain below, to 
take on board these questions – to perform a cultural studies thought through 
the work of Jacques Derrida (and thus able to acknowledge its ambivalent 
relationship to conspiracy theory, for example) – might put at risk any hard 
won legitimacy; might even risk cultural studies no longer being recognizable as 
cultural studies (see Hall 2002). It might mean, for example, not being able to say 
that a conspiracy theory (or any other strange, crazy, odd, paranoid or just plain 
stupid text) is outside the cultural studies’ ‘canon’, because these judgements 
themselves are inhabited and made possible by overinterpretation, paranoia, and 
conspiracy theory. The decision itself would be unstable.
In general, cultural studies is unable to acknowledge any possible resem-
blance on its part to conspiracy theory. Instead, cultural studies has to maintain 
its ‘critical distance’ from the conspiracist text that nevertheless interests it as 
a form of culture. One possible reason for this could be that having begun as a 
marginal discipline of somewhat uncertain status, its subsequent institutional-
ized legitimacy can’t bear much scrutiny within that discipline because, let’s face 
it, cultural studies receives enough attacks of this kind from elsewhere.8 To take 
just one example: the ‘Sokal affair’ I referred to above obviously represented a 
direct attack against the legitimacy of cultural studies as a mode of enquiry (see 
the editors of Lingua Franca 2000). As we have seen, Sokal’s concern stemmed 
from the way in which cultural theory had appropriated terms from science 
and used them out of context; or, put a different way, Sokal was concerned that 
scientiﬁc terms were being used by people without the authority to do so.9 But 
rather than being purely negative, I want to suggest that such an incident can 
also be seen as afﬁrming the cultural studies ‘project’ – as being endemic of 
cultural studies’ openness to the question of what legitimate knowledge is (an 
openness that constantly gets rehearsed as a challenge to ‘canonized’ histories 
or knowledges and to disciplinarity, but rarely in terms of legitimacy per se). 
Instead of excusing the Sokal incident, then, and fashioning it as an aberration 
in an otherwise functional discipline, cultural studies should own it. By doing 
this, the Sokal affair could reinforce the capability of cultural studies to be, after 
Derrida’s use of the term, a discipline ‘under erasure’, if you like; because it 
represents a moment of undecidability around the issue of legitimacy which is 
central to what cultural studies in many ways is. Cultural studies can force us to 
question what knowledge is and therefore what cultural studies is. And because 
the answers to such questions and the rules according to which answers can 
be arrived at are unstable, the risk of being deemed an illegitimate discipline is 
deﬁnitive.
From this point of view, the Sokal affair represents something of a missed 
opportunity for cultural studies. For Sokal’s forgery, in common with conspiracy 
theory (which is a kind of forgery in its own way – a forged form of knowledge 
about the world perhaps), demands questions to be asked concerning the 
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status of knowledge, including the knowledge that cultural theorists draw on. 
The Sokal affair doesn’t show up the inadequacy of cultural studies; rather, 
like conspiracy theory, it suggests that the legitimacy of knowledge cannot be 
decided in advance of any reading. Too often cultural studies leaves little room 
for questions of this kind to be asked. Instead, cultural studies has a tendency 
to keep such questions at bay, associating them understandably with attacks 
against its validity. To acknowledge the close relationship that cultural studies 
has with ‘illegitimate’ forms of knowledge such as conspiracy theory (both are 
synthetic discourses made from an indeﬁnite amount of sources; both raise 
questions of legitimacy and institutionalized knowledge) would, in this view, 
risk undermining cultural studies. But, as I will explore below, cultural studies is 
vulnerable to attacks on its legitimacy, not because there is something dubious 
about its project but rather because all knowledge, all interpretation relies on 
an aporia of legitimacy. As a ‘discipline’ (or inter- or post-discipline) conceived 
on the margins of the university, cultural studies just has a greater capacity for 
opening itself up to questions of legitimacy than others. But to open itself to 
these questions, it would need to make a revelation.
TOP SECRET
Cultural studies would have to break a ‘conspiracy of silence’ to reveal a secret: 
that cultural studies could well be a con, a scam, a swindle. Cultural theorists 
may be a bunch of charlatans. Others certainly suspect that this is the case 
and say as much. The suspicion others unleash upon cultural studies is that 
we all just arrange data to suit our own purposes, to arrive at a conclusion 
we’ve already decided upon in advance. When cultural studies gets lambasted 
for being too ‘speculative’ (as we will see Alec McHoul and Toby Miller 
do in Chapter 4), or too post-structuralist (recall Bruno Latour’s question 
in Critical Inquiry, ‘Is it really the task of the humanities to add decon-
struction to destructions?’ (2004: 225)) or when Alan Sokal or Jim McGuigan 
(albeit in very different ways) critique cultural populism, this seems to me 
precisely a concern over the legitimacy or proper representation of cultural 
‘intelligence’, of how we are going to present information gathered in the 
ﬁeld. Are we agents who have dirtied our own hands, who have hard-and-
fast data to back up our claims? Or have we been sitting in our ‘ivory tower’ 
reading second hand accounts of events? What have we risked in order to 
bring this particular ‘intelligence’ to light? These are the suspicions of those 
out to attack cultural studies: they suspect that cultural studies is illegitimate 
because of the way it gathers intelligence. The secret I think cultural studies 
has to divulge sounds only slightly different for these detractors, but has 
radically different implications: what I think we need to reveal is that it is a 
structural possibility that cultural studies is indeed illegitimate.
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Traditional ways of getting around the possibility of illegitimacy (of keeping 
the secret secret) entail claims to metanarratives like Marxism or Humanism; or 
rooting one’s statements in ethnographic observation or hard political economy. 
We try to assert the legitimacy of cultural studies by appealing to its political 
project, for example, or by having it resemble a science as closely as possible, 
hoping that the more respectable discipline’s credibility will rub off on ours. 
But I don’t want to patch up this risk of illegitimacy or to keep it secret. Before 
I am branded a traitor or informer for breaching the cultural studies’ version of 
the Ofﬁcial Secrets Act, I should defend my ‘experimental’ revelation. In the real 
British Ofﬁcial Secrets Act, a disclosure is deemed damaging if it (and I’m going 
to substitute the references to the Crown and State here with cultural studies to 
make my point):
(a) it damages the capability of . . . the armed forces of [cultural studies] to 
carry out their tasks or leads to loss of life or injury to members of those 
forces or serious damage to the equipment or installations of those forces; or
(b) . . . it endangers the interests of [cultural studies] abroad, seriously 
obstructs the promotion or protection by [cultural studies] of those interests 
or endangers the safety of [cultural theorists] abroad . . .10
Rather than damaging the capability of cultural studies to function as cultural 
studies, to carry out the important political and cultural work we often feel 
that we are here to do, or putting at risk the reputation or professional life of 
any cultural theorist at home (‘within’ cultural studies) or abroad (in other 
disciplinary contexts), my disclosure of this secret is intended to support and 
develop the interests of cultural studies.
The frequent attacks against cultural studies show up a risk of illegitimacy 
that is never far away. But cultural studies doesn’t need to keep the secret of 
its possible illegitimacy because, as should be clear by the end of this book, it 
is not just our secret: it pertains to everybody who works with knowledge. But 
too often cultural studies keeps the secret, associating disclosure with a threat 
against our validity, funding and furtherance (threats that we are usually busy 
ﬁelding from elsewhere). To acknowledge an aporia of legitimacy and authority 
would, in this view, risk undermining cultural studies. But what I have been 
suggesting is that cultural studies is vulnerable to attacks on its legitimacy, not 
because there is something dubious about its project but rather because there 
is an aporia of legitimacy and authority conditioning all knowledge. This is 
something that I will return to in my discussion of gossip.
The secret, then, despite my earlier call to break the conspiracy of silence, 
remains undepleted. The secret is not that which has been hidden, later to be 
revealed, and is in principle, fully knowable. Nor is it an enigma that remains 
unknowable (like God). It is not the object of knowable or unknowable 
knowledge at all. Rather, we are faced with the more radical ‘Derridean’ secret: 
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that which remains outside the phenomenal event as it happens but which 
nevertheless conditions that event. The irreducible, non-present secret (or in 
fact ‘non-presence’) in this sense structures presence. I can name this secret 
‘undecidable legitimacy’ or something like that but this is really only akin to 
saying the secret is that no-one knows the secret. The secret remains irreducible 
even while we try to reveal it, keeping the future open: keeping, to pick up 
Derrida’s thoughts on September 11 that I closed the previous chapter with, the 
trauma traumatic. I will not have revealed anything that will help us to decide 
in advance about any future encounter with knowledge. All I can say is that 
illegitimacy is neither present, nor unpresent in cultural studies, its presence 
is undecidable, the risk, irreducible. Illegitimacy is a necessary possibility that 
enables us to say anything that has validity and force, enables us to say anything 
outside an already calculable realm of set responses.
This second version of the secret is, then, the ﬁrst without the lure of ﬁnal 
revelation. The ﬁrst version pointed towards an aporia of legitimacy at the heart 
of knowledge-claims and ‘disciplinary’ authority; the second makes it clear that 
the secret can only ever be that no-body knows the secret. Cultural studies is 
well placed to ‘expose’ rather than ‘keep’ the secret of undecidable legitimacy: 
a secret that conditions any knowledge statement, and anything that we could 
recognize as cultural studies. Cultural studies could be the mode able to question 
the very nature of legitimacy (once it has stopped trying to keep the secret that 
legitimacy is always in question). We are not breaching the cultural studies’ 
version of the Ofﬁcial Secrets Act because nothing I have said can harm the 
existence of cultural studies but it might make it more robust, more able to 
show that it understands the status of the knowledge or ‘intelligence’ it gathers 
and presents in various dossiers for public consumption. How, then, can we 
produce a cultural studies that would be able to take on board the possibility of 
its own illegitimacy?
Cultural studies theorists (such as Fenster and Fiske) have not explicitly tried 
to draw a clear line between interpretation and overinterpretation, between 
knowledge and non-knowledge, between rational concerns and hysteria as their 
contemporaries in literary studies (such as Eco and Showalter) and political 
science (such as Pipes) have done. Nevertheless, in writing about conspiracy 
theory primarily in terms of a politically successful or unsuccessful object, they 
too often fail to take into account their own positionality (their own discursive 
legitimacy) to any radical degree. And if what I have suggested above is true 
– that it becomes harder for us to decide what counts as cultural studies when 
we follow through the implications of questioning discursive authority – it 
is understandable. How – to rephrase the question I posed above – can we 
produce a cultural studies that would be able to take on board some elements 
of its mistaken, paranoid, conspiracy theory-like nature rather than trying to 
control, limit, marginalize or repress them? Does risk – or radical openness to 
the possibility of overinterpretation and conspiracy theory (and other ‘aberrant’ 
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elements) – lead to a ‘cultural studies’ that looks more or less like cultural studies? 
Or more and less: after all, this is the ‘same’ cultural studies that Stuart Hall is 
referring to when he discusses the necessity of inclusivity as a way for cultural 
studies to remain open-ended (see Hall 1996: 150 and 263). While I am sure Hall 
is envisaging interdisciplinarity rather than acknowledging paranoid tendencies 
in this scenario of inclusion, the idea of open-endedness cannot be advocated 
in a limited sense. What would an open-endedness that had to be regulated, that 
had to ‘end’ somewhere, be worth? Signiﬁcantly, Hall has also called for cultural 
studies to go towards, rather than away from, ‘dangers’ (1992: 285), which is 
precisely what I am trying to do in this book.
In a typically provocative manner, Slavoj Žižek claims that cultural studies has 
already subsumed these conspiratorial elements, suggesting that, in fact, cultural 
studies reads like a conspiracy theory:
If standard Cultural Studies criticize capitalism, they do so in the coded way 
that exempliﬁes Hollywood liberal paranoia: the enemy is ‘the system’, the 
hidden ‘organization’, the anti-democratic ‘conspiracy’, not simply capitalism 
and state apparatuses. The problem with this critical stance is not only that 
it replaces concrete social analysis with a struggle against abstract paranoiac 
fantasies, but that – in a typical paranoiac gesture – it unnecessarily redoubles 
social reality, as if there were a secret Organization behind the ‘visible’ cap-
italist and state organs. What we should accept is that there is no need for a 
secret ‘organization-within-an-organization’: the ‘conspiracy’ is already in the 
‘visible’ organization as such, in the capitalist system, in the way the political 
space and state apparatuses work. (2002: 170–1)
And I would have to agree that in its least rigorous and effective guise, cultural 
studies can fall back upon the simpliﬁcation of power to be found in paranoid 
rhetoric. In many ways, what is worrying about certain strands of conspiracy 
theory – the way in which it enables someone to produce knee-jerk reactions 
to anything that threatens their belief system – is true also for cultural studies. 
Witness, for example, the kind of unreﬂexive liberal response Wendy Brown 
received when she questioned the premise of women’s studies (see Brown 2001, 
and my discussion of it in Chapter 1). Yet, this near paranoid defensiveness is not 
what I have in mind when calling for cultural studies to take on board ‘marginal’ 
elements like conspiracy theory (and other popular knowledges). The kind of 
inclusion I’m thinking of does not manifest itself as vague allusions to an evil 
system instead of close readings of particular politico-economic conjunctures. 
The idea is not to replicate the failures of conspiracy theory but to take on board 
the lessons to be learnt from conspiracy theory regarding authority, legitimacy, 
and how to approach cultural phenomena without silencing it, in order to re-
imagine cultural studies and what it is capable of becoming.
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I will revisit these issues in different terms as I come to look at my second 
popular knowledge – that of gossip. Indeed, in turning to gossip, all that we have 
said here about how conspiracy theory functions is relevant. The relationship that 
we have considered between conspiracy theories and other more legitimated 
knowledges, including our own, will have implications for considering gossip 
too. In fact, as I increasingly learn the lessons of popular knowledge, it will 
become less possible to maintain my distance from it. I say all this by way of 
a welcoming: as I write this book, as I attempt to take on board what the form 
and content of popular knowledge has to tell me, I am trying to open myself to 
ways that might better reﬂect this close relationship. By the time I come to my 
next case study in Chapter 5, I will try, at least for part of it, to produce a more 
‘gossipy’ discussion of gossip. Similarly, it remains a necessary possibility that 
I might, in discussing conspiracy theory, have here constructed a conspiracy 
theory of conspiracy theory. That is as it should be.
CHAPTER 4
Hot Gossip: The Cultural Politics of Speculation
TEST YOUR GOSSIP-OMETER
 Which member of the British Royal family has refused calls to take a blood 
test to settle the issue of his/her paternity?
 Which of your friends is having an affair?
 Which supermodel attends Narcotics Anonymous?
 Which member of your family is most likely to be heavily in debt?
 Which A-List movie star hunk wears a hairpiece to disguise his baldness?
 Who is just about to get the sack in your workplace?
 Which international tennis star was formerly a high-class call girl/rent boy?
Obviously, I can’t tell you the answers – not even the ones about people in the 
public domain. For a start, I don’t know if the gossip I’ve encountered is true. And 
you’re probably not sure either. But if you answered most of these conﬁdently 
the likelihood is that you are already well aware of the way in which we receive 
and use gossip. You may think, therefore, that this chapter is not for you. Yet the 
fact that we are all so familiar with gossip – celebrity or otherwise – testiﬁes to 
the importance of understanding exactly what is at stake when we encounter it. 
For the time being, I won’t be divulging any more gossip, but in the next chapter, 
I will consider some early twenty-ﬁrst century encounters with gossip. First, I 
want to explore the cultural politics of gossip.
Hollywood gossip columnist Hedda Hopper famously defended her work by 
saying ‘Nobody’s interested in sweetness and light.’ But such appeals to human 
nature only get us so far when trying to understand the ubiquitous appearance 
of gossip (and its avatars) not only within popular culture, but even realms 
traditionally associated with ‘hard’ knowledge, like the university, government, 
and the economy. The cultural politics of gossip, therefore, includes a self-
reﬂexive consideration of the position from which cultural politics can even be 
considered. In this way, I will attempt to scrutinize the implications of gossip’s 
multiple contexts, focusing in the latter half of this chapter and the next on the 
way in which they challenge the status of knowledge and claims to legitimacy 
and authority. To begin a broader discussion about the places in which we 
encounter gossip and its many guises, I want to look at gossip as a cultural 
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phenomenon before moving on to think about how it has been positioned as an 
academic ‘object’.
THE SCENE OF GOSSIP
Within the remit of gossip, I am thinking not only of the face-to-face practice of 
speaking about an absent third party, say among friends or colleagues, but also 
the speculations and revelations that ﬁll the pages of tabloids and magazines. 
On this continuum countless variations lie – workmates discuss who is next in 
line for promotion; talk of a teacher’s affair with her pupil spreads around the 
playground; speculation about a rock star’s sexuality ﬁlters into a tabloid’s gossip 
column. All trade in a tension between the public and private – whether the 
‘public’ is local or global. When an unsavoury political scandal emerges, a familiar 
defence proposed by those who played an instrumental role in the exposé is 
that it is in the public’s interest to know the moral character of those involved 
(making the personal political in a way never intended by feminism when it 
coined the phrase). In the Bill Clinton–Monica Lewinsky affair, for example, the 
trustworthiness of Clinton was very much at the heart of the case, especially 
as Clinton initially denied having relations with ‘that woman’. The question of 
Clinton’s moral character (not only did he have extra-marital relations, but he 
lied about them) was seen to justify, for many, the prurient publishing of explicit 
details about their affair. The private in this case, is seen to be very much an 
issue of public concern. Justiﬁable or not, this making public – of the (‘real’ or 
invented) private lives of celebrities, politicians, colleagues, or peers – ensures 
that we can encounter gossip every day of the week even if we don’t engage in 
the practice within our immediate community.
Gossip Industry
The gossip industry involves not only individual celebrities but also, as Jack 
Levin and Arnold Arluke (1987) point out, his or her agent and any publicists and 
gossip columnists – encompassing cultural intermediaries. The contemporary 
celebrity industry is almost unthinkable without gossip – the production, 
generation, and cultivation of it. Gossip has long been recognized as supporting 
various entertainment industries such as ﬁlm or music. Though highly reliant on 
these industries for story content, celebrity gossip is now widely acknowledged 
to be a highly proﬁtable industry in its own right. Though much of the British 
tabloids’ content could be said to be lead by gossip already, they also include 
extremely popular columns or supplements devoted to reporting gossip. While 
this is a tradition that reaches back through the history of print – at least as far, 
Roger Wilkes wagers, as the news sheets of Restoration Grub Street and even 
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satirical Tudor pamphlets such as Thomas Nashe’s Pierce Penilesse of 1592 
(Wilkes 2002: 18) – the British Daily Mirror’s ‘3 AM girls’, the ‘Bizarre’ column 
in the Sun, or ‘The Goss’ in the Star reﬂect a more forceful gossip industry 
inﬂuenced by ‘pioneering’ journalists like Louella Parsons and Hedder Hopper 
who reported from behind the scenes of the Hollywood ﬁlm industry in the ﬁrst 
half of the twentieth century.
With the rise of the Internet, the history of gossip enters a new phase. The 
Internet both exacerbates the popularity and consumption of political spec-
ulation and celebrity gossip (through sponsored, proﬁt-making online gossip/
speculation sites) and challenges their protocol (the relatively unregulated 
Internet allows mediated gossip to have an interactive element, making it more 
like everyday gossip). For example, the UK based Popbitch.com offers a free 
weekly email bulletin collated from gossip posted on the message boards by real 
(or feigned) media workers. Started as a chatroom for music industry insiders to 
share their knowledge, Popbitch deliberately avoids mainstream brand sponsors 
or back scratching relationships with celebrity publicists. Journalist Kate Burt 
quotes Popbitch’s anonymous creator as saying: ‘the minute you go down the 
business route . . . you play into the hands of PRs’ (2001). Popbitch attempts 
to avoid libel (not always successfully – the site was closed down for three 
weeks after a tale involving an innocent TV presenter and some extremely 
unpleasant allegations of illegal sexual preferences) by disclaiming responsibility 
for any third party contributions, which of course, is what the site consists of. 
The site’s reputation for ﬁnding stories before the press and for printing ironic 
and entertaining stories that blur fact and ﬁction sustains its popularity among 
subscribers.
The interactivity and speed of the Internet has obviously shaped contemp-
orary gossip practices. Wilkes cites the Clinton-Lewinsky affair as one that 
displays the role of the Internet in contemporary gossip. The scoop was due 
to be published by the American magazine Newsweek, but the Ofﬁce of the 
Independent Council intervened as they were conducting an investigation and 
the publication date was postponed. Cybereporter, Matt Drudge, found out about 
the story and published it ﬁrst on his homemade website (see Wilkes 2002: 
316).
Indeed, it is possible to go so far as to claim that any history of gossip needs 
to be thought in tandem with the history of different modes of mass com-
munication and their effects. The telephone, for example, has been studied as a 
medium that inﬂuenced social interaction including gossip (see Fischer 1995), 
while Marshall McLuhan claimed that radio ‘contracts the world to village size, 
and creates insatiable village tastes for gossip, rumor and personal malice’ (1965: 
306). Others have argued that mass communication can both intensify and 
arrest gossip: so that while the proliferation of television and print media has 
obviously contributed to the conditions of celebrity culture that fuels a ‘gossip 
industry’, and provides a medium through which gossip can be relayed to 
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millions at a time, Ralph Rosnow and Gary Alan Fine point out that technologies 
such as the telegraph also had the opposite effect, quelling rumours quickly 
before they could spin out of control (1976: 94). The mobile phone, which has 
been compared with the old ‘garden fence’ (see Fox 2001), and the Internet 
are just the latest communication devices to feature in the continuance of, and 
investment in, gossip.
The New Gossip Economy
We therefore encounter and manage a great deal of gossipy knowledge every 
day, coming at us in both public and private realms, from the media and our 
acquaintances (of course these distinctions are anything but clear cut). Yet this 
glut of popular knowledge is not what Tony Blair primarily has in mind when he 
talks about the rise of the ‘knowledge economy’ and the importance of ‘know-
ledge workers’.1 The knowledge economy is often described as the logical next 
phase of capitalism after industrialization: one that places a premium upon 
invention and innovation.
Knowledge in this recently identiﬁed economic phase is hailed as the most 
important asset in many enterprises (from mining to venture capital) rather 
than – as in previous eras – land, non-renewable raw materials or traditional 
products. While knowledge in the knowledge economy is primarily thought of 
in terms of codiﬁed technical know-how (such as that information which can 
be communicated through, and learnt from, a manual), it is also the tacit, non-
codiﬁed, contextual knowledge embodied in humans (such as how to make that 
manual successful and useful). In other words, what is valuable in the knowledge 
economy is knowing how best to work with the knowledge we have. Which is 
where gossip comes in. Far from being excluded from the economy, it might 
play a central role in it – helping people to understand the knowledge around 
them and how best to use the power it engenders. If so, formal and informal 
knowledge networks can be given equal credence (the economy, unlike gossip’s 
critics, does not care how valuable knowledge is ascertained). This has certainly 
been recognized in knowledge management circles. Earl Mardle, for example, 
a freelance consultant, entitles his article ‘Gossip – the Original Knowledge 
Economy’ (2004). He states that it is futile for an organization to try to limit 
gossip in the way that some management teams desire ‘when the magazine 
stands and most of TV is predicated on salacious gossip and unsubstantiated 
rumour, including business columns and especially politics’ (Mardle 2004). But 
he also advocates recognizing ‘gossip [as] an economics of information’ that can 
be harnessed for the health of the organization.
I will consider more carefully this relation between gossip and the knowledge 
economy at the end of this chapter; for now, we simply need to recognize that 
gossip, far from being a property of the ‘gutter’, arises in the most respected and 
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‘rational’ domains. Not only is it a key commodity or currency within the current 
economic mode (in the way described above) but it can be seen to inﬂuence 
the ﬁnancial markets. Therefore, gossip about which stocks or currencies will 
rise or fall is not merely a comment upon ﬁnancial markets from the outside. 
This kind of gossip can also have a direct (and indirect) inﬂuence on the health 
of those stocks and currencies. Equally, gossip about world events can affect the 
market. In February 2005, for example, a rumour that American spy planes had 
caused an explosion near an Iranian nuclear plant caused the ﬁnancial markets 
to wobble.2 Studies in behavioural ﬁnance have long suggested that markets are 
inﬂuenced by emotional criteria rather than just rationalized predictions (see 
Shleifer 2000).
GOSSIP IS . . .
When gossip arises in such wide-ranging contexts, it becomes harder to ﬁnd an 
adequate description. Scholars in the ﬁeld have put forward many deﬁnitions. 
Sissela Bok describes gossip as ‘informal personal communication about other 
people who are absent or treated as absent’ (1982: 91). Ayim includes a long list 
of qualiﬁcations:
1) gossip is informal talk, 2) conducted within a very small group of parti-
cipants, 3) who know each other fairly well, and 4) trust one another not 
to violate each others’ conﬁdence. 5) The subject matter is highly personal, 
focused on knowledge of other people, and 6) the person or people who 
form the subject matter are not among those doing the discussing. Another 
set of features, though not necessary, is frequently associated with gossip: 
1) There is a sense of illicitness connected with the activity of gossip, and, 
hence, participants often engage in it covertly; 2) gossip is conversational. . . 
depending upon real interchange among participants. Other characteristics 
of gossip are subject to much debate: 1) whether gossip endorses or under-
mines social norms, 2) whether its content is trivial or highly signiﬁcant, 
3) whether it is limited to women or extends to men as well, 4) whether 
it occurs only in private domiciles, or extends to shop talk as well, and 5) 
whether it is unreliable and unsubstantiated or highly accurate and worthy of 
belief. (1994: 86)
In this apparently exhaustive list, however, the possibility of a gossip industry or 
economy does not seem to ﬁgure. This is where Jan B. Gordon’s open deﬁnition 
comes in useful (though it too introduces a problematic dimension). He suggests 
that gossip is ‘a discourse which enacts informational transfer while disclaiming 
(or being prohibited) from any foundational responsibility or representational 
share in its effects’ (Gordon 1996: 57). This deﬁnition moves beyond a concern 
96 Knowledge Goes Pop
with context (professional or private), gender, mode (conversational, trivial, 
signiﬁcant), medium (face-to-face or mediated encounters), meaning, or worth; 
to focus on the role of responsibility in any instance of gossip emission or 
production. Gossip, in this guise, is information or knowledge with a disclaimer 
clause: whereas information and knowledge are traditionally thought to be 
traceable to a source if they are to be considered information or knowledge 
at all, gossip puts on display the difﬁculty of such a pose. Illustrating this point, 
Homer Obed Brown writes, ‘If [gossip] is groundless and self-constituting it is 
because communities are so. It establishes an authority without an author. This 
ambiguity of gossip is emblematic of its riddle of narrative voice (and perhaps 
of language itself): who (or what) speaks (writes)?’ (1977: 579). While other 
modes of knowledge transmission are busy checking their sources, as Gordon 
would have it, gossip is enjoying itself. Hedonist gossip is largely unconcerned 
with its past (where the content comes from) and its future (what will happen 
as a result of the content being shared). I will return to this issue of inheritance 
and responsibility in the next chapter, by which point I will have revised (or re-
inscribed the meaning of) the terms of Gordon’s deﬁnition. But at this juncture 
I want to note that Gordon’s fear is widespread and taps into a deep-seated 
cultural antipathy towards gossip. And, although that antipathy might precede 
today’s gossip industry, it is perhaps exacerbated by that commercial context 
due to popular culture’s negative moral connotations.
I want to draw on these deﬁnitions but add a crucial dimension. I think we 
should also think about gossip as a highly speculative endeavour. In this way, the 
status of the information it communicates is ambiguous in terms not only of its 
verity, but also of whether it is claiming any veritable status at all. It could simply 
be about putting an idea into circulation that may or may not prove to be a good 
investment.
In the next few sections I will outline the academic treatment of gossip in 
order to pave the way for my own intervention. The treatment and positioning of 
gossip has been dictated by two opposing trends. The more established approach 
– drawing inspiration from a range of discourses – saw gossip as a negative and 
destructive social force. After Max Gluckman’s seminal 1963 essay, ‘Gossip and 
Scandal’, an ethnography of gossip among Makah Native Americans, the other, 
more recent approach positioned gossip as an essential and effective part of 
group maintenance and management. I want to provide examples of these two 
approaches as a way to begin thinking about what gets lost between them.
EVIL TONGUES
The mayor of a small Columbian town recently outlawed gossip. He said, 
‘Human beings must recognise that having a tongue and using it to do bad is the 
same as having dynamite in their mouths’ (see Flett 2005: 4). Offenders could 
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be sentenced to four years in jail. Extreme as this example is, the sentiments 
behind it are commonplace. Many commentators and critics at various points in 
history in a variety of geographical contexts have presented the consumption 
and production of gossip as a negative force. For these critics, gossip is a form 
of contamination that needs to be eradicated. For example, Sissela Bok claims: 
‘gossip can be an intoxicating surrogate for genuine efforts to understand . . . It 
turns easily into habit, and for some a necessity. They may then become unable 
to think of other human beings in other than trivial ways’ (1982: 100). Bok’s 
warning fashions gossip as a narcotic that encourages addiction. There is no 
room, in this scenario, for both ‘genuine efforts to understand’ and gossip – 
gossip colonizes the cognitive ﬁeld but can only ever be a surrogate, rather 
than a mode of knowledge in its own right. Gossip is dangerous because it is 
bad practice, excessive, unﬁxed in truth, unsecured by the presence of those 
discussed, and presents information out of context. Nicholas Emler, when ex-
ploring why gossip has received such bad press, suggests that criticisms arise 
from the idea that ‘gossip is not merely a sin of omission – one should have 
been using one’s time more productively – but also a sin of commission. It is 
deliberate mischief making’ (1994: 119). According to a Protestant work ethic 
and equivalent concerns with productivity and utility, gossip is not productive 
enough (it wastes time that could be spent in labour) and overly productive 
(of distractions from work). It produces too much labour and talk of the ‘wrong’ 
kind.
A history of the word’s usage suggests a reason why the practice of gossip 
has gained negative connotations. The etymological root of gossip simply means 
‘God-related’ (God’s sib). The word evolved from the description of a godparent 
to include a close friend. Before the nineteenth century, gossip could be used 
to refer to fellowship and fraternity between men, but it was its other meaning 
– which referred to a woman’s friends invited to be at a birth – that led to 
its latterly female gendered identity. By the time of Dr Johnson’s dictionary of 
1755, a gossip is deﬁned as ‘one who runs about tattling like women at a lying-
in’ (quoted in Wilkes 2002: 7); and in the nineteenth century, ‘the term gossip 
referred speciﬁcally to “idle talk” and “tattling”’ (Levin and Arluke 1987: 5). This 
gradual feminization consolidated gossip’s negative cultural status.
Below, I’m going to brieﬂy focus on several realms in which gossip becomes 
an object of critique. I have chosen these discourses as examples because it 
seems to me that though distinct, each can be considered an important and 
inﬂuential form of societal regulation (ranging from explicit prohibition to subtle 
inﬂuence).
Religion
The injunction against gossip and its equivalents in a range of religious texts is 
striking. The Christian commandment – ‘You shall not bear false witness against 
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your neighbour’ (Exod. 20: 16) is echoed throughout later Books.3 Sylvia Schein 
(1994: 140) hones in on a few of these echoes including: ‘You shall not go 
around as a slanderer among your people’ (Lev. 19: 16); ‘A gossip goes about tel-
ling secrets’ (Prov. 11: 13); ‘Like a gold ring in a pig’s snout is a beautiful woman 
without good sense’ (in earlier versions, ‘good sense’ is given as ‘discretion’) (Prov. 
11: 22); and ‘A gossip reveals secrets; therefore do not associate with a babbler’ 
(Prov. 20: 19). Peter Fenves ﬁnds in Amos a clear instance of this prejudice: ‘the 
price of associating with those who engage in empty conversation is spelled 
out’ (1993: 256, fn. 15). Schein and Fenves also detect an avid concern with 
gossip and attempts to regulate speech in general in the New Testament. Schein 
points out that ‘gossip appears among such serious transgressions as malice, 
envy, murder, and deceit’ in Romans 1: 29 and Corinthians II 12: 19 (1994: 140). 
Fenves (1993: 256) cites the example of Paul admonishing the Ephesians: ‘Let 
no evil talk come out of your mouth’ (Eph. 4: 29); and James’s description of the 
tongue as a ﬂame (James 3: 6). In his ‘letter’, James goes on to encourage purity at 
the source of language, asking Christians not to bless and curse out of the same 
mouth: ‘Does a spring pour forth from the same opening both fresh and brackish 
water?’ (James 3: 11). Ultimately, the tongue – speech, communication – is at risk 
of betraying its owner at every step and must be kept in check: ‘but no one can 
tame the tongue – restless evil, full of deadly poison’ (James 3:8). Vigilance and 
restraint must be practiced as gossip (along with boastfulness, curses, blasphemy 
and so forth) is fashioned as a poison waiting to contaminate the tongue and 
impair the moral or spiritual ‘health’ and even (if we give credence to the use of 
‘deadly’) existence of the speaker. In line with this, great attention is given to the 
distinction between appropriate and inappropriate speech in general in Sirach 
(20: 1–8, 18–20).
Fenves casts his net wider for other scriptural injunctions against gossip:
Talmudic and rabbinic literature . . . often denounces loshon hora (evil tongue, 
hearsay, gossip) . . . The justification against the injunction against loshon 
hora remains constant: once God entered into human language, he 
sanctiﬁed it, and so its only altogether legitimate use lies in the preservation, 
remembrance, and study of divinely sanctioned speech. Every other use, even 
those that are not blasphemous or otherwise ra (evil, wicked), amounts to 
illegitimate intrusions into a domain made holy by the divine presence. (1993: 
256–7)
Editors of The Encyclopedia of the Jewish Religion explain that the rabbis of 
classical Judaism in late antiquity warned against gossip in the most heightened 
terms. For example, the rabbis claimed that slander, talebearing, and evil talk 
were worse than the three cardinal sins of murder, immorality, and idolatry. 
Indulging in lashon ha-ra is seen to be akin to denying the existence of God 
(see the entry for ‘Lashon Ha-ra’ in Zwi Werblowsky and Wigoder 1986). Of note 
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for our discussion later concerning the unstable verity of content transmitted 
through gossip is that while Judaism distinguishes between slander (lashon ha-
ra), which refers speciﬁcally to true talebearing, and motsi’ shem ra’ (causing a 
bad name), which applies to untrue stories, ‘both are totally forbidden by Jewish 
Law’ (Zwi Werblowsky and Wigoder 1997: 648). Here, then, the verity of the 
gossip is not at issue, but rather the very act of passing potentially damaging 
information on whether true or false.
Islam too warns of gossip’s adverse effects on the community. Al-Gibah, the 
translator of a short book by Husayn al-Awayishah on the subject tells us, is not 
an easy concept to translate, but ‘it may be loosely covered by the term “gossip”’ 
(Khattab in al-Awayishah 2000: 5). al-Awayishah cites many indictments against 
gossip for Muslims and offers an Islamic code to live by that strictly excludes it. 
One vivid deterrent can be found in Sunan Abu-Dawud, a collection of sayings 
and deeds of Prophet Muhammad recorded by Abu-Dawud (see translation 
by Hassan 1983). The following hadeeth describes the fate of gossipers: ‘The 
Prophet said: When I was taken up to heaven I passed by people who had nails 
of copper and were scratching their faces and their breasts. I said: Who are these 
people, Gabriel? He replied: They are those who were given to back biting and 
who aspersed people’s honour’ (Book 41, No. 4860).
Not only is producing gossip prohibited but listening to it is seen as a lapse 
in the conduct of a good Muslim: for Allah, according to the Qur’an, said, ‘Every 
act of hearing, or of seeing, or of (feeling in) the heart will be enquired into (on 
the Day of Reckoning)’ (al-Isra 17: 36).4 Another hadeeth, this time from Sahir 
Bukari, tells us that Allah’s Apostle said, ‘Whoever believes in Allah and the Last 
Day should talk what is good or keep quiet, and whoever believes in Allah and 
the Last Day should not hurt (or insult) his neighbor’ (Volume 8, Book 76, No. 
482). Correcting any indulgence in Al-Gibah is advised in the ﬁrst instance, 
and failing that, walking away – the words of Allah are clear on this point: ‘turn 
away from [men engaged in vain discourse] . . . unless they turn to a different 
theme . . . do not sit in the company of those who do wrong’ (al-An`am 6: 68). To 
avoid being blameworthy in the sight of Allah for even just overhearing gossip, 
a Muslim should go to the person being spoken about to confront them with 
what has been observed (al-Awayishah 2000: 56–7). Gossip about a lapse in faith 
is itself seen as a lapse. Focus on other people’s faults – which forms a good deal 
of gossip’s content – is an unquestionable distraction from faith.
Etiquette and Ethics
As Spacks (1985) and Gordon (1996) show, the moral ramiﬁcations of gossip 
have concerned many essayists and novelists. Anxiety about the moral code that 
gossip apparently challenges and the spiritual corruption of those who indulge 
in gossip, seem to be leftovers from religious guidance regarding conduct that 
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I have just looked at. Spacks writes, ‘Moralists did not abandon the language of 
Christian reference, but their increasing shrillness suggests that readers could 
no longer automatically be expected to assume the primacy of their Christian 
obligations’ (1985: 28). But on certain occasions, as Spacks points out, moralists 
focus less on the one who is gossiping, and more on the damage inﬂicted upon 
the one gossiped about: ‘The three aspects of gossip condemned by the moralists 
. . . – its circulation of slander, its betrayal of secrets, its penetration of privacy 
– all embody threats to those made the objects of gossip’s discourse’ (1985: 
33). Gossip’s tendency to objectify becomes a matter for concern for those 
objectiﬁed.
The necessity of protection against the adverse effects of gossip can also be 
detected in earlier literature with a slightly more amorous focus. Literature con-
cerned with courtly love, for example, fashioned gossip as ‘most “uncourtly”’ 
(Schein 1994: 140): a force against which love and lovers must protect 
themselves. To illustrate, Sylvia Schein quotes Andreas Capellanus’ Art of Courtly 
Love (‘a sort of summary of the rules or the doctrine of courtly love’ from the 
twelfth century): ‘love decrees that if the lady ﬁnds that her lover is foolish 
and indiscreet. . .or if she says that he has no regard for her modesty, she will 
not forgive his bashfulness’ (quoted in Schein 1994: 140). Gossip in this guise 
threatens the success of love. Of course, gossip may be uncourtly in one sense 
(ungentlemanly, unwise, ungracious), but what is not acknowledged in this 
conﬁguration is the way in which gossip could be said to be at the heart of the 
court – the court, that is, was only made up of reputation making or breaking, 
and the circulation of political gossip, which would not have excluded love 
gossip. In this blindness, as Schein goes on to show, gossip is personiﬁed in the 
courtly literature ‘as the enemy of love’: ‘Guillaume de Lorris in his Romance 
of the Rose (ca. 1237), an allegoric epic about ideal love, includes among the 
allegoric ﬁgures . . . [one] he calls “Evil Tongue”. . .’ (Schein 1994: 140).
Love ﬁgures here as a bond that keeps the secret of intimacy between lovers. 
Real love, true love, will not abide disclosure or indiscretion. It becomes aligned 
with a trust between only two. Any third person is considered an evil tongue 
waiting to expose the details only contextual within the trust of love, or able 
to threaten the bond with incitements to jealousy. ‘Besides being condemned 
by Scripture, then’, Schein points out, ‘gossip was considered “uncourtly”, an 
initiator of jealousy and therefore a foe of love and of lovers’ (1994: 141). Keep-
ing clear of gossip becomes less out of fear of sullying an unblemished spiritual 
record than spoiling one’s chances of secular happiness (though, of course, to an 
extent, courtly love functioned as an allegory for divine love).
Though not evident in this early literature or in the religious texts in which 
gossip is a risk for either gender, etiquette manuals from the seventeenth century 
onwards often focused exclusively on the behaviour of women. Gordon tells us 
how conduct books warned against listening to tales and rhymes, including 
children’s stories. For example, John Locke cautioned parents ‘not to allow their 
 Hot Gossip 101
children to be terrorized by the “prattle” . . . of nurses’ stories which interfered 
with the development of a presumably empirical reason’ (Gordon 1996: 37). 
Gordon sees this as one example of a prejudice against an oral folk tradition 
but what is in evidence here is a whole binary system whereby women, oral 
tradition, emotionality, and fantasy are stacked up on one side while men, 
scholarly tradition, scientiﬁc rationalism, and factuality are on the other. In terms 
of protection, the latterly gendered associations of gossip implied that men (and 
women) needed to protect themselves from the excesses of gender (that gossip 
supposedly signiﬁed).
The Law
If we turn to the treatment and status of hearsay as evidence in courts (parti-
cularly courts of common rather than civil law), it becomes clear that the law is 
another realm which has felt the need to erect safeguards against the effects of 
gossip.5 The degree to which this reﬂects a society’s prejudice against ‘bastard’ 
orality rather than a desire to ensure justice is debatable and of course varies in 
different constitutional contexts.
To take the US example, the guidelines in the Federal Rules of Evidence for 
determining what counts as hearsay in court characterizes it as a ‘declarative, 
secondhand statement offered in evidence as proof of a matter asserted. In 
order for a declaration to be deemed hearsay, the statement must be established 
as assertive in intention’ (Gordon 2001: 204). Equating gossip with hearsay, 
Gordon claims that gossip ‘has been a “suspect” discourse, in the Anglo-American 
tradition, when brought to court. For, though there is no reason why second-
hand utterances are innately less likely to be truthful than those of persons 
present, this sort of talk is imagined to pervert justice’ (2001: 203). Gordon goes 
on to provide a fascinating history of the treatment of this ‘unruly orality’ within 
the law, pointing towards some of the contradictions inherent in this exclusion 
along the way. For example, there are a number of exceptions to the hearsay 
rule including the reporting of dying words. If ‘hearsay [can be] “rationalized” 
– rendered ﬁrsthand and purged of its authorless, originless, traceless character 
– through a mediate process by the declarant’, Gordon tells us, ‘it no longer 
qualiﬁes as fugitive orality and is thus admissible’ (2001: 204–5). The irony is 
clear: though hearsay is kept at bay through the court’s appeal to rationality 
and reason, ‘the more ‘irrational’ utterances (dying declarations, a child’s res 
gestae exclamations, “state of mind” descriptions, highly emotive victim impact 
testimony)’, Gordon explains, are ‘judged admissible under the assumption that 
deception is less likely in highly emotional, associational, or reﬂective narrative’ 
(2001: 214).
Though written afﬁdavits are given precedence over hearsay in court, the 
philosophical privilege given to speech (as an assurance of truth, self-identity 
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etc.) is kept intact, for an afﬁdavit is seen as being a more accurate record of 
what someone has said than the spontaneous recollections of another witness. 
The afﬁdavit is only privileged for its apparent proximity to the actual spoken 
moment under consideration. The written only supersedes speech when the 
latter recalls other speech: when it is second-hand, and therefore, ironically, closer 
to the traditional view of writing. Jacques Derrida has repeatedly shown how 
writing has been fashioned by Western metaphysics as a mode of representation 
beleaguered by the risk of forgery as it has to function in the absence of its 
author. Writing, according to this phonocentric logic, is further away from the 
truth, more susceptible to lies and fabulation, a mere copy in place of an absent 
original. What is important here is that despite this ideality given to speech in 
Western thought, ‘the procedural exclusion of hearsay evidence would suggest 
a prejudice against unregulated orality in Western jurisprudence’ (Gordon 2001: 
210). Speech is privileged unless it is gossip, for gossip is thought to have been 
‘contaminated’ by the same fallibilities that belong to writing. Presence remains 
dominant. Hearsay or gossip is thus imagined by common law to be on the 
‘outside’, even when it is permitted (because these instances are fashioned as 
exceptional). In practice, this means being cautious about any spoken evidence 
that cannot be cross-examined, to limit the possibility of a witness speaking 
about someone who is not there to defend themselves – all admirable and 
necessary; but in theory (and this, I would argue, has ramiﬁcations for ‘practice’), 
this exclusion and the privileging of presence as a surer access to truth is highly 
fragile.
While Gordon considers the (in)admissibility of gossip into court as evidence 
within a trial, Patricia Mellencamp, looking primarily at the American example 
again, is interested in what happens when gossip takes the dock itself. In 
discussing libel and defamation (accusations that focus on the effects of gossip), 
Mellencamp ﬁnds gossip to be a pivot around which capital, corporate culture 
and print culture spin (1992: 157). In these cases, several guidelines are put in 
place to determine slander from libel, once deﬁned as the difference between 
casting aspersions on someone else by talking to others, and publishing those 
opinions. But in the televisual and electronic age, the distinction becomes 
blurred. (TV presenters, for example, are only talking to others – akin to slander; 
but that talk is broadcast to millions – closer to libel. The case of Ron Atkinson 
in the UK springs to mind as one that complicates the distinction. Atkinson, an 
ITV football commentator, made racist comments about the Chelsea FC player 
Marcel Desailly, thinking he was off air. Unfortunately for him, his comments 
were broadcast in several places in the Middle East, including Dubai and Egypt. 
Slander or libel?)
Attempts to make the deﬁnition clear in this age include the idea that some-
thing can be considered libel if it is read from a written text but only slander if 
spoken without a script (Mellencamp 1992: 185). The written text makes the 
statement seem as though it is presenting itself as fact, while the spoken word 
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can always be taken as mere opinion. The rehearsed and composed is held to 
be more responsible than the spontaneous and disorganized. However, in a 
further complication, creative writing is virtually immune to accusations of libel 
– ﬁction being seen as dealing with opinion rather than fact. As with the criteria 
for determining admissible from inadmissible hearsay, these divisions could be 
challenged.
In the US, the issues raised by gossip (as libel or defamation) are caught in a 
tension between protecting citizens against defamation and the right to freedom 
of speech. So while much effort is made to demarcate which kind of hearsay is 
admissible as evidence in a court of law, hearsay in the guise of libellous gossip 
is very much at the centre of the litigation ‘industry’ in the US and elsewhere, 
where lawsuits involve large sums of money for defendants, claimants, and 
lawyers alike. Much energy is spent deﬁning what is admissible or inadmissible, 
and malicious or innocent gossip; a great deal of capital is spent keeping gossip 
in check.
Philosophy
In philosophical terms, gossip and associated forms of communication such as 
‘chatter’ and ‘idle talk’ have been posited negatively against the pursuit of truth. 
Robert F. Goodman believes that gossip is lambasted on the grounds that it is the 
emotional rather than informational content that drives the speaker and draws 
the listener. If emotions stand in contrast to reason, ‘gossip is repugnant to the 
rationalist conception of knowledge that we have inherited from the Greeks and 
that has dominated Western thought since the seventeenth century’ (Goodman 
1994: 6). This distaste can be clearly seen in early texts. Plato’s dialogues, for 
example, are broken up by ‘accusations of le¯ros (small talk)’ (Fenves 1993: 6). 
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes the desirable conduct of the ‘great-
souled man’ (megalopsuchos): ‘Nor is he a gossip; for he will speak neither about 
himself nor about another, since he cares not to be praised nor for others to be 
blamed’ (Aristotle 1984: 1775). As Jorg R. Bergmann reminds us, gossips were 
seen as stock characters within Greek drama: ‘Theophrastus, Aristotle’s student 
. . . in his famous “Characters” describes the “backbiter” with the remark, “He is 
prone to malign one of the company who has gone out; and give him but one 
the opportunity, he will not forbear to reville his own kin, nay he will often 
speak ill of his friends and kinsfolk, and of the dead”’ (Bergmann 1987: 21–2 
quoting from Theophrastus 1953: 117).
The ethico-rationalist grounds for castigating gossip are idiosyncratically 
appealed to by later philosophers. Chatter for Kierkegaard disrupts the difference 
between silence and speech. Chatter is not speech with content, it is speech 
that says nothing but is not silent. Those who indulge in chatter cannot speak 
or act ‘essentially’; rather chatter moves ‘ahead of essential speaking, and giving 
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utterance to reﬂection has a weakening effect on action by getting ahead of it’ 
(Kierkegaard [1846] 1978: 97). Chatter is in excess of essential speaking; it 
dilutes action. ‘Talkativeness’ gets one further from what is important, practised 
as it is by people who ‘are not turned inward in quiet contentment, in inner 
satisfaction, in religious sensitiveness’ (Kierkegaard [1846] 1978: 97). With 
decreasing ideality and increasing externality, Kierkegaard warns, ‘conversation 
will tend to become a trivial rattling and name-dropping, referenced to persons 
with “absolutely reliable” private information on what this one and that one, 
mentioned by name, have said etc., a garrulous conﬁding of what he himself 
wants or does not want’ ([1846] 1978: 99). It is only by avoiding such a state of 
affairs, by attaining ‘the inward orientation of silence’ that ‘cultured conversa-
tion’ can be achieved (Kierkegaard [1846] 1978: 99). Kierkegaard realizes that 
most everyday conversation is based on chatter – gossip about their daily affairs 
– and that ‘all those garrulous people’ would be ‘miserable’ should it be banned. 
He amusingly proposes that a law be passed demanding everyone speak about 
things as if they had happened ﬁfty years ago (Kierkegaard [1846] 1978: 100). In 
other words, only the essential essence of an event would be reported, gossipy 
trivia would fall by the way.
A particular kind of silence is respected by Heidegger too: ‘In talking with 
one another, the person who keeps silent can “make one understand” (that is, 
he can develop an understanding), and he can do so more authentically than 
the person who is never short of words’ ([1927] 1962: 208). The opposite of 
silence is ‘idle talk’ (Gerede) which communicates by ‘gossiping and passing 
the word along’ (Heidegger [1927] 1962: 212). This occurs when the speaker 
is more interested in the claim made about an object than understanding the 
essential nature of the object itself. The object becomes lost to interpretation 
of it. That which is spoken about in this mode accumulates authority simply 
through circulation – ‘Things are so because one says so’ – rather than authentic 
discourse which has a ‘primary relationship-of-Being towards the entity being 
talked about’ (Heidegger [1927] 1962: 212). Moreover, Heidegger claims, ‘The 
average understanding of the reader will never be able to decide what has 
been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle and how much is mere 
gossip’ ([1927] 1962: 212). Such a distinction, he indicates, is not an issue for 
the average understanding because it thinks it knows everything anyway (it 
does not, we could say, know that it does not know). ‘Idle talk is the possibility 
of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own’ 
(Heidegger [1927] 1962: 213). Genuine understanding is positioned against this 
repetition of superﬁcial, groundless readings. Rather than disclosure, then, the 
effect of idle talk and its accompanying illusion of understanding is to close off 
the object and a thorough understanding of it.
Responses to these philosophical charges against gossip will point us towards 
a more recent trend of what I want to call ‘gossip appropriation’ – towards read-
ings that problematize dismissals of gossip to focus on its positive or essential 
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role in human relations. Having earlier warned about the excesses of gossip 
himself, Bok responds to the sentiments of Heidegger and Kierkegaard by 
branding them reductive. These warnings against gossip, Bok claims, ‘often fail 
to consider its extraordinary variety. They ignore the attention it can bring to 
human complexity, and are unaware of its role in conveying information without 
which neither groups nor societies could function’ (1982: 101). This appeal to 
societal functionality for gossip’s redemption is echoed with a slightly different 
pitch by Spacks: ‘Heidegger’s distaste for gossip, and Kierkegaard’s, deny the 
moral possibilities of trivia.’ In this way, ‘The value of gossip at its highest level’, 
Spacks reasons, ‘involves its capacity to create and intensify human connection 
and to enlarge self-knowledge predicated more on emotion than on thought’ 
(1985: 18–19). Rather than reading gossip as spiritually corrupting, general bad 
practice, an enemy of love, unsecured by presence, a deviation from the pursuit 
of truth, harmfully speculative, excessive interpretation, and as an obstruction to 
genuine efforts to understand, the appropriative readings want to emphasize the 
social or psychological uses of gossip. In this alternative view, gossip’s prevalence 
in contemporary culture might not be a signal of ‘dumbing down’ or immorality 
but a necessary feature of a functioning society.
GOOD GOSSIP
This vindication of gossip might be best exemplified by the premise of an 
interdisciplinary edited collection of essays entitled Good Gossip (Goodman 
1994). Though unanimous vindication is not achieved, the collection sets out to 
counter the traditional moral condemnations of gossip (Goodman 1994: 1–2). As 
an example of one of the more forthrightly positive accounts in this collection, 
Nicholas Emler’s essay, ‘Gossip, Reputation, and Social Adaptation’, tells us that 
‘gossip . . . is fundamental to the functioning of all human collectives’ particularly 
‘the successful adaptation of humans to the requirements of group living and 
the control mechanisms that operate to conserve effectively functioning human 
groups’ (1994: 117). Such an approach takes its cue from anthropological studies 
like Max Gluckman’s ‘Gossip and Scandal’, which illustrates gossip as group 
maintenance and management:
gossip, and even scandal, have important positive virtues. Clearly they main-
tain the unity, morals and values of social groups. Beyond this, they enable 
these groups to control the competing cliques and aspiring individuals of 
which all groups are composed. And ﬁnally, they make possible the selection 
of leaders without embarrassment. (1963: 308)
By bestowing the ‘right’ to gossip, the Makah Native Americans Gluckman was 
studying signal when a person has been accepted: ‘It is a hallmark of membership’ 
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(Gluckman 1963: 313). Equally, it enables this community to mark its boundary 
from another as codes of allegiance are drawn.
While anthropologists focus on the socializing processes inherent in gossip 
– seeing it as an important component of normative group mentality and social 
functioning – other disciplinary interventions have fashioned gossip as an 
altogether more subversive object. In the preface to Gossip, Spacks is clear 
about her motives: ‘My mission began to deﬁne itself as a rescue operation: 
to restore positive meaning to a word that had once held it, and to celebrate 
the set of values and assumptions particularly associated with women, as well 
as with gossip’ (1985: x). With this mission in mind, Spacks ﬁnds fault with 
the sociological approach, feeling that it avoids moral judgement. In bypassing 
‘ancient problems of propriety and of virtue’ (1985: 34), Spacks thinks that 
sociological accounts haven’t fully considered the possibility that gossip offers 
an alternative moral code to that which dominates public life:
If gossip in its positive aspects indeed reﬂects moral assumptions different 
from those of the dominant culture, that fact suggests . . . its special usefulness 
for subordinated classes. It embodies an alternative discourse to that of public 
life, and a discourse potentially challenging to public assumptions; it provides 
language for an alternative culture. Gossip’s way of telling can project a 
different understanding of reality from that of society at large, even though 
gossip may claim to articulate the voice of the community. A rhetoric of 
inquiry, gossip questions the established. (Spacks 1985: 46)
Gossip, here, is not simply a mode of communication telling us how com-
munities bond or function regardless of the content. Spacks moves beyond form 
to think about gossip’s content – to think, that is, about gossip as a resistant 
‘way of knowing’ (1985: 46). She focuses on gossip’s attention to detail, to the 
particular, and to understanding relationships, ﬁnding them to play a vital role 
for ‘alternative culture’ or ‘subordinate classes’. Here she locates a way for those 
traditionally disenfranchised by knowledge systems to be able to participate in 
the construction of ‘reality’ in a move not dissimilar to John Fiske’s in relation to 
conspiracy theory we have already seen in Chapter 3.
Also to be found in Good Gossip are claims to the subversive potential of 
gossip:
the theme of resistance or subversion runs powerfully through a number 
of these chapters. People gossip about the powerful, rich, and famous in 
order to “cut them down to size.” Informal gossip networks ﬂourish in large, 
bureaucratic organizations as a way of softening, resisting, or subverting their 
depersonalizing tendencies. Gossip offers passive resistance to many forms of 
power. (Goodman 1994: 5)
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An exemplary essay in this vein is Maryann Ayim’s. She considers gossip as an 
efﬁcient form of knowledge acquisition when other more ‘revered’ avenues 
are unavailable: ‘Those who remain shut off from the bastions of commonly 
recognized social and political power will continue to look to gossip as one 
form of inquiry, knowing, and power available to them as other forms are not’ 
(Ayim 1994: 99). Ayim even goes so far as to say: ‘If . . . we want to keep the road 
of inquiry open, we are obliged not just to condone gossip but to encourage it’ 
for gossip is a way of ﬁnding things out when more formal modes of inquiry 
aren’t up to the job (1994: 99).
In such positive accounts, however, the aberrant status given to gossip by its 
detractors is kept largely intact. In positive accounts, gossip is still positioned as 
an improper or informal knowledge (that holds societies together, say, or that 
has subversive potential). Gossip is still posited outside of ‘ofﬁcial’ knowledge. 
Let me explain through the example of anthropology, for the way in which this 
discipline conﬁgures its relationship with gossip is very telling. At ﬁrst, it would 
seem as if anthropology comes closest to collapsing the difference between 
academic knowledge and gossip. Gluckman, for example, understood the close 
relationship between the work of the anthropologist and the work of the gossip. 
Recounting the experiences of a fellow anthropologist, Gluckman wrote, ‘When 
Frankenberg had been in the village for some time, as soon as he went into a 
shop, the tea-kettle was put on the ﬁre: after all, as anthropologos, he was the 
scandalmonger par excellence’ (1963: 315), before commenting on his own time-
consuming, gossip-tinged shop transactions during anthropological ﬁeldwork. 
However, saying that the role of the anthropologist is like the role of the gossip 
– that gossip is an integral part of acquiring information for anthropological 
study – keeps the identity of gossip and of academic enquiry intact. If gossip 
is an integral part of the community, the anthropologist can hardly risk paying 
it no attention. Gossip, in this setup, is employed as a distinct and knowable 
mode in order to be a part of the community that the anthropologist hopes to 
observe and understand; but as a research method, it is often imagined to be left 
at the door of the university on return. Although gossip enters into the world 
of academics/anthropologists, it doesn’t radically upset the categories of know-
ledge they work with.
Similarly, in Spacks’ argument about women’s relation to gossip, gossip 
may temporarily take the place, and therefore challenge the dominance 
of, ‘official’ modes of rational thought and communication but it is still 
conﬁgured as outside of ofﬁcial modes of knowing: it is deﬁned against these 
norms. In these appropriative readings, therefore, the main difference to 
the injunctions against gossip detailed earlier, is that the ‘improper’ quality 
of the knowledge is seen as potentially positive and useful rather than neg-
ative and useless. The opposition between knowledge and gossip is kept 
largely in place. Even when gossip is considered to be a form of knowledge, 
for example, it is still clear what a ‘legitimate’ mode of knowledge is and 
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therefore how gossip can function like it. Though explored, catalogued, and 
vindicated, gossip itself isn’t necessarily interrogated. I want to argue that at 
one level these appropriative accounts are on the right tracks – that gossip 
certainly does present a challenge to ‘ofﬁcial’ forms of knowledge, and that it 
does have a central role to play in society. But I want to take a step further 
to show that gossip’s identity is challenged as well as challenging. Gossip is 
not left intact by the encounter with knowledge (as apparently transparent 
justiﬁed true belief) and vice versa. Moreover, this modiﬁcation will have 
already occurred; the ‘encounter’ has already happened. I am arguing, then, 
that gossip is a constitutive necessity: which is, as I will explain, very different 
from saying that it plays an important role in society.
THE FUTURES MARKET: INVESTING IN THEORY
What I want to propose here, and what I think is lacking from previous 
accounts of gossip within cultural studies (and the humanities and social 
sciences generally) is that gossip, far from being a contaminating force that 
needs to be kept in check or an aberrant, improper form of knowledge external 
to knowledge proper, is at the heart of cognition, conditioning any history 
of knowledge or claim to knowledge put forward within the socio-cultural 
sphere. Such a conﬁguration will force us to reconsider the opposition between 
‘illegitimate’ and ‘legitimate’ knowledge. I want to begin to explain my position 
by turning to an interesting earlier attempt on the part of cultural studies to 
redraw the relationship between academic discourses and popular, everyday 
discursive culture (one that I’ve found to be a useful springboard from which 
to think about these issues): that provided by Toby Miller and Alec McHoul in 
Popular Culture and Everyday Life (1998).
I want to consider Miller and McHoul’s book to further my discussion at this 
stage for three main reasons. First, it presents one of the few attempts in recent 
cultural studies to move the ‘discipline’ beyond what Miller and McHoul call 
‘speculative readings’ (that is not just a proposed return to political economy). A 
‘speculative’ cultural studies, as they see it, produces unsubstantiated speculation 
via critical theory on the meaning and importance of everyday culture. I too feel 
that a certain kind of ‘speculative’ reading is problematic and I want to test the 
apparent escape route presented in Popular Culture and Everyday Life. Second, 
in using the term ‘speculative’ when referring to the kind of cultural studies 
that they want to challenge, Miller and McHoul prompted me to think about 
the connection between cultural studies, theory and gossip, if we think of all 
three as (albeit very different) forms of speculation. Third, in fashioning ‘critical 
theorizing’ (Miller and McHoul 1998: 181) as the villain of the piece, Miller and 
McHoul present an opportunity for me to explain exactly why I think ‘theorizing’, 
for my money, is a better investment than their own ethnomethodologically 
 Hot Gossip 109
inspired cultural studies (EMICS), political economy approaches, or the kind of 
‘speculative’, politically determined accounts they critique. In particular it offers 
me the opportunity, which I will take in the following chapter, to explain why 
deconstruction can offer a more responsible, more political even, future for 
cultural studies.
To divulge some academic gossip of a kind, one respondent to an earlier 
paper version of this chapter suggested that nobody takes Miller and McHoul 
seriously (implying, of course, that I shouldn’t either).6 I think that a comment 
like this misses the point. First, it raises all sorts of questions about academic 
legitimacy, some of which I want to address further below. Second, whether or 
not they have been taken particularly seriously, I nevertheless found Miller and 
McHoul’s book productive for helping me think through some of these issues 
and ideas (even if this ‘thinking through’ has often been in the face of or against 
their ideas). And third, while I certainly don’t think we necessarily need take 
Miller and McHoul’s answer very seriously, I do think that the question they raise 
in their book is in fact the right one to ask: how to move cultural studies beyond 
readings of culture that arrive with an a priori politics that is then revealed in 
some cultural product or practice.
This question of the aptness of politically determined speculative readings, of 
course, enters a well-established debate between cultural studies and political 
economists best exempliﬁed by Nicholas Garnham and Lawrence Grossberg’s 
exchange in the 1990s (see Gary Hall (2002) for a provocative examination 
of this debate). Garnham expressed a distaste that many political economists 
held for cultural studies and what they saw to be its tendency to produce 
politically ‘optimistic’ readings of subversive or resistant culture (what Miller and 
McHoul are calling ‘speculative readings’), and not paying sufﬁcient attention 
to the economic conditions of cultural industries and their ensuing constraints. 
Grossberg defended cultural studies against these attacks, pointing to the work 
of those in cultural studies (such as Meaghan Morris and Angela McRobbie) who 
do pay attention to questions of production. More recently, as I have mentioned 
in Chapter 1 already, Grossberg has insisted that the way forward for cultural 
studies is to ‘do’ politics and economics ‘better than’ the political scientists and 
economists: that is to say, since the agent of change no longer resides in popular 
culture, we need, Grossberg argues, to turn to political and economic culture 
where it does (2004). A radical rethink of the relationship between culture and 
the economy, Grossberg hopes, will help us to arrive at an adequate, cogent and 
even ethical analysis of the contemporary conjuncture.
While it risks being reductive of Grossberg’s nuanced argument, it is still 
worth quoting an anonymous reviewer of the conference at which Grossberg 
aired these views: ‘At Crossroads, accompanying the praises sung to the 
“economic turn” was another refrain. One good turn deserves another, and in 
this case it meant a turn away from “theory.” It seems that turning the clock 
back to Stuart Hall, Gramsci, and Policing the Crisis meant turning our backs on 
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deleuzians of grandeur (and other speculative indulgences)’ (Interactivist.net 
2004). Grossberg’s turn to cultural economy, along with the general mood of the 
2004 Crossroads in Cultural Studies Conference, is interpreted here as a warning 
against the excesses of theory and speculation.
Miller and McHoul’s intervention into this general debate is interesting, it 
seems to me, precisely because, in lambasting ‘speculation’, they express an 
aversion to theory that seems to be, albeit with different emphases, an increasing 
commonplace among cultural studies departments today. As I have suggested 
in Chapter 1, there has been an identiﬁable shift in cultural studies towards 
sociology and political economy and what Paul du Gay and others have called 
‘cultural economy’ (see Amin and Thrift 2004; Du Gay and Pryke 2002; Merck 
2004; Hesmondhalgh 2002). And as an indicator of this general climate, the 
revision of Raymond Williams’ seminal text, Keywords, edited by important 
ﬁgures in cultural studies – Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg and Meaghan 
Morris – includes an entry for theory that ends thus:
If theory was, on the whole, victorious in these [theory] wars, it has, like all 
victors, taken on much of the coloring of the conquered population, and 
has entered into a compromise which guarantees its formal authority at the 
expense of substantial, but tacit, concessions to its opponents. It is not certain 
that this victory was not a defeat, and the mood of its erstwhile proponents is 
perhaps best summed up in book titles such as What’s Left of Theory? (Frow 
2005: 349)
Presenting theory both as having passed its sell-by date, and as being irredeem-
ably compromised, John Frow’s entry airs a familiar sentiment. Miller and 
McHoul’s distaste for theory has a slightly different, if equally familiar, inﬂection. 
They ﬁnd speculations on the meaning and political importance of popular 
culture abhorrent because for them it suggests an irresponsibility towards the 
‘member’, as they call their subject, who is not allowed to speak in this scenario. 
Theorizing takes the place of ‘real’ experience. I will challenge such notions of 
irresponsibility in the next chapter but for now I want to suggest that at a time 
when speculation is being lambasted we need to be more not less speculative, 
or at least to pay more attention to what is involved in speculation. I will explain 
further after outlining Miller and McHoul’s argument.
One response to speculative readings that take cultural phenomena always to 
stand for something else on a socio-political level – for example, reading gossip as 
a form of empowerment for the politically marginalized – is to declare an aversion 
to external judgement. That is to say, if meaning is produced by and within the 
social practice under consideration (here, gossip), the risk of imposing meaning 
is apparently averted. Such an attempt to avoid speculating upon the importance 
of people’s everyday actions from the outside is suggested by Miller and McHoul. 
They are ill at ease with a cultural studies that equates ‘mundane transgressions 
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with general social tendencies’ and assumes ‘that everyday cultural objects stand 
on behalf of, or represent, wider social forces’ (Miller and McHoul 1998: ix). As 
well as the ‘urgent hunt (characteristic of cultural studies) for resistive readers 
who can delegate their wildness to researchers’ (Miller and McHoul 1998: 25), 
Miller and McHoul, then, ﬁnd politically determined pronouncements on human 
subjects mired in a state of false consciousness problematic.
Miller and McHoul provide an example of what they mean by speculative 
cultural studies in the form of Cindy Patton’s reading of MTV and Madonna. They 
are concerned that her reading begins with a speculative claim – in this case, 
that MTV is ‘an important site for the struggle over control of popular memory’ 
(Patton 1993: 91) – which steers the rest of the argument. At the troubling heart 
of Patton’s proposition and others like it is a speculative statement that seems to 
Miller and McHoul more guided by politics than observation. What is at stake in 
speculative readings is what status the political as analytic or speculative force is 
allowed to have when confronting everyday phenomena.
Miller and McHoul do not single out and discuss speculative readings of 
gossip, yet we can guess that such readings would make speculative assertions 
concerning gossip’s political or moral import. Gossip would be made to perform 
as a symptom of something else, in the way that both the positive and negative 
readings of gossip have done above. As a psychoanalyst seeks to ﬁnd the hid-
den traumas indicated by an eruptive symptom, so Spacks, for example, reads 
gossip as a symptom of women’s experience of patriarchal constraints. In other 
words, gossip is never (or never just) gossip here; it’s always a symptom of 
something else. Gossip is women’s challenge to established thought (Spacks 
1985); an attempt at mastery when other avenues are blocked to us (Ayim 
1994); like jokes, according to Freud, it is displaced aggression (Spacks 1985: 
50); or gossip is connected to the unconscious Oedipal wish for patricide (see 
Rosenbaum and Subrin 1963: 829). The same is true for the sociological accounts 
that think of gossip in terms of its societal function – of what it does within or 
for communities, and it is especially evident in the negative accounts of gossip 
in which it represents a malignant and corrupting force. In this way, gossip 
has signiﬁed a number of societal ‘ailments’ or ‘desires’. Miller and McHoul are 
concerned with approaches that read these kind of symptoms at a cultural-
political level.
As an alternative to the speculative cultural studies they see as currently 
dominating the discipline, Miller and McHoul want to ‘look at the everyday in 
its historical particularity and in its utterly mundane character’ (1998: x). 
The speculative drive within symptomatic readings of cultural studies is to 
be countered by an attention to context, empirical data, and an acceptance of 
banality, giving unspectacular popular culture the attention that has hitherto 
been limited to spectacular forms. Miller and McHoul call upon a two-pronged 
approach as a way of combating speculation and its dubious authority. (Who is 
allowed to make pronouncements upon others? On what authority are these 
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speculations based?) This ethnomethodologically inspired strategy involves both 
securing context via ‘factual’ historical detail in the guise of political economy, 
and observing and talking to people (or ‘members’) in everyday environments. 
Ethnomethodology approaches everyday interactions as acts which engender 
knowledge in participants. A close relationship between context and cognition 
is therefore emphasized. Understanding does not come from somewhere outside 
of the action, practice, or analysis itself, but is experienced through the process.
I do, as I’ve already said, sympathize with Miller and McHoul in their criticisms 
of speculative readings that assume a political agenda prior to an encounter 
with culture. I would go even further by repeating something I have already 
said in earlier chapters: that not only is a politics assumed, but the question of 
what politics ‘is’ is left unasked. This can lead, as we have seen with reference 
to the work of Wendy Brown (2001) in Chapter 1, to a certain kind of moralism. 
Nevertheless, while I have sympathy for Miller and McHoul’s concerns about 
speculation in the way they set it up, I want to retrieve the trope of ‘speculation’ 
from their grasp. In their hands, ‘speculation’ becomes a lapdog to an already 
decided politics. Their answer to the question of how to move beyond politically 
optimistic readings (what, in the Garnham-Grossberg debate would fall on 
the ‘cultural studies’ side) is to drive out the ‘speculative’ elements of cultural 
studies. Yet this has serious problems, which I hope will become clear through a 
meditation on speculation.
While Miller and McHoul are using ‘speculative’ to primarily refer to readings 
that are dogmatically or reductively guided by politics, the term is far richer and 
more suggestive. The elements of speculation Miller and McHoul object to can 
certainly be found in the dictionary deﬁnition of speculation. (And while there is 
a certain irony in invoking this apparently authoritative source in the midst of an 
essay contesting the purity of such appeals, it should be noted that the OED is 
an assembled record of casual language usage not opposed to gossip as a social 
indicator of signiﬁcation.) The OED includes references to the way in which 
‘speculation’ is used in a derogatory way – as in mere or pure speculation; and 
also to the idea of speculation as opposed to practice, fact, action. To speculate 
is to engage in thought or reﬂection especially of a conjectural or theoretical 
nature and it is this element of speculation that Miller and McHoul object to: in 
the concluding paragraph of Popular Culture and Everyday Life, they insist that 
their method (that could be said to emphasize ‘practice, fact, action’) is a better 
alternative to ‘critical theorizing as a way of beginning any cultural study’ (1998: 
181).
All of which sounds like a form of risk aversion. Indeed, speculation involves 
risk. The OED tells us that to speculate can also mean, ‘To engage in the buying or 
selling of commodities or effects in order to proﬁt by a rise or fall in their market 
value; to undertake, to take part or invest in, a business enterprise or transaction 
of a risky nature in the expectation of considerable gain.’ When we invest in the 
‘right’ theory, then, speculation can provide a proﬁtable return. But it can also, if 
 Hot Gossip 113
we have not done our homework so well, or if we are unlucky, result in a loss 
– a bad return. It is not just theories about the political importance of cultural 
products and practices that propel an idea out ‘there’, into a realm beyond fact 
and ﬁction. All theory could be said to be speculative in the sense that it is about 
an unguaranteed future return, a beyond that is unﬁxed. Such a characterization 
resonates with Stuart Hall’s description of theoretical work as ‘interruption’ 
(1992: 282), for an interruption posits something unexpected, something which 
the existing paradigm cannot easily subsume even while it might have given rise 
to it. Hall suggests feminism as one such interruption to cultural studies, positing 
feminism as a thief in the night. But while ‘thief’ might connote something totally 
foreign invading the safety of the ‘home’, Hall acknowledges that thieves are 
produced, of course, by the society they steal from. In this way, he describes how 
the male-dominated Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham 
sought out ‘good feminist scholars’ (Hall 1992: 282), and how feminists rightly 
resisted this polite invitation, preferring rather to break in. The CCCS speculated 
on feminism but had to radically change when its unruly ‘proﬁt’ arrived. There’s 
no telling what form the interruptive return from a speculation will take.
What might be more unsettling about speculative or theoretical approaches 
in Popular Culture and Everyday Life than the political commitment such 
approaches display in their conjectural leaps is the risk of a bad return that is 
opened by the theoretical speculation. The risk is higher for Miller and McHoul 
when people are at the heart of this speculative drama: when speculation takes 
the place of the actual experience or voice of people. (It is too much like hearsay 
in court, perhaps. Why listen to a witness’ second-hand account of someone else’s 
statements, when that someone can be made to testify him/herself? A speculative 
cultural studies is too much like Heidegger’s idle talk, then, unable to get to the 
thing itself thus mistaking secondary interpretations for real understanding.) 
I want to think more about where this connection between speculation and 
theory might lead us to make an interruptive intervention into the debate about 
the practice and identity of cultural studies. I hope it will provide an alternative 
to: ﬁrstly, the cultural studies versus political economy divide; secondly, the 
solution provided by Miller and McHoul; and lastly, and most importantly, to 
the stagnant moralism (Brown 2001: 18–44) that those approaches might 
unwittingly foster (especially those which cast theory/speculation as politically 
irresponsible).
This involves a move ‘nearer to’ rather than ‘away from’ speculation to come 
to a new formulation of cultural studies’ relationship to gossip, and, I would 
argue, all cultural phenomena. Rather than defend cultural studies against the 
accusation of speculation put forth by Miller and McHoul, then, I want to invest 
further in the idea of speculation, towards a more radical formulation, to see 
what kind of return we will get. Far from repeating a theoretical inﬂection 
of past phases in cultural studies, I concur with Sadie Plant, Gary Hall, Wendy 
Brown, Neil Badmington, Johan Fornas and others, that cultural studies has yet 
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to fully think through the implications of those aspects of theory that are not 
easily reducible to the overtly political project of cultural studies. That is to say, 
while cultural studies of the 1980s and 1990s readily took up notions of social 
and discursive construction in terms of gender, sexuality, class, race and so on, to 
take one example, it was less eager to explore the conditions of (im)possibility 
for making statements about social constructionism, about politics even, in the 
ﬁrst place. Gary Hall quotes Sadie Plant making this very point (Plant 1995; 
cited in Hall 2002: 2). Plant feels that cultural studies has employed elements of 
psychoanalytic theory, deconstruction and Foucauldian analysis ‘in the service 
of an idealist and humanist tradition, and any ideas that might have disturbed 
this picture have been left on the shelf’ (Plant 1995: 100). Wendy Brown ﬁnds 
that even though we live in a post-sovereign and post-literal theoretical regime, 
a hypersovereignty and literalism pervades within cultural politics (Brown 2001: 
22), suggesting that many of the lessons of post-humanism and post-structuralism 
have yet to be rigorously taken on board. Thinking about speculation is my way 
of contributing to this unﬁnished project. I want to suggest that we need to take 
on board the way in which speculation is at work whenever principles are put 
forth, displaying the redundancy of being anti-speculative.
YOU GOTTA SPECULATE TO ACCUMULATE
Despite their safeguards, Miller and McHoul cannot avoid speculation. In a 
review of Popular Culture and Everyday Life, Kirsty Leishman writes, ‘the 
authors’ proposed [ethnomethodologically inspired cultural studies] is . . . fraught 
with the same pitfalls of speculation and assumption with which they charge 
the history of cultural studies’ (1999). She provides an example from one of 
Miller and McHoul’s case studies:
In the case of observing McDonald’s, any conclusions drawn are circum-
scribed by the EMICS scholar’s assumption that this everyday activity is 
experienced by those who are observed, solely within the discourses the 
scholar nominates, in this instance those around food. This approach to the 
study of culture relies on a peculiar negation of the intersection between 
political, social, economic and cultural spheres in any given situation. 
(Leishman 1999)
She rightly points out that subjects call upon a range of discourses – at micro 
and macro levels – when going about their everyday business. To cut off the 
macro, speculative, political level of everyday life (say, the way gender or race or 
our awareness of political issues inﬂect our everyday conduct), is to be false to 
that experience. Leishman (1999) claims that doing so ‘denies the way cultural 
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texts are produced in the ﬁrst instance by people who participate in the culture 
at many levels’. And so the premise of the project is limited by the authors’ 
predetermined speculations as to the political importance of one discourse over 
another.
While I wholeheartedly agree with Leishman’s analysis, I want to push it 
further, drawing out the full implications of what she merely identiﬁes as an 
‘irony’. I want to suggest that speculation/theory is not a deviation from either 
a factual path of enquiry or an investment in ‘real’ political action left intact, 
one that is just waiting for the speculator to return when s/he has ﬁnished 
with the realm of chance and guesswork of ‘mere’ speculation. Rather, I will 
argue, speculation, as the ‘motor’ of knowledge, is already present in the path 
of, say, empirical or ethnomethodological enquiry. ‘Non-theoretical’ work is 
already drawing on theories of the non-theoretical, or of agency, or of politics. 
Speculation, I want to suggest, has always already begun.
I will begin by restating the logic of Leishman’s observations in slightly differ-
ent terms. In their preface, Miller and McHoul stress that theirs is an ‘extremely 
data-driven’ approach attempting to show ‘what these [popular cultural] 
objects actually look like in their everyday situated places’ (1998: xi). They will 
attempt their project by ‘actually going out and collecting relevant data’ (Miller 
and McHoul 1998: xi). Miller and McHoul tell us that: ‘The historical parts are 
rigorously based in the factual bases of cultural phenomena. The analytic parts 
are, equally, rigorously based on empirical data’ (1998: xii). They promise to 
‘refrain from speculative conclusions’ (Miller and McHoul 1998: xii). That may 
well be the case, but in avoiding speculative conclusions Miller and McHoul do 
not automatically free themselves from the speculative altogether. In the very 
ﬁrst chapter, they say that their focus is on ‘subjectivity’ and ‘power’. They explain: 
‘By “subjectivity” we mean the ways in which people experience themselves 
as human: what it means to be, for example, exercised, fed, and counselled; 
and how individuals move through society inside these and other categories. 
By “power” we refer to the exercise of knowledge and agency to construct 
and police such identities’ (Miller and McHoul 1998: 1). They begin with these 
philosophical concepts that have a history in speculative assumptions about 
subjects’ relations with themselves, the nature of experience, of agency, and the 
relationship between knowledge and force. Just because they choose not to do 
the speculative work themselves does not free them from speculation.
But in order to extend Leishman’s observation, we need to think about the 
role of speculation in knowledge processes. We can see that the principles of 
ethnomethodology inform Miller and McHoul’s study. These principles involve 
observing and reporting, rather than interpreting what people do. Miller and 
McHoul feel that ‘everyday popular culture is too important a social phenomena 
to be dealt with speculatively’ (1998: x). In seeking to reject or avoid speculation, 
they position their whole project against it, but speculation is nevertheless 
‘there’ in the ‘data’, the knowledge they produce. This is because knowledge 
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is subject to principles. Certainly, the knowledge produced through an ethno-
methodological approach is subject to principles regarding the observation of 
mundane situations in order to view the way people use their culture. But a 
principle, a law governing the enquiry, is transcendental and in being positioned 
away from or before the action non-speculative ethnomethodology is presented 
as a sealed entity. In this way, it only goes into contract with itself, we can call 
on no higher law to help us, and it apparently doesn’t need anything ‘below’ it 
in order to organize and operate. Now because of this self-reliance, because it is 
‘everything’, it unleashes otherness within itself – a radical alterity.7
This alterity, the non-self-identity or non-belonging of the principle, this 
‘relation to itself (as other) which binds it to itself’ (Bennington 1993: 142) 
constitutes what we can name ethnomethodology (or political economy, or 
ethnography and so on). This is all that identity is. No identity, then, without a 
relation to the other, rendering identity ‘impure’. In a very different context, 
Derrida writes, such an always already interrupted relation, or ‘non-belonging[,] 
unleashes speculation’ ([1980] 1987: 283). Speculation is ‘unleashed’ because 
knowledge gives rise to, but cannot be ultimately secured by, recourse to a 
stable concept or organizing principle, and so a proliferation of possibilities 
opens the ﬁeld. No mastery is afforded to a principle or, for that matter, to an 
author. Speculation ‘infects’ and has always already ‘infected’ texts, even when 
the ‘principle’ is one of doing justice to the experience of people and of anti-
speculation.
So Miller and McHoul unwittingly speculate. They are investing in a set of 
ideas, concepts and principles but without paying the necessary debts. They 
claim allegiance to an ethnomethodological ‘camp’ (as well as cultural studies, 
even while stating their problems with it), and pay their dues to these precursors. 
But in disclaiming the speculative, they cannot pay their debts to, ﬁrstly, the 
speculative work that has produced the concepts (of politics, or power, say) and 
also principles (of the anti-speculative) that they use, and, secondly, the play of 
speculation through the possibility of iterability that causes texts, including their 
own, to reach beyond the boundaries designated for them.
Derrida claims that speculation is always already in operation where know-
ledge or reason is concerned, because ‘to borrow is the law. Within every lang-
uage, since a ﬁgure is always a borrowed language, but also from one discursive 
domain to another, or from one science to another. Without borrowing, nothing 
begins’ ([1980] 1987: 384). In other words, because organizing principles or 
authors cannot completely master knowledge or reason, cannot contain meanings 
moving beyond the limits set up, and because of a radical intertextuality, there 
is already something ‘foreign’ that has been ‘borrowed’ from elsewhere, from 
the other, within a text (and this includes cultural texts of all kinds, not just 
written). On a practical level, like Miller and McHoul and their unacknowledged 
speculative precursors, we cannot help but borrow (ﬁgures, ideas, language 
and so on) and incur interest: ‘Everything begins with the transfer of funds, and 
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there is interest in borrowing, this is even its initial interest. To borrow yields, 
brings back, produces surplus value, is the prime mover of every investment. 
Thereby one begins by speculating, by betting on a value to be produced as if 
from nothing’ (Derrida [1980] 1987: 384). But because this debt from borrowing 
is generalized (is the general state of beginning and thus is everyone’s debt), it 
is neutralized. In borrowing, we are caught up in a speculation – which, if we 
recall, can mean: ‘To engage in the buying or selling of commodities or effects in 
order to proﬁt by a rise or fall in their market value; to undertake, to take part or 
invest in, a business enterprise or transaction of a risky nature in the expectation 
of considerable gain.’
If we accept that knowledge is indeﬁnitely subject to speculation because 
it cannot ultimately either ‘belong’ to anyone or be contained by any principle, 
this means that Miller and McHoul’s endeavour to limit speculation (and con-
sequently deny alterity and a ‘primary’ borrowing) is fraught with problems. 
From this point of view, a cultural studies free from speculation is impossible. 
It is hoped that the commitment to observation or material conditions will 
produce an account uncontaminated by speculation. But Miller and McHoul are 
caught up in a speculative exercise in both the sense that Leishman uses and 
that which I am identifying here: they repeat what they seek to escape.
Miller and McHoul, and other critics of a theoretically inflected cultural 
studies, characterize cultural studies as being lost to speculations upon the pol-
itical meaning of cultural phenomena: dominated by an approach that owes 
too much interest after borrowing from a pre-existing (usually political) ideal. 
But if borrowing and thus speculating is something that inheres in knowledge, 
is something that makes the positing of knowledge possible (because without 
the possibility of repeating knowledge, we would not be able to recognize it 
as knowledge); if knowledge moves beyond the realm of mastery, beyond any 
speculator who may have placed the speculation in circulation, then any attempt 
to keep speculation at bay is obviously futile.
Critics of a theoretically inﬂected or speculative cultural studies borrow ideas 
and language and are therefore always already caught in a system of debt and 
speculation. Their own assertions, even when based on political economy, case 
studies, or ethnographic work, are already borrowed, subject to alterity, and open 
to further borrowing and signiﬁcation. They are in as much debt to predecessors 
as I am. The problem is that such positions are so busy rooting their work in ‘real’ 
politics or ethnographies, and positioning this work as some kind of alternative 
to speculation, that they do not acknowledge the speculative ‘nature’ of their 
own work. They are, therefore, caught up in repeating or borrowing from these 
models of speculative work without acknowledging it. This blind repetition 
leaves such positions open to the kind of conservative moralism that I discussed 
in Chapter 1. For without a consideration of what conditions our assertions – 
what enables us to say anything about politics or the ‘real’ experience of people, 
say, in the ﬁrst place – or an account of the alterity within the identity of politics 
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(or, indeed, identity politics), we risk solidifying the terms of the debate in order 
to use them against anyone who dares to question them. However, all is not lost. 
Cultural studies can be thought otherwise. By recognizing the way in which 
speculation is central to cognitive, textual, discursive and even disciplinary 
operations, it is possible to open up a cultural studies beyond suspicion of the 
theoretical.
But of course, theory is not the same as speculation. As I have already said, 
Miller and McHoul are right to think that what they identify as speculative 
cultural studies is problematic. But in turning away from all speculative work 
in the process – in allowing ‘speculation’ to stand for all ‘critical theorizing’ 
(Miller and McHoul 1998: 181) – they close down the possibility that some 
theoretical, speculative work might be needed if we are to come up with an 
account of popular culture that takes it seriously, as they profess to want to do. I 
am imagining a cultural studies that can try to trace some of the ways in which 
that popular culture exceeds itself: a radically speculative cultural studies that 
can take on board the speculative drive – a necessarily risky investment, to be 
sure. Rather than thinking of speculation in Miller and McHoul’s limited sense 
(as speculations upon the political meaning of texts), we could try to think of 
the speculative in a more athetic way. That is to say, a kind of speculation that 
doesn’t involve positing a ﬁrm thesis or which operates under a stable principle.
In order to get to the speculative in this more radical form, I want to turn 
more explicitly to a text that has been informing my discussion so far. It is a text 
in which speculation is speculated upon most famously, rigorously, interestingly, 
and speculatively: this is Jacques Derrida’s ‘To Speculate – On “Freud”’, a close 
reading of Freud’s attempt to account for the experience of unpleasure in the 
face of an apparently dominant or master principle – the pleasure principle.8 In 
this essay, the issue of philosophical speculation arises because Derrida detects 
an anxiety on Freud’s part about the threat it poses to the scientiﬁc claims he 
wants to make for psychoanalysis. At ﬁrst it would seem that Derrida in ‘To 
Speculate – On “Freud”’ is concerned that Freud, in An Autobiographical Study 
(1925), avoids paying a debt – to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, and philosophy 
in general. Freud invokes these philosophers only to deny them a place in the 
genealogy of his ideas. He rejects them as inﬂuences upon his psychoanalytic 
theories of the mind because he does not want philosophical speculation to 
infect psychoanalysis. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud ﬂatly states, it is 
‘of no concern to us . . . to enquire how far, with this hypothesis of the pleasure 
principle, we have approached or adapted any particular . . . philosophical system. 
We have arrived at these speculative assumptions in an attempt to describe and 
to account for the facts of daily observation in our ﬁeld of study’ (1920: 7). 
To paraphrase, Freud is saying something to the effect of, ‘I might well have 
inherited this idea of the pleasure principle from philosophical notions, but this 
is of no interest as I am not in the business of claiming originality; I am interested 
in getting results.’
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Freud cannot acknowledge the debt he owes to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer 
because Freud, according to Derrida, feels that the inheritance is empty – 
comparable to ‘counterfeit money’; the philosophers’ notions may resemble 
those found in psychoanalysis, that is, but they ‘lack the equivalent of a content 
proper to psychoanalysis, which alone can guarantee value, usage, and exchange’ 
(Derrida [1980] 1987: 266). The philosopher has not gained the insights through 
the hard work of psychoanalytic observation. Consequently, these philosophical 
notions remain for Freud, mere simulacra ([1980] 1987: 266), just philosophical 
speculation, and hence intolerable. Given this dismissal of philosophical 
speculation, when Freud later admits in An Autobiographical Study that he 
eventually gave ‘free reign to the inclination, which [he] kept down for so long, 
to speculation’ (Freud 1925: 57, quoted in Derrida ([1980] 1987: 272), Derrida 
has to conclude that Freud’s speculation is of an order different to ‘philosophy 
or scientiﬁc or clinical experimentation in their traditional modes’ ([1980] 1987: 
272).
Rather, the speculation at work in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, is athetic 
– a term Derrida employs to indicate the way in which Freud’s text, in trying to 
take a step ‘beyond’ the pleasure principle, cannot quite posit another theory. 
Derrida uses the phrase pas au delà: the idea of ‘steps for nothing’ ([1980] 1987: 
296), referring, translator Alan Bass tells us, to ‘Freud’s repeated gesture of taking 
another step forward that goes nowhere, the rhetoric of the athesis’ (in Derrida 
[1980] 1987: 292 fn1).
So, we are not dealing here with ‘the speculative of the Hegelian type’ (an 
argument that propels itself forward via the Hegelian dialectic – thesis, antithesis, 
synthesis – speculation as a synthesis of known parts), nor with inductive 
science: in fact, ‘Freud does not, under the name of speculation, call upon a 
pure and a priori theory that simply precedes the so-called empirical contents’ 
(Derrida [1980] 1987: 277). Freud’s step beyond the pleasure principle never 
quite happens, he never ﬁnds a sure footing; he can only speculate without 
positing a thesis.
Unwittingly – and Derrida is quick to point out that Freud in no way ‘elab-
orates this inconceivable concept [of speculation] for itself . . . or works in order 
to present its properly theoretical originality’ (Derrida [1980] 1987: 277) and 
admits that he is ‘corrupting the “properly Freudian” usage of “speculation”’ 
([1980] 1987: 283) – Freud’s text points towards a notion of speculation al-
together more unsettling than its traditional meanings within philosophy. 
Derrida’s allegation that ‘speculation is not only a mode of research named by 
Freud, not only the oblique object of his discourse, but also the operation of his 
writing’ ([1980] 1987: 284) shows the speculative operations of Freud’s text.
Of course, Freud did not choose to produce an athetic text. He wanted to 
get ‘beyond’ the pleasure principle, to a new thesis, but could not quite manage 
to because of the speculative excess of his speculations. But I still think we can 
draw on this model – not to produce frustratingly evasive essays that never 
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quite say anything – but as a way of being more in tune with the speculative. 
What is unhelpful about ‘speculative cultural studies’ (in Miller and McHoul’s 
opinion) is the overly thetic nature of its readings – for example, the way in 
which these readings try to master popular culture with, for example, identity 
politics. To avoid the problems that I have identiﬁed with this anti-speculative 
stance, deconstruction can be useful (and I use the word ‘useful’ here as a 
deliberate rejoinder to those who lambaste it for its ‘uselessness’). For in paying 
attention to the quasi-transcendental movement of its terms (like différânce, 
or dissemination, but also, speculation), any ﬁrm thesis is denied in turn. That 
is not to say that meaning is not posited in deconstruction; it is, but the ‘quasi’ 
recognizes the way in which absolute meaning is deferred, in the same way that 
we have seen a principle to at once seal itself – become posited – and unleash 
alterity, something that is anything but ‘itself’, which is already inside ‘itself’. Not 
all kinds of speculation are thetic.9
GOSSIPING AGAIN
Derrida names the athetic operations of Freud’s text ‘speculation’; it is 
the name he gives to the in-between, undecidable, faltering status of the 
knowledge/non-knowledge in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Because in 
Knowledge Goes Pop I am looking at popular knowledges, I want to think 
about such knowledge/non-knowledge (or what exceeds knowledge) as 
gossip. Like Derrida’s terminology, it is a strategic employment of a word 
(here, to name the undecidability of knowledge) coming out of the texts 
I am encountering. As such, I want to argue in this section that the uneasy 
position Freud unwittingly assigns speculation in his text, is comparable 
to the strange place or status gossip has hitherto been given in cultural 
studies and the humanities more generally (the implications of which I will 
make clear shortly). While gossip has been treated as an alternative mode for 
desperate times to be selectively employed, or as an external object of study, 
I want to argue that gossip is actually already ‘within’ the cognitive practices 
and knowledges associated with more ‘legitimate’ endeavours.
Now, commentators on gossip, usually in their preface or other some such 
aside, often acknowledge the saturation of academia with gossip. In the university, 
we find an institution that is at once founded upon ideals of knowledge, 
dedicated to its discovery and exchange, and yet also very much involved in a 
less ‘legitimate’ knowledge – that of gossip. Mellencamp, in High Anxiety, muses, 
‘I often wonder if any profession is as gossip-prone as academia, where words 
are the biggest, if not only, commodity’ (1992: 172). In Spacks’ book, Gossip, she 
describes the central role and lure of her daily gossip sessions with a female 
colleague at her university (1985: ix). Ayim is interested in the central place that 
what is, in effect, gossip assumes in ofﬁcial university business such as selection 
for tenure in the US, or grant applications:
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Hiring committees at universities . . . frequently totally disregard formal letters 
of support for applicants, assuming that such documents, becoming as they 
do part of the ﬁle, are always liable to the possibility of falling into the hands 
of the candidate. Consequently, the committees often believe that such a 
format is not conducive to receiving either substantive or even reliable 
information about the candidate. In such cases, a committee member is likely 
to telephone the referee and informally report the conversation to the rest of 
the committee. (1994: 97–8)
The point – academics bitch and gossip – might be an obvious one. And I 
don’t want to suggest that cultural studies is subject to this kind of gossip more 
than any other ‘discipline’, but I do think that cultural studies is in a good position 
to explore this relationship with gossip further. Not least because it shares 
much with gossip. Both, for example, can be considered a knowledge-producing 
discourse of uncertain position within the academy (despite cultural studies’ 
increasing institutionalization). That is to say, the legitimacy of cultural studies 
as a knowledge, like that of gossip (and conspiracy theory, as we have already 
seen), is often questioned or indeed under attack from inside and outside the 
university. Its legitimacy comes under attack partly because, like gossip, cultural 
studies opens itself to being speculative – cultural theorists make inferences 
about the world from a necessarily limited amount of information. Like gossip, 
cultural studies is often not about being ‘factually’ right or wrong but about 
communicating something that has resonance with the reader about the world 
around them. Like gossip, cultural studies is often accused of decontextualizing 
information and repeating it without the ‘authority’ to do so. The ‘knowledge’ 
that cultural studies produces is, then, of an uncertain status – what authority do 
our speculations about culture have? How should they be read? (To emphasize 
this point, it is worth noting that academics from disciplines outside of the social 
sciences rarely quote from cultural studies to back up their points, whereas 
different strands of cultural studies, including my own, insist on borrowing from 
philosophy, physics, biology, linguistics, psychoanalysis and so on.)
Pointing out the afﬁnity cultural studies has with certain popular knowledges 
is in no way meant to discredit cultural studies; rather, it acknowledges the 
unique vantage point of cultural studies to address the issues of marginality 
and legitimacy that I have already broached in Chapter 3. I think that there are 
several lessons that cultural studies can learn from what gossip puts on display, 
not least that gossip forces us to judge the knowledge we encounter at every 
step. This is lost when we overlook or underplay the uncertain status of the 
‘knowledge’ each produces. In order to show up the limitations of thinking 
about gossip as just an object of cultural studies, or as something that cultural 
theorists do among themselves when no one is watching, I want to highlight 
how gossip, as a form of ‘illegitimate’ knowledge, conditions more legitimated 
knowledge, including the knowledge cultural studies draws on and produces.
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To show this, I want to return to one of the cultural studies commentators’ 
asides regarding gossip and the university. In her study of gossip in cultural life, 
Mellencamp stresses that the anthropologists and sociologists who have had 
much to say about gossip in various cultures, are often on the outside of those 
cultures, ‘comparable’, she writes, ‘to being tourists or foreigners’ (1990: 167). 
She points towards the way in which this outsider status potentially devalues 
the experience and affect of gossip (ironically at a conjuncture which values 
experience and affect) but she fails to bring gossip completely ‘in’, as it were. 
Certainly, she discusses many case studies that were topical to the writing of 
High Anxiety but this does not stop Mellencamp herself from being a ‘tourist’ 
or ‘foreigner’, as she puts it, to gossip. She may well be discussing the gossip in 
‘her’ culture (American, or ‘Western’), the one that she inhabits, but by failing 
to include her academic context in that culture to any signiﬁcant extent, the 
analysis remains one that objectiﬁes gossip.
It is within a brief discussion of a study by the Canadian psychologist J. D. 
Logan (who likened geniuses to gossips) that Mellencamp includes her comment 
regarding academia already quoted: ‘I often wonder if any profession is as gossip-
prone as academia, where words are the biggest, if not only, commodity’ (1990: 
172). And yet, the implications of this parenthetical aside and Logan’s comparison 
are not followed through. The suggestion is that academia’s product – words – 
cannot be contained by its ofﬁcial knowledges, its ofﬁcial economy, and is always 
liable to spill over into a black market in which value is subject to new exchange 
rates, the laws of other knowledges. Though mentioned, the connection between 
the words produced through academia’s ‘legitimate’ knowledge and this popular, 
other knowledge is not pushed.
At the end of the paragraph that contains her parenthetical observation, 
Mellencamp goes on to ponder that she ‘could cheekily update’ Logan’s char-
acterization of the logic of gossip (and genius) as ‘one of rhizomatic thinking, or 
describe the style as a postmodern one of pastiche, eclecticism, and bricolage’ 
(1990: 172) and yet, despite raising the spectre of these theoretical models, 
the work that this ‘updating’ would require is never actually done. She makes a 
hypothetical hypothesis; the theoretical remains merely a theoretical possibility. 
It would be ‘cheeky’, somewhat ‘illegitimate’, too speculative, perhaps, and not 
completely safe in this context, she implies.10 Could it be that Mellencamp does 
not wish to risk the market value of her words through a necessarily insecure 
speculation? Just at the point where they seem to be allowed ‘in’, gossip and 
theory are kept at bay. Gossip is acknowledged as being present in academia 
but is subsequently still treated as an object to be described at arms length. And 
theory is a possible route left untaken. Indeed, many of the references to theory 
and theorists in Mellencamp’s book are not followed through. She is certainly 
not anti-theoretical – her book is littered with references to Deleuze, Lacan, 
Bakhtin, and Baudrillard – but in never quite doing the theoretical readings she 
suggests are possible, theory appears like an unnecessary detour or risk that one 
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could take if one had time or sufﬁcient funds, rather than an essential endeavour. 
The knowledgeable performance of Mellencamp’s literature review and cultural 
account is kept distinct from its object: gossip.  
I want to argue that this separation between the proper knowledge of 
the university and gossip is untenable because gossip makes that very idea 
of knowledge thinkable. This is easily explained with reference to the history 
of knowledge. This history is not one uniﬁed or linear account. It is always 
liable to moments of splitting off or borrowing. Because textually manifested 
knowledge can always be cited and quoted (a necessary state if it is to become 
ratiﬁed as knowledge and hold some kind of force), it is subject to misquoting 
or citing out of context: it is open to ‘abuse’. Knowledge is always subject to the 
possibility of ‘degrading’ into ‘just’ gossip, ‘mere’ speculation, or simply illusion, 
of moving further and further from its deﬁnition of justiﬁed true belief. Rather 
than the possibility of ‘degradation’ coming after knowledge has been secured, 
it accompanies knowledge at every step; knowledge cannot be carried forward 
without this possibility in fact, because without citation, repetition, borrowing 
(all of the things that make knowledge vulnerable to becoming further from 
the truth – more like gossip, in fact), knowledge would not count as knowledge 
– no one would be able to recognize it as knowledge. For example, for us to be 
able to recognize the authority and force of the knowledge to be found within 
an encyclopaedia, it has to be open to repetition. This means that knowledge is 
open to decontextualization, distortion, misquotation. It is open to something 
akin to gossip, if we are to think of gossip as the presentation of information 
without recourse to a method of verification, leaving its status ‘open’ and 
‘uncertain’. The borrowing and repetition that makes knowledge and a history 
of knowledge possible in the ﬁrst place also means that it might only ever be 
speculation or gossip. Thus the presence of gossip, rather than being opposed to 
knowledge, is an integral part of it. What, then, is knowledge that is conditioned 
by gossip?
None of the cultural studies discussions of gossip cited have been able to 
think through this question. They have not been able to resist reinstating the 
distance between some ideal of knowledge and gossip even when they appear 
open to a closer relationship. So Mellencamp glosses over the appearance of 
gossip in academia choosing, rather, to chart gossip’s appearances in popular 
culture knowledgeably.
Ayim acknowledges the university’s use of gossip when more formal modes of 
enquiry aren’t up to the job but still positions gossip as aberrant, and thus merely 
an aid to knowledge (1994: 99). But because ‘legitimated’ knowledge cannot be 
recognized as knowledge without the possibility of gossip (being, as I’ve said 
above, repetition out of context, repetition in the absence of any ‘author’, and 
a statement lacking any authority or grounding in fact) knowledge and gossip 
cannot operate as distinct unities. Each identity (knowledge as knowledge, 
gossip as gossip) is dependent upon a relation to the/each other. Gossip is the 
124 Knowledge Goes Pop
speculative possibility of knowledge. This non-unity, this alterity within identity, 
as I have already explained, opens up the possibility of speculation, meaning that 
a text or any other apparent unity, is structured by the possibility of speculation.
We can start to think through the implications of this by changing the terms 
of our discussion a little. Rather than thinking about gossip as a modiﬁed form of 
knowledge, what would it mean to generalize gossip – to think of all knowledge 
(both popular and ‘ofﬁcial’) as a form of ‘gossip’? This generalized gossip is what 
makes it possible to think about the relation between gossip and knowledge in 
the ﬁrst place – enables us to speculate about any relation at all. A generalized 
gossip is the condition of possibility and (therefore) impossibility of the ‘purity’ 
of knowledge.
In light of this, gossip is not a contamination that needs to be kept in check; 
nor a form of improper knowledge. Rather, we are trying to think speculatively 
‘beyond’ the oppositions between proper and improper, knowledge and gossip 
so that gossip is redeﬁned: it is generalized. We are not on stable ground here. 
This ‘beyond’ cannot be a ﬁrm synthesis of the two opposed terms, from which 
further (Hegelian) dialectical speculations can be launched, but is something else, 
something altogether more speculatively speculative – an athetic step. In this 
athetic ground, we can suggest that gossip is a textual and discursive necessity 
and, as such, inheres in knowledge proper. (We are dealing with the athetic here, 
because none of the terms that we are dealing with – gossip, knowledge – are 
stable precisely because of that relation.)
If gossip conditions knowledge, the openly uncertain status of gossip’s auth-
ority and authenticity (it seems to be accepted, that is to say, on the idea that it 
may or may not be true) affects the authority and authenticity of all knowledge. 
Gossip makes us address the ‘mystical foundations’ of authority (as Kant would 
have it), problematizing our attempts to trace knowledge back to an ultimate 
source. It is this question of authority exposed by gossip that I want to consider 
in the next chapter in relation to a case study. To assist this move into thinking 
about gossip in culture more closely, I want to conclude this chapter by thinking 
through all that I have said so far about a generalized gossip in relation to the 
cultural economy.
GLOBAL GRAPEVINES: THE CULTURAL ECONOMY OF 
POPULAR KNOWLEDGE
There seem to be (at least) two different (but related) ways of reading the 
cultural climate in relation to what we have said about gossip. The ﬁrst read-
ing concentrates on the disruptive effect of generalized gossip on other, more 
‘respectable’ ways of knowing and the wider social, ideological, political 
structures this knowledge/knowing supports. According to this reading, the 
trace of gossip (and, as we will see in the next chapter, of the undecidability 
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regarding legitimacy) at the heart of knowledge encourages us to question the 
ground on which all kinds of ofﬁcial conﬁgurations of knowledge stand.
If, as current political thought suggests, we are living and working in a 
global knowledge economy (one only needs to scan government Web sites 
from ‘developed’ countries to see evidence of this belief) we could ask what 
status the signiﬁer ‘knowledge’ has in light of the challenges set forth by the 
structuring or conditioning role of a generalized gossip. The connected question 
that needs to be posed here is (and this relates back to my discussion of Table 
1 in Chapter 1): what status does that economy have – and therefore the ideal 
of the free market it propagates – if its dominant commodity (knowledge) is 
volatile, unstable, undecidable because it is shot-through with the possibility 
of being ‘only’ gossip, of being of little or no value? What happens when a 
dominant commodity, before any mercantile exchange has taken place, already 
involves a debt to another (in the way that I have discussed above in relation to 
borrowing)? Can the constitutive relationship between knowledge and gossip 
upset, halt, arrest, challenge the economy and patterns of ownership and power? 
This would be politically desirable to those of us who are opposed to the way 
in which the knowledge economy privileges a particularly utilitarian notion of 
knowledge – as opposed to one based on community, for example, or creativity 
– and the free market policies that often accompany this (see Rutherford 2003 
for a number of essays on these issues).
In order to sell knowledge, in order for it to have value, the knowledge 
economy has to disguise the aporetic tension between the impossibility and 
possibility of legitimate knowledge at the foundation of all knowledge: service 
providers and retailers have to convince consumers and shareholders to invest 
in knowledge by presenting it as useful, authoritative, unique, legitimate, and as 
theirs to sell in the ﬁrst place. What is in fact risky speculation (investing in a 
knowledge that holds the trace of its own illegitimacy within it) with no appeal 
to a ﬁnal authority, no guarantee of a proﬁt, is presented as a safe investment. 
This is the difference between, say, playing the stock market and taking out a 
ﬁxed-rate bond. We imagine through purchasing knowledge that we are the ones 
who will receive interest, but we are not encouraged to think about the debt 
that knowledge itself already owes for its indeﬁnite, ‘originary’ borrowings.
While those who work with knowledge develop strategies (such as appeals 
to metanarratives, or personal endorsements) to present knowledge as secure, 
gossip forces us to think about its insecurity. This is because, as I have shown, 
gossip functions according to an uncertainty, an undecidability, as to its status (is 
it ﬁction, is it fact; is it false, is it true; is it playful or serious; is it non-knowledge, 
is it knowledge?). In this way, gossip is perhaps (potentially) less violent than 
other forms of knowledge in that it admits its self-instituting, infected structure 
(as long, of course, as it isn’t being presented as something else, which is a 
problem I will consider in the next chapter). When we indulge in gossip, we 
are speculating – investing (to a lesser or greater degree, depending on the 
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gossip) in one knowledge over another. Crucially, when we gossip we are usually 
aware that there are other accounts to consider, that it is highly subjective, 
and that other ways of knowing are available to us for understanding the 
information we receive. Likewise, we understand that with gossip comes a debt, 
that it is borrowed information; we understand that it may be a misquotation, a 
borrowed fragment, a repetition out of context. We could say, then, that gossip 
is more ‘honest’ about the way in which knowledge works: how knowledge is 
conditioned by those elements which it attempts to exclude such as fallibility, 
ﬁction, doubt, undecidability, illegitimacy.
However, this reading only gets us so far; only as far as we have gone with 
conspiracy theory in Chapters 2 and 3. While this is a valuable and important 
element of what popular knowledges can potentially provide, to rest with this 
reading would surely be to risk repeating the conclusions (though not the 
methodologies) of the celebratory readings we are trying to avoid. I would be 
able to claim a subversive or deconstructive potential for popular knowledges 
like gossip and conspiracy theory in advance of any singular instance and leave 
it at that, happy that there is a force in the world able to disrupt the dominant 
economic mode (reliant, as it is, upon ‘knowledge’ networks and commodities). I 
could sleep easier at night knowing that knowledge was being brought down a 
peg or two and kept in check by underdogs like gossip. Which brings me, before 
I get carried away with notions of heroism, to the second reading of knowledge 
and gossip in the cultural climate.
For rather than gossip interrupting the knowledge economy – and that econ-
omy’s associated neo-liberal open market and erosion of the value of knowledge 
beyond a notion of ‘utility’ – gossip could also be thought to facilitate and be 
facilitated by the rise of information networks and the knowledge economy. 
What I mean by this is that it is possible to read the unstable nature of knowledge 
that gossip puts on display as wholly compatible with the often confusing and 
complicated networks of knowledge and information in contemporary society. 
The Internet, for example, can be a useful research tool but more often than 
not leads us on a wild goose chase to random search results unrelated to our 
original enquiry or to sites that link endlessly to others, deferring the source 
of knowledge. Often, even when we ﬁnd what we are looking for, it is unrefer-
enced, unclaimed, without clear copyright; the knowledge we ﬁnd there is of an 
uncertain status, much like gossip itself. We seem more and more comfortable, 
that is to say, with the idea that knowledge cannot be traced back to an ultimate 
source (as is often the case with gossip). We seem more willing to allow 
information to accrue validity simply through circulation. If we read or hear 
something in enough contexts, it will assume the status of knowledge in spite 
of an absence of authority or method of veriﬁcation. A great deal of knowledge 
today seems to have taken on something of the status of gossip. It is neither true 
nor false, knowledge nor non-knowledge but somewhere in between. This is 
precisely why I have chosen to focus on popular knowledges in this book. They 
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seem to me to provide a unique way to understand the nature of knowledge 
today.
Gossip in this second reading is normalized. It ceases to be an exceptional 
occurrence or practice, and becomes a dominant mode of knowledge exchange 
itself, wholly in keeping with the demands of a modern knowledge economy. 
In fact, although in my ﬁrst reading I suggested that the knowledge economy 
relies on ascribing value to knowledge through claims to authority, it can also 
assimilate popular knowledges as commodities. I mean this not only in the sense 
of a commodiﬁed content (a conspiracy culture or gossip industry), but also 
in the sense that some popular knowledges as mode or form can be imbued 
with commercial value. Indeed, if a form of popular knowledge is not codiﬁable 
in any clear way, if it has no recourse to a written constitution, if it is based 
on an undecidability as to its verity, if it is based only on arbitrary decisions as 
to its identity, it might be all the more proﬁtable for a savvy entrepreneur to 
assume the position of being (popularly) knowledgeable, as having, after Pierre 
Bourdieu, popular cultural capital. If knowledge has an uncertain status and 
is uncodiﬁed and tacit, one can cash in most spectacularly – because popular 
knowledges might need expert readers, translators, and interpreters as much 
as, if not more than, ofﬁcial knowledges. The entrepreneur can suggest that only 
through engaging their services can the employer have access to this popular, 
unwritten, ambiguous knowledge. Think, for example, of style gurus. Retailers 
of all kinds seek to tap into uncodiﬁable ‘street’ level knowledge by employing 
those who can translate emerging trends into commercial proﬁt.
Gossip becomes normalized through our frequent encounters with know-
ledge that cannot, as we shall see in the next chapter, be traced to an ultimate 
authority. In this way, it does not necessarily present a challenge to the knowledge 
economy. Rather, it could aid it (remember James Earle’s suggestion that gossip 
is the original knowledge economy?) and increase our reliance upon the 
commodiﬁcation of knowledge. Gossip might become normalized to the point 
that it begins to assume a role like its ‘ofﬁcial’ counterpart. Popular knowledges, 
like gossip, become the latest fodder for an ever-expanding economy looking 
for new products, new markets, and new ways of selling. Even gossip becomes 
commodiﬁed and claimed. I mean this in terms of content and form: content-
wise I am thinking of the product sold by magazines like the National Enquirer 
in the US and Heat in the UK; with regards to form, what I am arguing is that 
less formal, stable ways of receiving knowledge are taking centre stage, like the 
Internet. Thus, gossip becomes familiar as we are increasingly confronted with, 
consume and learn to think through forms of knowledge of uncertain status and 
origin.
If we leave aside the commodiﬁcation of gossip (as content or process) for 
a moment and concentrate on the normalization of gossip, it becomes clear 
that this has far-reaching implications, not all of which are necessarily desir-
able, progressive or subversive. The more familiar we are with unfounded 
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knowledge, the less surprised we will be to see it included in the news, or 
as a part of ofﬁcial government procedures (such as the inclusion in the UK 
governmental dossier entitled Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment, 
Deception and Intimidation11 that presented plagiarized work from a PhD 
student as veriﬁed intelligence). The breakdown of the opposition between 
knowledge and gossip in the cultural sphere means that knowledge takes 
on more and more characteristics of gossip (neither true nor false; neither 
knowledge nor non-knowledge) so that we get ‘faction’ on television, nar-
rative science, and uncorroborated intelligence.
It might seem that this state of affairs testiﬁes to the popularity of popular 
knowledges, justifying the name. People perhaps look to popular knowledges 
because these knowledges do not pretend that there is an ultimate foundation 
to knowledge; they don’t present themselves as unshakably true. In their playful, 
provisional, speculative form, popular knowledges hold less connotations of 
power, force, or violence.
Because of this popularity, the argument follows, the ambiguity of popular 
knowledges has inﬁltrated spheres more traditionally associated with ofﬁcial 
knowledge, perhaps in a way that complicates that distinction. And yet, of course, 
there is ‘violence’ at work. When a student thesis is unreferenced and presented 
as sound intelligence, when the speculative is presented as observational – as 
fact – and when this is given, as I shall be considering in Chapter 5, as a reason to 
go to war (as it was in the UK’s case for war in Iraq, which depended on a single 
source) there is ‘violence’.12 So we may not be surprised to learn about the 
inﬁltration of undecidable gossip into ofﬁcial realms when we ﬁnd out about it 
but I think we must be vigilant as to when it is presented as either wholly true or 
false. Gossip’s potential to put the provisionality of authority and undecidability 
between truth and lies on display, is only that: a potential. It is up to us to realize 
when gossip is being used not to suspend or interrupt power and authority, but 
is disguised in order to reinforce it. These will be my concerns in the following 
chapter.
CHAPTER 5
Sexed Up: Gossip by Stealth
Despite my focus on the relationship between gossip and cultural studies in 
the previous chapter, I ﬁrst became interested in gossip because of its ubiquity 
in cultural and political life. As I became more aware of this gossip I realized 
that it was rarely named as such. This chapter is my attempt to understand that 
omission. It is also an attempt to produce a responsible reading of this important 
cultural phenomenon.
MY GOSSIP
If I told you (one-to-one, in private, in secret, stressing that you not pass the 
information on, while knowing that you probably will) that the case for war in 
Iraq hinged on gossip, would you believe me? Would you tell anyone else?
Before deciding, you might ask me to prove it. Now, I could just say, ‘trust me’ 
with a knowing look, and a tap on the nose to suggest it’s all in hand. Or I could 
allude to someone else, someone of higher authority, from whom I gleaned the 
information, thus passing on the burden of authority and proof to a ﬁgure you 
may not be able to question. Or, I could rise to the challenge; after all, gossipers 
often try to persuade us of the verity of what they reveal (‘a friend of mine saw 
them!’ or ‘I read it in the paper!’). But it is not a condition of gossip’s identity to 
be proved (or, in fact, disproved) and it may well be more ‘gossipy’ if the question 
of its verity is left open.
So I’ll tell you my gossip, and as with all gossipees, you can decide whether or 
not to invest it with import. You might try to elevate my gossip to knowledge and 
even succeed in doing so but, I will be arguing, this new credibility and identity 
would still contain the trace of undecidability that structures it. This trace is not 
just something to sweep under the carpet (if indeed this were possible – a trace, 
after all, is indelible); it would still organize that from which it was excluded, 
even from its position ‘under the carpet’.
I want to speculate on the way in which popular knowledges are at the heart 
of some important contemporary events. Speciﬁcally, I want to list the numerous 
ways in which I think gossip was central to the case for war on Iraq, the ensuing 
battle of wills between Westminster and the BBC in Britain, and the subsequent 
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questioning of how intelligence was handled in the lead up to the second Gulf 
War in both Britain and the United States.
Before charting this territory, I want to come clean. In an attempt to approx-
imate the experience of gossip, I have suspended references and footnotes for 
the duration of this gossip transmission.
Maybe I shouldn’t have told you. Maybe you would have found yourself 
feeling uneasy or sceptical half way through without quite knowing why. 
Maybe you would have realized soon enough that there are fewer avenues of 
authentication to follow.
Of course, this is not to say that the work in the rest of this chapter that 
does have guiding parenthetical references and footnotes is exempt from your 
scrutiny and scepticism, nor from the problems with legitimacy encountered 
here – that would be a mere trick or illusion as my ensuing discussion of 
legitimacy and authority will make clear. And I am not trying to demonize 
reference systems. I become very frustrated when my students don’t use them 
– they do, after all, form the backbone of academic research, not least because 
they can lead other researchers to the source of material so that they, in turn, 
can offer a different interpretation in an ongoing dialogue. Our problems 
concerning legitimacy are not circumvented once we stop telling the reader 
where our information is from. Nevertheless, this more ‘gossipy’ discussion 
of gossip might help us to keep the question of legitimacy and the status of 
knowledge open, at least for a little while. This is but one experiment in the 
process of producing an analysis sympathetic or responsible to its subject, 
rather than following a recommended or programmatic course of action. 
A speculative or ‘gossipy’ reading of gossip (in which facts have a dubious 
status, and any claim to authority is unclear) is necessary for the subject of 
the case study below – for we will encounter material that has been, or still 
is, classiﬁed, unveriﬁed, or secret. Every way we turn, it seems as if another 
piece of gossip arises. That such gossip is made to look like anything but 
gossip does little to reassure and reorient us. Because of the nature of this 
material, I am dealing with secondary texts and accounts that are themselves 
all looking for ways to distinguish gossip from knowledge. I began looking 
at gossip in the lead up to the war on Iraq and subsequent events precisely 
because of this instability. Perhaps all situations of such international 
import are equally opaque, but it seemed more noticeable, more striking, 
and particularly ominous, in the post-September 11, trans-Atlantic, politico-
cultural scene. If, as I will go on to argue, undecidability affects any encounter 
with, and experience of, knowledge – then it cannot but be the case that the 
knowledge being produced by a post-September 11 discourse around security 
and terrorism is questionable.
I am aware of the problems of trying to produce a more gossipy account 
of gossip. For a start, I am still indebted to academic discourses. Which means 
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that I am caught in a residual adherence to knowledge hierarchies – I look to 
fairly reputable sources for my information, for example. I haven’t asked my 
grandmother, or my next-door neighbour what they think. It would, then, be 
disingenuous and unhelpful to claim what follows to be the same as gossip 
(although the accounts I draw from are all secondary texts – so, in a sense, 
I am merely passing on what I have heard or read; and even where I have 
included the name of the author and publication, we should remember that 
gossips aren’t immune to such tactics of persuasion). I can but ﬂirt with 
gossip as form rather than content. But, I still want at least to try to create 
unease about the status of what I write – for such unease or scepticism 
reproduces our experience with gossip in the way that it forces the question of 
knowledge and legitimacy upon us. I would like to ﬁnd ways of going further 
with this in an attempt to realize one kind of responsible reading: one that 
lays before us the arbitrariness and, therefore, undecidability of knowledge; 
and to think through the decisions that we make in spite, or rather because 
of, these conditions concerning what is and what is not knowledge. It also 
means, of course, being aware of our own investments in knowledge as we 
think through those decisions (hence this qualifying, transitional section; in 
italics, no less, in an attempt to signal reﬂexivity). This chapter will at worst 
be read as bad scholarship, at best, good gossip.
Now for that gossip:
 The intelligence that suggested that Iraq could deploy weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) in forty-ﬁve minutes was unreliable, uncorroborated 
and single-sourced. In fact, during the Hutton Inquiry in the UK, established 
to investigate the events leading up to the death of weapons inspector Dr 
David Kelly after he was ‘outed’ as the source of reported doubts about the 
government’s dossier (Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Assess-
ment of the British Government), it emerged that the ‘forty-ﬁve minutes’ 
claim was from a single source reporting a single source. In other words, 
you could say it was gossip. Dr Brian Jones, who managed scientists working 
at the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), admitted at the Inquiry, ‘We even 
wondered when discussing the issue whether [the informant who passed on 
the “forty-ﬁve minutes” claim] may have been trying to inﬂuence rather than 
inform.’ Jones thought the informant was bragging: resorting to gossip to gain 
status. And yet, this gossip was included in the governmental dossier not as 
gossip, but as reliable intelligence. In Tony Blair’s foreword to this document, 
he states ‘[Saddam Hussein’s] military planning allows for some of the WMD 
to be ready within forty-ﬁve minutes of an order to use them.’ Like much 
gossip, the claim is vague. (Which WMDs? Are we talking nuclear, chemical 
or biological? Are they short-range or long-range? Who are they intended 
for?) And it is inﬂammatory. Like all juicy gossip, this morsel is picked up and 
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passed on by others. In this instance, George W. Bush passed it on in a radio 
address to the nation: ‘The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical 
weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the 
British government, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little 
as forty-ﬁve minutes after the order is given.’ The gossip is passed on not as 
gossip, but as reputable fact from that respectable establishment, the British 
government.
 When BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan accused the government of ‘sexing 
up’ the dossier that made the case for war (by using single-sourced 
intelligence such as the ‘forty-ﬁve minutes’ claim) the government counter-
accused Gilligan of poor journalism: of reporting an anonymously sourced, 
uncorroborated piece of gossip. The BBC defended itself by claiming that 
the fact that someone working closely with those writing the dossier had 
doubts about its validity and concerns regarding the role of Alastair Campbell, 
Blair’s director of communications and strategy until his resignation in 
2003, was a story in itself. The ofﬁce gossip, when the ofﬁce is the DIS, is 
considered worth reporting. Campbell responded thus: ‘If the BBC are now 
saying that their journalism is now based on the principle that they can 
report what any source said, then BBC standards are now debased beyond 
belief.’ Campbell’s repetition of the word ‘now’ three times might just indicate 
nerves in a stressful situation, but it also implies a slippery BBC eager to shift 
their position as it suits, and also a ‘then’ in which standards, apparently, were 
more rigorous. In an unprecedented letter to the then director general of the 
BBC, Greg Dyke, Blair himself wrote, ‘It seems to me there has been a real 
breakdown of the separation of news and comment.’ Campbell and Blair’s 
questioning of the BBC’s journalistic practices was a taste of things to come 
as the effects of the Hutton Inquiry were felt throughout the profession in 
the UK. A report in The Economist reads:
Mr Gilligan’s approach contrasts with that of another BBC reporter, Susan 
Watts . . . Her account partly backs up Mr Gilligan’s version of what he 
was told by Mr Kelly; but she felt Mr Gilligan’s most explosive allegation 
– that Alastair Campbell, Tony Blair’s communications chief, had personally 
ordered that the dossier be “sexed-up” – was “gossip” and not reportable.
 Susan Watts is set up here as a journalist who has no difﬁculty distinguish-
ing gossip from grounded knowledge and employing standard professional 
safeguards to judge the quality and viability of the information she encounters. 
It would be disingenuous not to acknowledge that, at a certain level, all of 
the ensuing fuss over Gilligan’s report could have been avoided if he had 
been more cautious. But that’s not the same as saying that his report was 
wrong, or, more importantly for us, that it didn’t highlight some interesting 
double standards about the status of gossip in the public sphere (and the 
secret services). For Gilligan could have been more sceptical about Kelly’s 
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views on the government’s dossier, or could have at least made more stringent 
efforts to record those views accurately, or ﬁnd others to corroborate Kelly’s 
doubts about the dossier, but the interesting point for us is that the gov-
ernment and intelligence agencies paid just as much credence to gossip (of a 
sort) as Gilligan, the ‘rogue’ reporter.
  BBC Newsnight reporter Watts had also been an informal press contact of 
Dr Kelly’s. In a transcript of Watts talking to Kelly after Gilligan had broken the 
story about Campbell sexing up the dossier, she admits that she ‘missed that 
one’, after which they both laugh. This suggests that, whereas in hindsight it is 
easy to characterize Susan Watts as the better, more ethical, more professional 
journalist, she may well have just overlooked the story that Gilligan saw. It 
wasn’t that she tried to ﬁnd a second source for the story about Campbell, 
it was that she failed to pick up that there was a story there at all, she dis-
missed Kelly’s mention of Campbell as ‘a gossipy aside’, as she told the Hutton 
Inquiry. It’s possible that her code of conduct wasn’t put to the test in the 
way that she and The Economist report suggests. Gilligan might have listened 
too closely to gossip but Watts perhaps wasn’t listening closely enough.
 During the Hutton Inquiry, Dr Brian Jones said that Kelly would have been 
aware ‘that there was a problem with the sourcing . . . just from chatting to us.’ 
In other words, as Kelly hung about at the Ministry of Defence, one or two 
gossiping acquaintances at the DIS expressed their unease about the ‘forty-
ﬁve minutes’ claim. In this way, by talking to Gilligan, Kelly was doing precisely 
what a good gossip does: passing gossip on. That he later professed ignorance 
as to the protocols surrounding the relationship between government 
employees with access to sensitive information and journalists testiﬁes to a 
lax, laissez faire attitude towards secrecy: what is the point of a secret if you 
can’t divulge it to someone who’ll appreciate it? It is highly likely that Kelly 
underestimated the signiﬁcance of his gossipy revelations over afternoon tea 
in the Charing Cross Hotel on the 22 May 2003.
 The ﬁndings of the Hutton Inquiry and the manner in which Gilligan was 
treated (the BBC stood by him during the row with No. 10 but he was sub-
sequently dismissed) have had far-reaching consequences for journalism 
in the UK. As an indicator of the anxious climate, an internal memo at the 
British broadsheet, the Guardian, from editor Alan Rusbridger to his staff is 
exemplary. He stresses the need to re-evaluate working practices: ‘Spooks, 
politicians, civil servants (and potential moles) will all be re-evaluating their 
ways of working (or leaking) in the light of the evidence that has been 
disclosed. So should journalists.’ Leaking, a form of gossiping, will be kept in 
check by those that have something to leak, and journalists will have to cover 
their backs in a similar way: a higher level of vigilance is required when it 
comes to encountering gossip (receiving and passing it on). It is not enough, 
he goes on to say, to be careful with the wording of a Guardian article if a 
journalist is less guarded elsewhere, say on talk radio (Rusbridger cites BBC 
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Radio Five as an example but he is thinking of Gilligan’s article in the Mail 
on Sunday which was even less careful about wording than his original, 
controversial BBC Radio 4 report). Rusbridger warns: ‘On sensitive stories 
be very careful to stick exactly to what has been agreed in print. That goes 
for tone as much as facts. And I’m afraid it also goes for entering into email 
exchanges with people who present themselves as innocent readers. More 
than one Guardian journalist has been lulled into a false sense of security via 
this route – only to ﬁnd their words splattered all over some hostile website 
or weblog.’ In other words, be careful who you write to, talk to, gossip with, 
because you never know who might pass it on, possibly misrepresenting or 
decontextualizing the information.
 In the wake of the Gilligan/Kelly affair, Rusbridger predicted that the practice 
of civil servants leaking stories to the press would be kept in check, but a 
different story has actually emerged from Whitehall. Even the Hutton Report 
itself, much to the chagrin of Lord Hutton, was leaked to the UK tabloid the 
Sun and its contents were reported before the ofﬁcial publication. A six-
month investigation by the Department of Constitutional Affairs failed to 
identify the leak. This is not unusual. Reporter Julian Glover writing in the 
Guardian says that it is a Whitehall tradition; apparently ‘About twenty-ﬁve 
civil service leak inquiries are set up a year and almost none of them ﬁnger a 
culprit.’ Gossip here – unauthorized leaking – is used as a check upon govern-
mental control over the ﬂow of information.
 Following Gilligan’s broadcast and the ensuing indignant stance from No.10, 
there was much speculation by the press and Westminster as to who Gilligan’s 
source was. The guessing game was made more difﬁcult because Gilligan had 
claimed his source to be a member of the intelligence community, whereas in 
actuality he was a weapons inspector. For a few weeks, the chattering classes 
exchanged heated gossip as to the identity of the mole. Kelly, having rec-
ognized some of what he had said in Gilligan’s report, eventually decided to 
put himself forward to his employers as the possible source of the story. Kelly 
recognized his own gossip in the content of the gossip of others.
 David Kelly committed suicide after the government leaked his name in an 
informal manner to the press, adopting a policy of question and answer for 
journalists to ascertain the identity of Gilligan’s source. (One can imagine 
similar ‘games’ of partial revelation taking place over the garden fence.) 
An informal process was favoured over a formal statement because of the 
sensitivity of the matter. While not exactly gossip, this informal mode of 
communication sought to ‘hedge its bets’ in the way gossip at ﬁrst sight does. 
That is to say, gossip is commonly thought of as a mode of communication 
that lacks responsibility: gossipers can always say that they are just passing on 
something they have heard. (I want to point out, however, that this is a very 
different conﬁguration of the relationship between gossip and responsibility 
than the one I will go on to outline at the end of this chapter.) In using this 
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policy of not naming Kelly as such but allowing journalists to run through a 
list of possible candidates (naming through not-naming), the government’s 
press ofﬁce can place the responsibility elsewhere – onto the journalist for 
guessing correctly. Sensitive? Or just plain cowardly?
 Britain’s Butler Committee, set up to investigate the quality of the intelligence 
on Iraq’s WMDs, criticized Blair’s ‘informal’ mode of government, which relies 
heavily on the advice of unelected special advisers (such as Alastair Campbell) 
rather than Cabinet ministers, thus ‘reducing the scope for informed collect-
ive political judgment.’ The report goes on to read: ‘Such risks are particularly 
significant in a field like [intelligence], where hard facts are inherently 
difﬁcult to come by and the quality of judgment is accordingly all the more 
important.’ The report seems to suggest that when dealing with material of an 
undecidable nature like intelligence (which could always be ‘just’ unfounded 
gossip), it is important that the context of reception or analysis be as formal 
(and as accountable) as possible. Gossip is better handled, the report indicates, 
if its informality is not seen to infect those around it. The image here is of a 
stable, unmoveable, reliable, credible ground that can receive material of an 
opposite nature, but what Blair’s preferred style of government shows is that 
formality can be considered too time-consuming and rigid.
 In the US, according to a report in the New Yorker, Bush and his cohort 
established the habit of circumventing CIA analysis, to obtain raw, un-
assessed intelligence. Reporter Seymour M. Hersh records his conversation 
with Greg Thielmann, a former director of the Strategic, Proliferation and 
Military Affairs Ofﬁce at the State Department’s Intelligence Bureau. Hersh 
tells us what he heard Theilmann reveal regarding what the CIA thought 
of this intelligence once it did reach them: ‘They’d pick apart a report and 
ﬁnd out that the source had been wrong before, or had no access to the 
information provided.’ The trustworthiness of Ahmed Chalabi, who led 
the foremost Iraqi opposition movement, the US-backed Iraqi National 
Congress, before the fall of Saddam Hussein, was a particularly sensitive 
matter: the White House liked what it heard through Chalabi’s defector 
reports even though they were discounted by the intelligence community. 
Theilmann tells Hersh: ‘There was considerable skepticism throughout the 
intelligence community about the reliability of Chalabi’s sources, but the 
defector reports were coming all the time. Knock one down and another 
comes along. Meanwhile, the garbage was being shoved straight to the 
President. A routine settled in: the Pentagon’s defector reports, classiﬁed 
“secret,” would be funnelled to newspapers, but subsequent CIA and INR 
[Bureau of Intelligence and Research] analyses of the reports – invariably 
scathing but also classiﬁed – would remain secret.’
  On the basis of these defector reports and uncorroborated Italian in-
telligence that suggested that the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam 
al-Zahawie, might have purchased uranium in Niger in 1999, Hersh reports:
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On August 7th, Vice-President Cheney, speaking in California, said of 
Saddam Hussein, ‘What we know now, from various sources, is that he 
. . . continues to pursue a nuclear weapon.’ On August 26th, Dick Cheney 
suggested that Hussein had a nuclear capability that could directly threaten 
‘anyone he chooses, in his own region or beyond.’ He added that the Iraqis 
were continuing ‘to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years 
ago.’
 US foreign policy concerning the Gulf was built upon shaky intelligence; or 
if you like, war against Iraq was justiﬁed using the gossip President Bush et al 
liked the sound of even if the CIA discredited it.
 I want to pause for a moment on the ﬁnal piece of evidence taken up by 
the White House to make a case for war: the documents indicating the sale 
of uranium to Iraq. For gossip within the CIA has been ﬂoating the idea that 
an ex-ofﬁcer, disgruntled at the way CIA analyses of intelligence were being 
disregarded by Iraq hawks in the White House, faked the documents in order 
to expose the folly of the hawks. Hersh writes: ‘Like all large institutions, 
CIA headquarters, in Langley, Virginia, is full of water-cooler gossip.’ A 
retired clandestine ofﬁcer talks to Hersh: ‘What’s telling . . . is that the story, 
whether it’s true or not, is believed.’ Hersh interprets this as ‘an extraordinary 
commentary on the level of mistrust, bitterness, and demoralization within 
the CIA under the Bush Administration.’
End of gossip transmission. End of gossip detection. (As if it were that easy to 
demarcate gossip’s beginnings and ends . . .)
I could go on but I don’t want to get lost in a list of instances in which gossip 
has arisen. As our encounter with conspiracy can tell us, the more we look for 
something, the more likely it is we’ll ﬁnd it. Collecting these examples under the 
name of gossip involves a certain amount of elision but I think it is important 
to name them as such for its presence makes us acutely aware of the fragility of 
information and (mis)uses of authority. But I should say more about this category 
of ‘gossip’ used with such liberty above. In using the name of gossip to gather 
these examples, I don’t wish to convey an overriding homogeneity. Repetition 
of the same snippet of gossip doesn’t even have internal homogeneity; that 
is to say, even when gossip passes information on, iterability ensures that it is 
haunted by the trace of the possible ‘death’ of the source of the gossip, making it 
always ‘other’ from the ‘original’ in that repetition (and this is before we take the 
‘Chinese Whispers’ effect into account). And so the possibility of homogenous 
relations between instances of gossip is also problematic. Rather, I think that 
this category of gossip can be usefully thought of as a play of heterogeneity. 
Different in each instance, the examples cited above cannot be reduced to 
one account or explanation, to one grand theory. Just as my discussion of the 
economy in relation to gossip in the previous chapter gave rise to very different 
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readings, so here it is difﬁcult to pinpoint the politics of gossip. In some of the 
scenarios gossip serves as a check on ofﬁcial stories, performing a ‘fourth estate’ 
role, exposing secrets and calling authorities to account. In others, however, 
gossip is taken up by those authorities and forced into a more reliable and 
airtight identity. But rarely, on either side, is gossip admitted, claimed, stood by. 
Gilligan made journalistic inferences and took chances; Kelly aired concern 
over the quality of the dossier perhaps out of an ethical duty – what we call 
‘whistle blowing’; Blair’s government employed informal modes of government; 
Bush endorsed and used uncorroborated and discredited intelligence. Gossip, 
named such, rarely arises, and so the way in which gossip forces the question of 
knowledge upon us is downplayed.
From these examples of gossip, as well as from our reading of the economy 
in Chapter 4, it is clear that gossip, like conspiracy theory, can have both con-
servative and radical manifestations. Irrespective of political allegiance, many of 
the forms of gossip that I’ve been gossiping about show the key players paying 
attention to gossip because of the story it can support: because it corroborates 
something they already suspect for whatever reason (personal, political, religious, 
social and so forth). I am, of course, just as susceptible to this and my own 
opinion is clearly evident in the way I have conveyed the gossip (well, gossip is 
never neutral). This involves playing down the undecidability of knowledge and 
gossip and presenting information as either ﬁrm thesis or fact. And yet, despite 
the conscious efforts to limit the undecidability that accompanies gossip (by 
not admitting that it is gossip in the ﬁrst place, or by attributing more authority 
to the gossip than it deserves, for example), it seems to me that collectively 
these instances still have the potential to put on display the unstable nature of 
authority. To illustrate, I want to examine the ‘scandalous’ nature of the Gilligan/
Kelly affair.
What, we could begin by asking, was the most scandalous aspect of the 
Gilligan/Kelly affair? Was it that a weapons inspector had doubts about the British 
government’s claims concerning Saddam Hussein’s WMD? Was it the revelation 
that workers with relatively high security clearance regularly, and sometimes 
unguardedly, talk to members of the press? Was it that Gilligan failed to clear his 
radio report script with his editors? Or that the BBC failed to enforce a system 
of double-checking stories? All of these are certainly scandalous on a local scale. 
But I want to suggest that it was the central role of gossip in the affair (even if 
it remained unnamed) that determined the heightened level of anxiety. That is 
to say, because gossip suggested that Iraq possessed WMD, it was impossible to 
trace the information back to an ultimate source. The Hutton Inquiry ascertained 
that the information had come via a single source reporting a single source, so 
that would be a difﬁcult lead to follow even if the ﬁrst informer weren’t secret; 
ﬁnding Saddam hasn’t resolved the issue of WMD and the actual weapons, if 
indeed there are any, haven’t been found either. The presence of WMD has not 
been proved (nothing has been found) or disproved (there is always the slim 
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possibility that stockpiles were destroyed or sold). The WMD scandal cannot ﬁnd 
closure. Certainly, it will blow over, become a footnote in history, become less 
important, but closure will continue to elude because so many of the elements 
in the puzzle are based on gossip. Gossip keeps the scandal scandalous (I will 
explain what I mean by this below).
Of course, many of the key players found it necessary to suggest certain 
points of closure. So Alastair Campbell et al., for example, concentrated on 
identifying the mole who raised the concerns in the ﬁrst place (eventually 
identiﬁed as Kelly) and on the legal status of Gilligan’s report. By focusing the 
story on exposing and discrediting the mole and the journalist, Campbell could 
present a provisional point of closure for the story in the not wholly successful 
attempt to prevent it from becoming one about the questionable authority on 
which war was waged. (I say not wholly successful for the anti-war coalition 
in Britain certainly ‘challenged the government’s authority to wage a war with 
Iraq,’ as Tony Benn phrased it at the People’s Assembly for Peace held at Central 
Hall, London, in March 2003, although I will go on to address the limits of this 
challenge.) Campbell’s game was always a dangerous one: as he questioned the 
authority of one British institution (the BBC), the same questions could be asked 
of his own (the government).
Which brings me back to the issue of the scandalous scandal. I want to 
suggest that the most scandalous element of the Gilligan/Kelly affair might be 
the inﬁnite regress of authority that conditions all decision making and claims 
to legitimacy (which is another way of saying, as I did above, that gossip keeps 
the scandal scandalous). With reference to his conversation with Kelly, Gilligan 
accused Campbell of altering the essence of the dossier to make it a more 
powerful document in a bid to gain support for war. Much of the ensuing debate 
and focus of the Hutton Inquiry concentrated on, ﬁrstly, Gilligan’s accuracy and 
journalistic conduct and, secondly, the government’s role in the presentation of 
intelligence in the dossier to the public. But in concentrating on these questions, 
a more fundamental one concerning the nature of authority was left unasked 
even though the presence of gossip raised it, and the anti-war coalition was 
certainly concerned about legality. Such obfuscation, of course, is far from 
surprising: it is necessary for governing to take place.
‘TRUST ME, I’M THE PRIME MINISTER’
In order to get a clearer sense of how gossip alerts us to this problem with 
authority, I will need to examine the classical formulation of knowledge. As I have 
already suggested in Chapter 1, ‘knowledge’ is commonsensically understood as 
justiﬁed true belief. If we recall the necessary conditions for knowledge are as 
follows: the proposition has to be true; I have to believe that the proposition 
is true; and I have to be justiﬁed in believing the proposition. Epistemologists 
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have debated the assumptions at the heart of these conditions for centuries, 
particularly concerned with deﬁnitions of truth, the nature of belief, and what 
constitutes adequate justiﬁcation for knowledge.
What is striking about the classical formulation is that it leaves open 
the question of authority – of who authorizes the justiﬁcation for knowing 
something and whether that justiﬁcation can be scientiﬁc only or could also be 
ideological. ‘Justiﬁcation’, after all, suggests both rational (disinterested) and non-
rational (interested) motives. And there is a more fundamental issue with the 
authorizing of knowledge, which rests on the question of who authorizes the 
authorization, and so on, ad inﬁnitum. That inﬁnity is the space of the mystical: 
there is no point at which the question of justiﬁcation comes to a standstill, 
no ﬁnal ground of justiﬁcation, thus keeping the question of authority open 
as fundamentally unknowable, or mystical. This means that knowledge cannot 
be justiﬁed in any rational, or should I say, knowledgeable way; it can never be 
legitimately legitimized in the ﬁrst place.
Knowledge leaves itself open to a self-authorizing legitimacy or justiﬁcation. 
Jean-François Lyotard elaborates on this issue:
Authority is not deduced. Attempts at legitimating authority lead to vicious 
circles (I have authority over you because you authorize me to have it), 
to question begging (the authorization authorizes authority), to infinite 
regression (x is authorized by y, who is authorized by z), and to the paradox 
of idiolects (God, Life, etc., designate me to exert authority, and I am the only 
witness of this revelation). ([1983] 1988: 142)
Knowledge, despite its attempts to the contrary, cannot do anything to stop 
this regression because it just inheres in the logic of authorization. It can seek 
to limit or mitigate the ‘madness’ that such a state of affairs implies by making 
sure that its objects are at least as scientiﬁcally robust as possible, but it will 
never stop the ‘madness’ per se. An appeal to one’s position within an institution 
(‘Trust me, I’m a doctor’ or ‘Trust me, I’m the Prime Minister’) doesn’t avoid 
this problem, as the founding moment of an institution too is shot-through 
with this problem of authority (who bestowed authority to the institution and 
who bestowed authority on the person bestowing authority etc.). To become 
knowledge, therefore, knowledge has no choice but to cut ‘arbitrarily’ into that 
regressive chain, and to posit something – to posit knowledge that will contain an 
irreducible and ineliminable trace of the arbitrariness that affects it. Clearly, this 
is a regrettable set up for knowledge, not least because it means that knowledge 
can never finally distinguish itself from gossip, a supposed sub-species of 
knowledge that spawns itself precisely on arbitrary positings of ‘knowledge’. On 
the other hand, without this arbitrary moment of a violent decision, knowledge 
would not exist at all. In taking its decision to cut into the inﬁnite chain of 
regress, knowledge becomes itself, and ultimately part of its authority derives 
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just from this act of decision. But the cost is that knowledge is shadowed by 
the gossiping twin that has the same parent. Because of the arbitrary decision 
at the heart of knowledge and gossip, legitimacy (the question of whether what 
we encounter is gossip or knowledge) is irreducibly undecidable. Of course, 
in one sense, we are only dealing with decidability (only a decision can make 
gossip gossip, or make knowledge knowledge), but the trace of the undecidable 
remains. This undecidability does not disappear once the decision has been 
made as to the verity/credibility/import or otherwise of particular content. 
Derrida tells us: ‘The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension 
between two decisions’ (2002: 252). Rather, it is a structuring impossibility at 
the heart of the question of authority. This means that while we can make 
local decisions as to whether a singular instance is knowledge or gossip, such a 
decision is shot-through with a more radical undecidability as to this opposition. 
We make provisional decisions according to laws, rules, and criteria, but the 
violent establishment of any authority that assures those laws, rules and criteria 
renders them unstable.
The undecidability of knowledge’s legitimacy remains as a trace even when 
knowledge functions perfectly well. Gossip can serve as a reminder of this. It 
is important to recognize that knowledge effects are produced – we live by 
these effects in everyday life, indeed, they are necessary to function – but the 
risk of gossip (of these knowledge effects being unfounded or of uncertain 
status) is never far away. Certainly such a trace became important in the cases 
I’ve been looking at, for the forging of intelligence into stable knowledge 
became unsustainable – it could be argued that intelligence, as secret, was never 
intended to be used in the public form it took around the issue of Iraq. The 
ghost of undecidability between founded or unfounded knowledge, and of the 
arbitrariness of knowledge’s positing, haunts anything that can be thought of as 
knowledge. When the details of the Gilligan/Kelly affair and the making of the 
dossier came to light, this simply brought the spectre of gossip into our line of 
vision. Gossip, then, is not a marginal mistake, self-contained, and unconnected 
to the ‘real’ business of knowledge and truth; it both shares the condition of 
the arbitrary with knowledge, and, as a name we can strategically give to un-
decidability, has a conditioning role to play itself in knowledge.
On one hand, this state of affairs makes it easy for Blair to take us to war 
more or less on the basis of gossip – uncorroborated and unreliable intelligence 
(concerning the ‘forty-five minutes’ claim, the procurement of uranium in 
Niger, and the presence of WMD in general), and a plagiarized student thesis 
(in the ﬁrst dossier titled Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception 
and Intimidation). On the other, it meant that Blair had to do something to 
secure the regress: he chose to assert his authority. In an attempt to counter 
the inﬁnite regress of authority and the instability of his intelligence, Blair told 
BBC’s Newsnight audience in the February of 2003 that military conﬂict is ‘what 
I believe to be the right thing to do’. He did not say that it ‘is’ right, but that he 
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believes it to be right. But what founds this moral belief? Well, his self-conviction 
and sense of moral duty and certainty is seen by many to be a result of his strong 
religious beliefs. Matthew D’Ancona, deputy editor of the British broadsheet, the 
Sunday Telegraph, is quoted in a US made PBS documentary as saying, ‘I think 
Blair’s entire political behavior has to be linked to his private religious beliefs. 
He doesn’t talk about his religious beliefs very much but they are fundamental to 
anything and everything that he does.’ Likewise, Charles Powell, former adviser 
to Margaret Thatcher, and Conservative member of the House of Lords, says, ‘I 
think it is true to say that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair do share a 
certain moral certainty about the way the world is going . . . Now, one has to be 
careful here. Morality and diplomacy are not easy bedfellows . . . You can’t just 
run a foreign policy on a moral basis. But there’s no doubt that the impulse with 
both of them is strong. And it is what has led to the vigorous prosecution of the 
war against terrorism, and now the impending war against Iraq.’1 Indeed, when 
asked who he would answer to for the deaths of British soldiers, Blair replied: 
‘My Maker’ (see Ahmed 2003). Blair’s political authority is elided with a moral 
‘duty’. He relies on his legally elected status to authorize his personal moral 
beliefs and, conversely, draws on his Christian morality to persuade his political 
constituents. I am not suggesting that any political decision is divorced from 
an ethical perspective (nor am I saying that it should be, necessarily, although 
we could separate moralism from morality here, and question the status of 
the ‘ethical’ in this context) but in appealing to this register, Blair looks to be 
scrabbling for authority in all directions (political authority, moral authority, any 
authority that can arrest the regress that gossip signals).
Blair follows through with his decision to go to war even though some of 
the people he represents are against it (a perfectly democratic thing to do, of 
course). We have authorized him to make decisions like going to war but pro-
test against this particular exercise of that authority (the protest also being a 
perfectly democratic thing to do). Blair sticks to his decision and appeals to a 
moral register in the hope, perhaps, that we will not think too much about this 
issue of political representation, the message being something like, ‘Look, I am 
listening to you, the public, but I also have to listen to my religious moral code 
that I represent here on earth.’ The result is an embarrassing logic (‘Britain has to 
go to war because, as your elected leader, I have to protect you from Saddam’s 
WMD that can kill us in forty-ﬁve minutes, and even if that isn’t true, we have to 
go to war because Saddam is the kind of dictator who would kill us in forty-ﬁve 
minutes if he could’). By looking to legitimize his actions through both a pol-
itical and moral authority, Blair increasingly appears as though he is acting with 
neither. Rather, he seems to be behaving, as old style Labour politician Tony Benn 
described it, like a ‘medieval king’ (quoted in Davies 2003). And medieval kings 
were, of course, earthly representatives of God’s will, rather than the people’s.
Now, we are faced with a precarious social-democratic contract here. Benn 
goes on to say that through Blair’s lack of adherence to international law, ‘he has 
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released us from our moral obligation to accept decisions and we are now free 
to follow our consciences’ (quoted in Davies 2003). Benn recognizes that the 
contract, in legal terms, has been fractured: if Blair doesn’t act democratically 
(adhering to international law) then those in a minority don’t have to act 
democratically (by being obliged to support his decisions as the elected leader). 
Sidestepping the issue of whether what we are really talking about here is a 
democratic rather than moral obligation, Benn’s call to ‘follow our consciences’ 
is interesting because of the way it challenges Blair’s authority by re-emphasizing 
the authority of citizens. He doesn’t, that is, question why any claims to authority 
are fragile but relocates authority firmly with the people. Authority isn’t 
questioned, just transferred. On one level, no-one would expect an anti-war 
protester like Benn to begin raising the question of authority in this way – it 
wouldn’t serve his immediate purposes. But I do think that this question can 
embolden arguments against the arrogation of power. I want to, then, retrace my 
steps more slowly with regards to this question of authority and representation.
It is, of course, true to say that at the time of going to war in Iraq the British 
public voted for Blair and the Labour party to represent them in 1997 and again 
in 2001 (the case is more problematic in the American context with disputable 
‘chads’ on Florida’s ballot papers during the Presidential election in 2000) but 
that authority is local and provisional: our votes, that is to say, bequeath authority 
on the Prime Minister or President in a democracy but the right to vote is secured 
by a number of historical contingencies rather than universal certainties. The 
right to vote is dependent on citizenship; citizenship is subject to birthplace or 
a successful application for citizenship. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights states: ‘(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government 
of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives’ and later, ‘(3) 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures.’ But the debate as to whether this right (or any right, for that matter) 
is inalienable has a long history. What is clear is that the legislative moment 
that authorizes the right to vote, that in turn bestows power upon the elected 
person to govern as s/he sees ﬁt (including going to war on the basis of gossip), 
is a moment of violence, for the legislator who declares voting to be a ‘right’ 
could not have been elected democratically. This is the scandal that the gossip 
we have been looking at can point us towards: it has the potential to show up 
such ‘violence’. Unlike localized scandals which are easily assimilated into public 
discourse, this kind of scandal does not have a place in the public sphere, which 
is invested in what Jodi Dean calls ‘the rhetoric of publicity’, which propagates 
the idea that ‘democracy is a system through which free and equal citizens 
rationally discuss and decide matters of public concern’ (2002: 53). And so, the 
‘violence’ of Blair taking Britain to war on the basis of gossip is only publicly 
evident in the ‘violence’ exercised against Kelly, the BBC, and Gilligan. The Kelly/
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Gilligan affair served as a convenient scandal to obscure the more scandalous 
scandal that ‘just’ is the inﬁnite regress of authority.
What we should take from this particular case is that the lack of authority 
revealed in Bush and Blair’s reliance on gossip is not an exception. Rather, this 
case simply makes the situation clearer, putting on display the way in which 
decision-making in government is always based on a ‘violent’ founding authority. 
Of course, the necessarily or inherently ‘violent’ stature of that authority can be 
experienced without the presence of gossip (we might, for example, experience 
a general sense of disenfranchisement when decisions we don’t agree with 
– like going to war, perhaps – are made) but the gossip in this case puts the 
‘violence’ to the foreground regardless of political allegiance (and, yes, we would 
also have to think about the implications of this argument for the way in which 
Gilligan forged Kelly’s gossip into reportable fact). In other words, in everyday 
governmental decision making, we might only experience the ‘violence’ of 
authority when the politics of those decisions sits uneasily with us; but the 
undecidability that permeated the gossip (disguised as knowledge) Bush and 
Blair relied upon potentially moves an experience of the ‘violent’ nature of their 
decision beyond political afﬁliation. Irrespective of whether we supported the 
war or not, the way in which Blair and Bush invested that gossip with legitimacy 
and force (since gossip does not inherently have those qualities and can only be 
endowed with them by an adjudicator or advocator), shows up the violence of 
their decision.
That is not to say that the violence that gossip can potentially expose was 
recognized or discussed explicitly. In line with traditional theories of ideology, 
we could say that what has become known as neo-liberal capitalism likes to 
keep such ‘violence’ under wraps. Democracy depends on voters believing that 
they, as self-present, rational, sovereign subjects, legitimately bequeath authority 
to their elected representatives, not questioning where in fact that authority 
comes from in the ﬁrst place. For example, when I marched with over a million 
people against the war in Iraq in London on 15 February 2003 we perhaps 
experienced the violence of decision-making authority. But this was translated 
into a frustration at not being listened to by our government. The war on Iraq 
was being waged without our speciﬁc consent and so, for us, Blair had acted 
without authority. The banners read, ‘Not In My Name’. Blair’s action was not, 
unsurprisingly, discussed as an inﬁnite regress of authority (Blair can’t authorize 
war because we haven’t authorized war and besides nobody has authorized us 
to authorize war in the ﬁrst place). Rather, it was positioned as an action that just 
happened not to have been endorsed by us this time (but, given different politics, 
or different politicians, could have). This keeps the secret of authority’s regress 
safe (and the secret of legitimacy I wrote about in Chapter 3), as well as the 
undecidable nature of knowledge. The democratic process is dented but survives 
because the idea of the self-present democratic subject is left unquestioned. 
Through the presence of marches and demonstrations this form of democracy is, 
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even, renewed. Wendy Brown is helpful in this context. She writes, ‘expressions 
of moralistic outrage implicitly cast the state as if it were or could be a deeply 
democratic and non-violent institution’ (2001: 36). Moreover, expressions of 
moralistic outrage render resistant movements (including, presumably, anti-war 
movements) as if they were not ‘potentially subversive, representing a signiﬁcant 
political challenge to the norms of the regime, but rather were benign entities . . . 
entirely appropriate for the state to equally protect’ (Brown 2001: 36). Brown is 
concerned that such moralistic outrage misunderstands and misrepresents the 
nature of state power.
The war on Iraq was conducted without authority. I mean this in localized 
ways: much of the public didn’t support it; the evidence was ﬂimsy to say the 
least; no second resolution was granted by the United Nations; and its legal 
status was hotly debated in the lead-up to the British general election in 2005 
after the Attorney General’s previously unseen, and highly ambiguous, advice 
prior to action was leaked to the press.2 But also in the radical sense that I’ve 
been discussing. Yet, such a state of affairs is not an aberration in the democratic 
process; it is simply an overt example of the way in which power operates. All 
of which should not sound like an attack on democracy in favour of something 
else: totalitarianism, say, the authority of which is, ethically speaking, even more 
violent. Yet the ironies of exercising and privileging one’s democratic rights 
to protest a war waged in the name of spreading democracy and protecting 
freedom are worth raising. It seems to me that if we do not think about these 
uncomfortable aspects of the democratic process we cannot begin to open 
up the ground for what Derrida calls ‘democracy to come’: democracy, that is, 
as an ‘endless promise’ to rethink ‘itself’, politics, responsibility, justice and the 
nation state; to honour the spirit of critique that the Enlightenment enshrined, 
but unsettle its metaphysically conceived assumption of the rational, self-present 
subject and the model of democracy it fosters (see Derrida 1992d: 38).
On the one hand, the ‘secret’ of the violent positing of authority and know-
ledge is always almost exposed. George W. Bush, we could say, is so obvious 
about the violence of his ideological decisions that the secret can’t stay secret 
for long. But on the other hand, the way in which abused parties experience this 
violence (as an infringement of their rights) doesn’t quite get to the point. In the 
feature-length documentary, Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004), Michael Moore expresses 
his outrage at Bush’s heavy-handed presidency; and it was a cleverly timed 
attempt to prevent Bush from being re-elected. Such efforts are admirable and 
much needed by the left but they never quite lift the veil I am referring to (such 
a metaphor, of course, is misleading, because under the veil is ‘nothing’: only an 
impasse). And so gossip – often when it goes undetected and not admitted to 
– serves as the basis of some ‘violent’ decisions, but gossip also has the potential 
to reveal the workings of power. The oscillation between moments of ‘violence’ 
and moments of exposure are centred, here, around gossip.
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ON BEING RESPONSIBLE
Why was the decision to go to war irresponsible and how can gossip, contrary to 
its usual associations with irresponsibility, point us towards a more ‘responsible’ 
response? First, it is important to recognize that it is impossible to establish a rule 
for a responsible response. This is because a truly responsible response would be 
singular, particular to the circumstances that demanded it. Derrida claims that 
the question of what responsibility is ‘must remain urgent and unanswered, at 
any rate, without a general and rule-governed response, without a response other 
than that which is linked speciﬁcally each time, to the occurrence of a decision 
without rules and without will in the course of a new test of the undecidable’ 
(1992b: 14–15).
In a number of Derrida’s texts, but perhaps most forcefully in Gift of Death, 
he puts forward a ‘radical form of responsibility’ in place of the orthodox 
‘transcendent experience that relates Platonic responsibility’ to the common 
good ([1992c] 1995: 27). One of the familiar prerequisites for making decisions 
is having enough knowledge to make that decision, but:
Saying that a responsible decision must be taken on the basis of knowledge 
seems to deﬁne the condition of possibility of responsibility (one can’t make 
a responsible decision without science or conscience, without knowing what 
one is doing, for what reasons, in view of what and under what conditions), 
at the same time as it deﬁnes the condition of impossibility of this same re-
sponsibility (if decision-making is relegated to a knowledge that it is content 
to ﬂow or to develop, then it is no more a responsible decision, it is the 
technical deployment of a cognitive apparatus, the simple mechanistic 
deployment of a theorem). (Derrida, [1992c] 1995: 24)
A programmatic decision, made as an afﬁrmation of one’s own subjectivity 
and knowledge, in a sense revokes and devolves responsibility to an already 
decided, calculable way of deciding. I am not making a ‘free’ decision if I make 
it according to terms already set. There is no role for us in the decision-making 
process other than perhaps as passive transmitter. Elsewhere, Derrida explains, 
‘When the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the 
way in advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said that there 
is none to make: irresponsibly, and in good conscience, one simply applies or 
implements a program’ ([1991] 1992: 41). In light of this, we could think about 
the way in which Bush and Blair’s response to the post-September 11 political 
conjuncture, particularly their decision to go to war in Iraq, was made according 
to an already established programme and logic.
Why do I feel able to say this? Well, I think it is reasonable to say that Blair’s 
decision to go to war came before the presentation of the ‘case’ for war to the 
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public. Indeed, minutes of a meeting between Mr Blair and other key ﬁgures, 
including Lord Boyce, Sir Richard Dearlove (then chief of MI6), Jack Straw, the 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Goldsmith QC, the Attorney-General, and Geoff Hoon, 
the Defence Secretary held in July 2002, a few weeks after Blair went to Bush’s 
ranch in Texas, were leaked. The contents suggest that the UK was committed to 
the course of war long before much of the subsequent intelligence came to light. 
A Times Online report claims: ‘The leak revealed what appeared to be minuted 
war preparations at the highest level of government in July 2002, months before 
Mr Blair received parliamentary approval for military action’ (Evans 2005). 
Similarly, Bush is commonly believed to have decided on military intervention 
in Iraq long before the public was told war was inevitable. Assistant managing 
editor of Newsweek, Evan Thomas, relates a telling story in the already cited 
PBS documentary: ‘Richard Haass went to Condi Rice, the president’s national 
security adviser, and said, “Well, should I start having meetings or studies about 
whether we’re going to confront Iraq?” And Condi Rice’s answer was, “Don’t 
bother. The president has already made up his mind.”’ Thomas adds his own 
opinion: ‘I believe the president, in a fundamental way, made up his mind on 
about September 12, 2001, that Iraq was something he was going to eventually 
deal with.’ And so gossip dressed up as knowledge was invoked to justify an al-
ready decided path of aggression. (What I said above, then, about Blair taking us 
to war on the basis of gossip, is slightly misleading: he tried to justify his already 
decided decision (made according to strategic alliances, political motivations, or 
a moral conscience) with reference to gossip disguised as something more solid.)
Blair’s decision to go to war was (however serious and difﬁcult) not a decision 
in Derrida’s terms. For the Derridean decision involves risk (as does speculation). 
War, to be sure, involves political risk (Blair’s position within the Labour Party 
and among some of the electorate was shaken by his support of Bush; the 
UK’s standing in Europe might be compromised; the balance in the Middle East 
might have been irrevocably destabilized and anti-Western feelings fuelled), 
and, of course, mortal risk (to Iraqi civilians and soldiers and to those sent to 
ﬁght and ‘keep peace’) but there is no rupture with an already established logic, 
say, of American economic, military and political dominance. The ‘idea’ of war 
on Iraq was partly inherited from the ﬁrst Gulf War or from George Bush Snr 
(who himself inherited it from precursors in socio-politico-military history). 
And continuity was insisted upon in Britain, too: Blair went as far to suggest 
that ousting Saddam was wholly in keeping with a morally-conscious Labour 
tradition of ‘liberating people from dictators’.3 Of course, the decision not to go 
to war wouldn’t necessarily have been a radical decision either, because that too 
remains within the logic of war: a codiﬁed option within the discourse of conﬂict. 
A rupture might involve bringing a wholly different order of understanding to 
bear on the Middle East, on terrorism, on post-September 11 global relations. It 
would not then be a decision between waging or not waging war, because there 
would be an ordering point of reference outside of war altogether.4
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Following a programme like this ‘makes of ethics and politics a technology. 
No longer of the order of practical reason or decision’ (Derrida [1991] 1992: 
45). Bush and Blair’s decision to go to war on the basis of gossip was necessarily 
‘irresponsible’ because it was not theirs alone, they borrowed the criteria by 
which the available knowledge was judged and a decision made. Of course 
we have to call upon knowledge to get us to the point at which we can make 
a decision (say, all of the context that Blair and Bush brought to bear on the 
Iraq issue), but there will always come a moment when a pragmatic, active 
decision must be made, breaking with (though carrying the trace of) that 
knowledge. The necessary leap into the incalculable when making a decision 
posits unreason in the very place where reason is expected: at the heart of an 
apparently responsible decision. So the kind of radical responsibility Derrida 
envisages is one that recognizes and takes on board this incalculability (rather 
than underplaying it, as the lack of caveats in Blair’s dossier did, for example, for 
fear of accusations of irrationality and the threat this poses to classical notions 
of subjectivity). The decision, in a way, makes us (rather than us making it); we 
make it through the other. Bennington explains:
responsibility cannot responsibly be thought of as following a programme 
of ethical (or political) correctness: responsibility can be taken only when 
such programmes are exceeded or surprised by the event of the advent of 
the other. Responsibility occurs on the occasion of a singular event which 
escapes prior normative preparations. Responsibility is responsibility to the 
other, but is also of the other: the responsive decision I must take is not mine, 
but a measure of ‘my’ originary depropriation in the advent of the other and 
other other. The other, we might say, signs my responsibility for me and only 
thus might I take a responsibility upon myself as other. (2000: 159)
Which makes it difﬁcult to tell the difference between this kind of responsibility 
and the programmatic decision that also seems to be made by another (religious 
doctrine, say, or etiquette guidance, in our examples of gossip in Chapter 4). And 
it is in this aporia between two kinds of decisions (both of which are rooted in 
incalculability and which seem to be made by another) that Derrida locates the 
force of the responsible response or decision.
Where does this leave us with regards to knowledge and gossip? I can know 
in advance that knowledge is constitutively ‘corruptible’ but I can’t know 
before my reading of it or encounter with it whether or not it has actually 
been ‘corrupted’. Equally, once I make the decision as to its ‘corruption’, I have 
to know that this is only a provisional decision, haunted, as it is, by the other 
possible decisions. The decision is only provisional (even if it forces us to make it 
as if it were our ﬁnal decision). None of this was brought to bear on the case we 
are scrutinizing. Blair’s government assigned the gossip about Saddam Hussein 
being able to launch WMD in forty-ﬁve minutes the status of credible knowledge. 
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Such a status was assigned according to a particular logic or ideology around 
Iraq and could not afford to appear to carry the trace of gossip within it.
In terms of our reading of the Iraq issue, I want to argue that what we are 
strategically calling here ‘gossip’ – this undecidability between knowledge and 
non-knowledge – almost presses the question of responsibility upon us. The 
partial breakdown between ‘official’ and popular modes of knowing in the 
cultural sphere, and the way in which gossip foregrounds knowledge’s inﬁnite 
regress of authority, can compel us to assume responsibility (some cases more 
than others, to be sure). We can no longer, gossip makes clear, rely on someone 
of authority, like Bush or Blair, to make a decision for us. Do we accept or refute, 
for example, the validity of a dossier making the case for war that uses unreliable 
intelligence?
I think that gossip is interesting and important precisely because it exceeds 
traditional or established disciplinary forms of, and ways of understanding 
knowledge. As we’ve seen in the previous chapter, the way in which the 
philosophical tradition ‘writes off’ gossip doesn’t do it justice, but nor does 
anthropology’s approach which emphasizes gossip’s community function. 
And because it exceeds the categories of undetermined and meaningless, 
and determined and meaningful, we are forced into making a decision if we 
are going to understand it more fully. Our encounter with gossip, that is to 
say, requires us to decide in an incalculable realm whether we think it is true 
or not, valid or not. The pre-decided, moral codes for judging gossip, and the 
ﬁgures of authority we might wish to turn to for advice, do not help us to 
face gossip as more than mere object – they do not help us to face gossip 
responsibly.
We could say, then, that the presence of gossip in the government’s dossier 
for war in Iraq was not a priori lamentable on moral grounds. Rather, it is 
concerning because the undecidability that gossip signals is not addressed. 
Indeed, not naming gossip ‘gossip’ is one way of leaving undecidability 
unaddressed. That is why I have pointed out that none of the people employing 
gossip in the scenarios above would want to give it that name – not Gilligan, 
nor the government – not even when they accuse each other of what is, in 
effect, gossip. In recognizing undecidability, in holding knowledge and non-
knowledge in tension, we are forced not to follow but go beyond the execution 
of a rule. Reducing the question of gossip to morality is an attempt to subsume 
the radical implications of undecidability within more stable discourses and 
ways of knowing (as happened in the Gilligan/Kelly case). And because these 
potentially radical implications can always remain unrealized, the presence of 
gossip can never be an assurance that questions about what knowledge is, and 
what or who authorizes it, will be left open. The discourses at hand to foreclose 
or contain these questions are multiple, coming from both the right and left.
I want to make it clear that recognizing the potentially disruptive effects of 
gossip on traditional ways of thinking (about subjectivity, about responsibility, 
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about knowledge) is not the same as championing actual acts of gossip. Not 
least because gossip, of course, has been responsible for some heinous crimes 
in history. A reminder of this arrived on the front page of the Independent as 
I was editing the final manuscript of this book. The headline ‘Vigilante 
Violence: Death by Gossip’ lead into an article about the vigilante killing of Paul 
Cooper, wrongly believed to have been a paedophile. It was gossip and rumour 
that led his killers to believe he was guilty of sex offences (Herbert 2005: 1).
Indeed, I am not saying that we should be unconditionally open or hospitable 
to gossip. That would be impractical and undesirable. If we take another emotive 
example (without implying that the comparison is unproblematic), infinite 
openness or hospitality to asylum seekers, while radically responsible (in that no 
other others are being excluded in favour of one other), is in practice impossible 
(there would be too many) and undesirable. An inﬁnite openness to all kinds 
of knowledges is not always practical and yet the implications of this must 
be addressed. While problematizing humanist notions of responsibility (and 
associated concepts like forgiveness or hospitality), Derrida is not saying that 
responsible decisions are impossible. In fact, he suggests that responsibility 
exists in a constant tension between contradictory demands, as an oscillation 
between the demands of the wholly other (say, a notion of inﬁnite responsibility 
or hospitality) and the more general demands of a community (the restrictions 
imposed on that responsibility or hospitality for the welfare of the hospitable 
community). If we can tolerate this aporia, we will have acted as responsibly as 
we can.
What does all that we have said about gossip mean for a discipline like cult-
ural studies, which should make understanding everyday acts like gossip part 
of its project (especially if it wants to understand how politics works today)? It 
means, I think, recognizing our own work as knowledge-production, and putting 
in motion an adequate theorizing of the relationship of this work to other forms 
of knowledge-production, including popular knowledges like gossip. We might 
do well to think of our own work as a form of generalized gossip. Far from 
producing speculations that fail to take seriously the subjects participating in 
that culture (in the manner Miller and McHoul and other critics of theoretical 
approaches to cultural studies are concerned about), we might, in recognizing 
the undecidable ‘nature’ of gossip, just be better positioned to trace the links 
between knowledge, politics and power. And rather than thinking of theory as 
a pre-existing system through which various cultural acts and artefacts can be 
read (which would be more like a form of moralism, the perils of which I have 
made clear), we should look to athetic speculation: which is about taking risks, 
and as such, somewhat counterintuitively, puts us in a better position to make 
responsible and singular decisions.
A politically committed cultural studies should be interested in a popular 
knowledge like gossip because it can force judgement upon us and make us 
wary of the knowledge we want to utilize to help us make that judgement – that 
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is, if we recognize gossip as undecidability, it forces us to decide what is and 
what is not knowledge at every step of the way. And this decision making about 
the knowledge we encounter is one possible description of politics. It is part of 
the work of an ethical and responsible analysis of culture.
Conclusion: Old Enough to Know Better?  
The Work of Cultural Studies
SCENE ONE
It is exactly one week after the bombings by Islamic extremists on the London 
Underground. The usually sober BBC Radio Four PM news show moves from 
a serious report about Muslim scepticism towards the ﬁndings of the police 
investigation to a lighthearted item about conspiracy theories with author Jon 
Ronson. No one explicitly suggests that the Muslim communities interviewed 
are peddling conspiracy theories but it is implied through the juxtaposition.
SCENE TWO
It is June 2005 and Tom Cruise and Katie Holmes are having their very own 
summer of love. Cruise, a Hollywood A-lister, announces his engagement to teen 
soap television actress Katie Holmes who is trying to make a career for herself in 
the movies now that she is too old to play young Joey Potter in Dawson’s Creek 
(1998–2003). The grapevine gossip sounds something like this: Cruise, long 
rumoured to be gay, has allegedly paid Holmes millions of dollars to act as his 
wife to secure his heterosexuality and astronomical salary. Worse, the rumours 
say Holmes wasn’t ﬁrst choice, but eighth. The gossip is everywhere, except in 
print.
SCENE THREE
It is 1994, Harvard Professor John E. Mack has just published his controversial 
study on alien abductions, Abduction: Human Encounters with Aliens. Mack is 
sent a letter informing him that there will be a formal inquiry into the validity of 
his research. It is the ﬁrst time in Harvard’s history that a tenured professor will 
be subject to this form of scrutiny. Mack does not yet know that the investigation 
will take fourteen stressful months, propel him to stardom in UFOlogy and 
152 Knowledge Goes Pop
abductee circles, and that the Medical School committee will be forced to retract 
any disparaging remarks.
SCENE FOUR
It is July 2005 and the European Union decides to ban various mineral sup-
plements and restrict the dosage of certain vitamins. The British Health Food 
Manufacturers’ Association, alternative health practitioners, and self-dosing 
consumers who swear by the beneﬁts are up in arms. The challenge is also 
supported by a number of high-proﬁle celebrities, including the actress Dame 
Judi Dench and the American ﬁlmmaker Kevin Miller, who claims that reducing 
vitamin dosages limits their therapeutic effect (see Saini 2005). The ban stems 
from medical evidence that reports the dangers of overdosing on vitamins and 
minerals.
It is the uncertainty around the status of legitimacy played out in these scenes 
that I ﬁnd interesting. Within them, the relationships between knowledge and 
‘non-knowledge’, between legitimacy and illegitimacy, between different appeals 
to authority, are being negotiated. A reading of each in the way I’ve tried to do 
with my case studies in this book could tease out the exact manifestation and 
effects of these tensions. Of course, what I have also been arguing for in this 
book is that such issues around legitimacy are not just played out in the cultural 
arena, but also ‘inside’ the academy where its practitioners are often wedded, 
consciously and unconsciously, to rationalist discourses.
I have suggested that the questions concerning legitimacy that popular 
knowledges raise are particularly interesting in relation to cultural studies given 
its historically uncertain place within the academy. This might account for some 
of its reticence to (a) trouble its own conditions of possibility; and (b) get too 
‘close’ to popular knowledges. Indeed, the question of legitimacy generates 
much anxiety inside and outside cultural studies (although, of course, such an 
inside and outside cannot easily be designated – a matter that also contributes 
to this anxiety). As I have shown, many attacks from critics of cultural studies 
and cultural theory strike at the heart of this concern. In generating statements 
without the necessary authority, cultural studies opens itself to accusations of 
being like a popular knowledge itself. Not only does the lack of authority render 
the credibility of statements unstable, but the very mode of discourse, the kinds 
of questions cultural studies wants to address, inevitably veers further away 
from a concern with scientiﬁc factuality, leaving the ﬁeld exposed, again, to a 
connection with more interpretative forms of knowledge that in some eyes do 
not count as knowledge proper at all.
We could borrow from a different register to think about what kind of 
position cultural studies ﬁnds itself in. We could say that cultural studies, the 
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bastard child of the humanities and social sciences, lacks a responsible father. 
There is no proper name behind cultural studies (in the way there is, for example, 
behind psychoanalysis, even when one considers the many precursors to Freud 
and his debts). Cultural studies might have many contenders for the role of 
the founding father (Mathew Arnold, F. R. Leavis, Raymond Williams, Richard 
Hoggart, and latterly, Stuart Hall), but the deﬁnitive paternal ﬁgure that proffers 
a degree of ‘legitimacy’ remains in question. This is not, of course, to suggest that 
disciplines that do have a deﬁnitive ‘father’ unproblematically attain legitimacy, 
but that the father (as one of the means by which the ﬁeld or discipline seeks to 
institute and reproduce itself and its original guiding idea, along with its canon 
and pedagogical techniques, its various forms and styles of writing, publication, 
research, assessment and so on) makes legitimacy more culturally accepted 
and is called upon to arbitrate in disputes concerning identity and belonging. 
There is no deﬁnitive father to appeal to that can assure us that cultural studies 
is not mere speculation, mere conspiracy theory, mere gossip. Indeed, the one 
living paternal candidate – Stuart Hall – continually refuses to accept this role 
and the responsibility that comes with it. In ‘Cultural Studies and its Theoretical 
Legacies’, he writes, ‘I don’t want to talk about British cultural studies . . . in a 
patriarchal way, as the keeper of the conscience of cultural studies, hoping to 
police you back into line with what it really was if only you knew’ (Hall 1992: 
277). There is no father. In fact what I have tried to reiterate throughout this 
book is that what is true for cultural studies is also true (albeit in different and 
singular ways) for other disciplines; the precarious position of cultural studies 
merely exposes a general rule (in a similar way to how we have seen popular 
knowledges function).
All this might seem to leave cultural studies in a perilous position – its prox-
imity to gossip, conspiracy theory and the rest – is all the more apparent in 
the absence of a father who would not tolerate such behaviour. But this vacant 
paternal role, this lack of a master, could be considered as that which allows cult-
ural studies to innovate and explore. All of which might just be another way of 
explaining that cultural studies is in a good position to address the question of 
legitimacy, to embrace radical rather than restrictive forms of speculation and to 
brush shoulders with, understand, and learn lessons from apparently ‘illegitimate’ 
popular knowledges. Without the punitive presence of the father, cultural studies 
has less to risk and lose.
Cultural studies’ willingness or otherwise to deal with these issues has to 
be seen in the context of the university. The questions raised by popular know-
ledges in this book, of course, have serious implications for the university as 
an institution devoted to the pursuit of knowledge.1 Institutions like the 
university are interesting because they have to posit knowledge despite 
its arbitrariness: they have to make decisions all the time about knowledge 
without this decision-making process necessarily being transparent. How 
does this work in practice?
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Institutions function, as Samuel Weber has explored, on the invisible ex-
clusion of certain elements. He is thinking particularly of the way in which 
founding or instituting principles are placed in a position of otherness once 
they have served their purpose. Institutions and disciplines then owe a debt to 
this other, which often goes unacknowledged. Weber considers the way in 
which professionalism was instituted as an example of how such ‘demarcation’ 
works:
limits and limitation were indispensable for the demarcation of the profes-
sional ﬁeld, but once the latter had been established, the attention to borders 
(founding principles) became increasingly the exception rather than the rule. 
Attention was focused on the problems and questions emerging within the 
ﬁeld, the coherence and even history of which was taken increasingly for 
granted. (1987: 30)
This is not far from what we have already demonstrated through a ‘deconstructive’ 
reading of popular knowledges (for example, that gossip, as an excluded element 
of knowledge proper, is the condition of knowledge’s possibility, already part of 
its foundation). When we introduce the university (as the institutionalization of 
knowledges) into this equation, the ambivalent relation that it has with popular 
knowledges like gossip becomes deﬁnitive. On one hand, the university draws on 
popular knowledge to function when more transparent methods are too lengthy, 
formal, and one dimensional. So that, to draw on an example already cited in 
Chapter 4, committees granting tenure (in the US) or making appointments call 
on less formal modes of communication like gossip to ﬁnd out the calibre of 
candidates. On the other, popular knowledges are formally frowned upon (to 
follow through the example of gossip, it is not in keeping with an ethos of equal 
opportunities for a start); and in terms of research, accusations of someone’s 
scholarship being ‘gossip’ or ‘conspiracy theory’ would be highly derogatory, 
indicating a lack of substantiated evidence, inadequate referencing, or other 
methodological mishaps. Popular knowledge becomes less and less desirable 
the closer it gets to the realms of teaching and research. If popular knowledge is 
kept in its place as a method of enquiry reserved for decisions made outside of 
research contexts, or as an object of study for particular disciplines, no problem 
is encountered.
The employment of popular knowledge is seen as a special circumstance, 
fashioned by an understanding about that ‘special’ status before, during and after 
the encounter. But in light of what I am suggesting – about the conditioning role 
of popular knowledge – this aberrant status does not tell us the whole story.
Weber is careful to point out that two readings of institutionalization should 
be held in tension: it is not just to be seen in terms of a structure that maintains 
the status quo, as in ‘instituted organization’, but also as a creative development 
that breaks with the old, as in ‘instituting process’ (Weber 1987: xv). These two 
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takes on institutionalization are ‘joined in the relation of every determinate 
structure to that which it excludes, and yet which, qua excluded, allows that 
structure to set itself apart’ (Weber 1987: xv). In other words, the instituting 
moment leaves an excess: as something is created or instituted the future is 
left open for other events to take place. The risk, of course, is that these future 
events might disrupt or threaten the institution, and so they are excluded; 
this exclusion, this setting apart, conferring identity upon the institution. The 
exclusion helps the institution to maintain the status quo as if institutionalized 
functioning could exist free from an instituting act. Wlad Godzich describes the 
situation thus: ‘the instituting moment, which endows the entire institution with 
signiﬁcation and meaning, is held within the institution as both proper to it and 
yet alien: it is its other, valued to be sure yet curiously irrelevant to immediate 
concerns’ (1987: 156). After Weber’s careful framing, I don’t wish to posit the 
university as a tyrannical agent, keeping unruly popular knowledge at bay; rather 
we should see the exclusion or management of popular knowledge as structural, 
an effect of its instituting ambivalence. Popular knowledge is othered, placed on 
the outside of the university and its prime resource – knowledge – even while 
making it possible. Weber calls this ‘ambivalent demarcation’:
The demarcation is ambivalent because it does not merely demarcate one 
thing by setting it off from another; it also de-marks, that is, defaces the mark 
it simultaneously inscribes, by placing it in relation to an indeterminable 
series of other marks, of which we can never be fully conscious or cognizant. 
(1987: 145)
Popular knowledge is not placed just in opposition to knowledge; the dividing 
line joins as well as separates and is, in any case, unstable because the terms 
it demarcates are in ﬂux, dependant upon a whole series of relations to other 
terms within and beyond our conscious horizon.
Irrationality is not being set up as a better rule by which to live (Embrace 
gossip! Be conspiracy theorists!); rather, I think it is important to interrogate 
knowledge in order to explore the limits of reason. The answer is not to 
institutionalize popular knowledges, to act as if the demarcation were a simple 
binarism that can be rectiﬁed by crossing popular knowledge over to the ‘other 
side’ to make it respectable and ascribing it some kind of ‘rightful’ position 
(creating disciplines called, perhaps, Scuttlebutt Science or Conspiracy Studies). 
This has meant recognizing that the ambivalent relationship between the uni-
versity and popular knowledge has implications for how we are to: ﬁrst, ask the 
question of legitimacy within the academy; and second, approach our objects of 
study. Which is why cultural studies is so important in this context. Weber writes, 
‘a discipline legitimates itself through the operations it performs upon objects 
(whether objects of study, or other disciplines) held to be different from it’ (1987: 
146–7). Weber claims that ‘the regulative idea of the [professionalist paradigm 
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of knowledge] is that of the absolute autonomy of the individual discipline, 
construed as a self-contained body of investigative procedures and of knowledge 
held to be universally valid within the conﬁnes of an unproblematized ﬁeld’ 
(1987: 147). Yet, cultural studies is supposed to be very much open to objects 
that are different from it, whether this is in terms of other disciplines (cultural 
studies is based on an ideal of interdisciplinarity or post-disciplinarity, even if 
in practice, this proves difﬁcult for the reasons Weber cites), or non-traditional 
objects of study (like gossip and conspiracy theory, to be sure, but also pop 
music, subcultures, street fashion and so forth). Cultural studies, however, has 
not necessarily exercised this openness in a way that sufﬁciently challenges the 
positioning of those ‘different’ objects as being still ‘other’ in some way.
Nevertheless, because of its potential openness to doing so, I want to argue 
that cultural studies is still in a better position to take on this challenge than 
many disciplines (precisely because of its long history of considering the 
subjects of disciplinarity and canonization).
If cultural studies is to be a discipline capable of doing more than merely 
analysing any popular knowledge as an external object, it will need to address 
the questions raised by this ambivalent relationship between the university 
and popular knowledge. For cultural studies’ relatively marginal position, its 
status as the university’s whipping boy (as evidenced by all the references to 
cultural studies as a ‘Mickey Mouse’ subject, for example, or lambasted as having 
no legitimate methodology) means that it shares at least some of the cultural 
value ascribed to popular knowledge. As I keep reiterating, rather than being 
concerned by this and trying desperately to assert its legitimacy in different 
ways, cultural studies could use this position to its advantage.
At the end of his book challenging previous cultural studies positions on 
fan cultures, Matt Hills writes, ‘Cultural studies may be keen to critique and re-
make the world, but it has become amazingly adept at ignoring its own power 
relationships, its own exclusions . . . and its own moral dualisms’ (2002: 184). 
I think that popular knowledges make such blind spots more noticeable for 
cultural studies. For an encounter with popular knowledge highlights perfectly 
the need for cultural studies at its best: as a ‘discipline’ able to analyse the 
institutional anxiety that attends popular phenomena and its own position in the 
crossﬁre. Cultural studies in this vision opens us up to the possibility of a radical 
responsibility when it comes to making decisions about knowledge in particular, 
and cultural phenomena in general. Some of these decisions will matter and 
some won’t. What will have been important, even in the most trivial example, 
however, is exercising a responsible response to knowledge and culture. It won’t 
make it any easier next time – for all decisions, as we have seen in Chapter 5, are 
forays into unknowability; if they are not, they cease to be decisions – but we 
will have acted as responsibly as we can.
Some will dismiss my enquiry as relativism. I would argue that we have 
become very accustomed to playing down this question of relative knowledge 
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as if it were simply a case of personal psychology. Saying, as I have, that there 
is an inﬁnite regress at the heart of authority (this issue of who authorizes 
the person that authorizes knowledge) certainly means that knowledge is 
dependent on cultural circumstance and ‘individual’ decision. But, crucially, 
the non-sovereignty of this individual who makes the decision means that the 
decision that is made is not based wholly in knowledge – it is, rather, without 
any safeguards at all, without any ﬁnal recourse; it is made in a realm of the other, 
in a realm of generalized gossip or conspiracy theory and the like (at least in the 
way I have rethought and strategically positioned them in this book).
Knowledge cannot be posited without this non-knowledgeable decision. 
The identity of knowledge is rendered non self-identical, is shot through with 
alterity and decentred because it always already contains non-knowledge 
(gossip, conspiracy theory and so on) at its heart. It is a mutually contaminating 
relationship: they are both inside and outside each other at the same time. This 
means that the relativity of knowledge is only one element of a much larger 
story.
So rather that get stuck on this point of relativity, I have tried to think about the 
way in which some knowledges put on display epistemological undecidability. 
That knowledge rests on non-knowledge, on a regress, rather than clear criteria 
for certainty does not signal a collapse into meaninglessness (or madness as 
Derrida would have it, following Kierkegaard) but it does force us into making 
a decision about the information we encounter. As I have explored in this book, 
the ‘legitimacy’ of knowledge (the question of whether what we encounter is in 
fact knowledge at all or ‘just’ gossip; whether it is sound interpretation or ‘merely’ 
conspiracy theory) is, while in one sense wholly subject to decidability (after all, 
only a decision can posit knowledge) also irreducibly undecidable because of its 
‘impure’ beginnings. It is in this realm of the undecidable that we have to make 
responsible decisions. In response, therefore, to accusations of relativism, it is 
not the case that there is no knowledge, or alternatively, that all knowledge is 
valid. (Knowledge will be posited just as meaning is communicated, and events 
do take place.) But it is the case that a certain restance – unique each time – will 
ensure that the future, even when it apparently ‘arrives’, will always be yet ‘to 
come’. This means that the question of what knowledge is will need to be asked, 
again and again, for we will not, and should not, always be able to recognize it.

Endnotes
CHAPTER 1: KNOW IT ALL
1. Stuart Hall usefully uses the terms ‘dominant’ and ‘popular’ to distinguish 
forms of culture. It is on the boundaries between these forms, for Hall, that 
the ideological struggle takes place (Hall 1981: 227–40).
2. For a cogent discussion of political populism, see Ernesto Laclau, The Populist 
Reason (2005).
3. Key Foucauldian texts in this vein include The Archaeology of Knowledge 
(1969) and The Order of Things (1966).
4. See Tyrone Yarborough’s manifesto (no date given), which tries to shake 
up the discipline of folklore to include contemporary examples. A book 
worth looking at in this context is Linda Dégh, American Folklore and 
the Mass Media (1994). In an attempt to bring folklore and media closer 
together, or at least to open a dialogue about the tensions of a mass mediated 
folklore, Dégh observes that: ‘with the advent of mass production . . . the 
earlier harmonious give and take between oral and nonoral folklore ceased 
to exist, and technical reproductivity . . . dictated a different pace for folklore 
communication through new media’ (1994: 1).
5. See Younge (2004) and BBC (2003b).
6. See Part Three of Gelder and Thornton’s The Subcultures Reader (1997), 
David Muggleton and Rupert Weinzierl’s The Post-subcultures Reader (2003), 
and Andy Bennett and Keith Kahn-Harris’s After Subculture: Critical Studies 
in Contemporary Youth Culture (2004) for subsequent problematizing of 
subcultural theory as set out by the CCCS at Birmingham during the 1970s.
7. Ien Ang’s seminal text in audience studies, Watching Dallas (1985), provides 
an example of such work.
8. I do, however, argue later that a theoretically inﬂected cultural studies is 
a better investment than other forms of cultural studies. But the kinds of 
thinkers I believe are most helpful, like Derrida and Lyotard, are not, it has 
to be acknowledged, ‘simply’ theorists. For in their work they pay attention 
to what escapes theory (the singularity of literariness or poeticity, the event, 
the madness of the decision and so forth). So theory itself is subject to the 
non-self identity that ‘beleaguers’ knowledge, which means that while the 
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 term ‘theory’ is something of an institutional or disciplinary one, designed 
to professionalize a certain set of discourses or modes of thinking, what 
exceeds theory is always undermining and problematizing that institution, 
discipline or professionalization.
 9. Of course, it would be naïve of me to think I can work outside of the 
obvious (but often unspoken) hierarchies of legitimacy that operate within 
the academy (as someone who spanned a rather ‘serious’ critical theory 
programme and a cultural studies department that was perceived as being 
less philosophically ‘serious’ – at least from the point of view of my fellow 
critical theorists – during my time as a doctoral student, I am only too aware 
of those hierarchies).
10. In a similar way, accusations that deconstruction is too ‘textual’ have missed 
the way in which ‘text’ is reinscribed through deconstruction.
11. This analysis leaves many interesting avenues yet to be explored. For 
example, a consideration of indigenous knowledge (local knowledge, parti-
cularly of the land) – its role in communities, and relationship to other, 
more ‘ofﬁcial’ kinds of knowledge – would provide a counterexample to 
the kinds of mass-scale popular knowledges I’ve concentrated on in this 
book. Equally, it would no doubt prove fruitful to consider the proliferation 
of post-colonial knowledges that challenge and subvert colonial narratives 
such as Orientalism or, for that matter, queer knowledges that challenge 
heteronormativity. Such investigations would make for a very different book, 
although some of the points I have made about the structure and condi-
tions of possibility (and impossibility) of knowledge would still be relevant.
CHAPTER 2: JUST BECAUSE YOU’RE PARANOID, DOESN’T 
MEAN THEY’RE NOT OUT TO GET YOU
1. Of course, it seems as if this is another example of academia arriving ‘late’. 
In some ways, this is a necessary state of affairs: we have to recognize an 
‘object’ of study before we can study it. This is not to deny the fact that 
academic structures of thought can accompany or inform a cultural 
movement, moment, or phenomenon, nor to simplify categories of primary 
and secondary texts, only to stress the necessity of recognizing a signiﬁer 
for any speculation on various signiﬁed meanings to take place. The time 
lapse depends somewhat on how close one’s ear is to the ground but there 
is always the risk that by the time academia comes to produce its own texts 
on a cultural phenomenon (and, in some ways, producing that phenomenon 
as it will come to be known in academic circles and possibly beyond), that 
phenomenon will have declined in popularity or at least distinctly changed 
in character. This inevitable transformation should not, however, render an 
enquiry redundant. It should merely make us recognize that an ‘object’ of 
 Endnotes 161
study will not wait for us to catch up with it, but will always be in ﬂux 
– presenting us with a process (the production of which we are intricately 
implicated in) rather than an ‘object’ in its traditional sense. This might be 
particularly true for ‘knowledges’, popular or otherwise. It may be late, then, 
but it is not ‘too late’ (and as scholars, we might contend that it is never 
too late; in fact, a common complaint about cultural studies from historians 
is that we approach things too early: that it might not be late enough to 
think about the culture we still live in and breathe). There is also a more 
‘post-structuralist’ way of thinking about this which might suggest that we 
construct the object in the very act of studying it. This would suggest that we 
both arrive too late and too early (before the object, so to speak, since we’re 
also constructing it).
2. Steamshovel Press, http://www.umsl.edu/~skthoma/sp16.htm.
3. Conspiracy Planet, http://www.conspiracyplanet.com/.
4. Todd Hoffman falls into the trap of attempting to cite an origin for the 
appeal of conspiracy theory. At ﬁrst, Hoffman entertains Ron Rosenbaum’s 
suggestion that the exposé of Kim Philby as a spy (‘who had every reason to 
defend the status quo’) opened up the possibility of anyone being connected 
to a conspiracy despite appearances. However, Hoffman settles on Watergate 
as the origin of the appeal (1998: 395). This, of course, can easily be countered 
by the many books on historical conspiracy theories. Of note is research by 
Bernard Bailyn (1972), David Brion Davis (1971), and J. Wendell Knox (1972) 
who have all produced historical accounts of the recurrence of conspiracy 
and conspiracy theories in American politics, often making a case for their 
central role in the formation of national identity. More recently, Pauline Maier 
(1997) directs us to the largely unsubstantiated accusations against the king 
in the Declaration of Independence.
5. The magazine Mondo 2000 links many of these threads in its features, 
showing how conspiracy theory cannot be isolated. Launched in 1984 
as High Frontiers in California (changed to Reality Hackers in 1988, and 
then to Mondo 2000 in 1992), Mondo 2000 ﬁlled its pages with articles 
on psychedelia and drug culture, cyberpunk, technology, design, hacking, 
issues of performative gender, as well as conspiracy theories. These concerns 
ﬁltered into the general ethos of the magazine. For a history of Mondo 2000, 
see Boulware (1995).
6. Stephen Duncombe writes that the two deﬁning inﬂuences on zines were 
the emergence of science ﬁction fanzines in the 1930s and the fanzines 
produced by fans of punk rock in the 1970s. ‘In the early 1980s these two 
tributaries, joined by the smaller streams of publications created by fans of 
other cultural genres, disgruntled self-publishers, and the remnants of printed 
political dissent from the sixties and seventies, were brought together and 
cross-fertilized through listings and reviews in network zines like Factsheet 
Five’ (1997: 7).
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 7. With thanks to Al Hidell of Paranoia magazine for providing a background 
to conspiracy theory zines. Personal email correspondence, 11 May 2000.
 8. Kenn Thomas quoted from personal email correspondence, 9 May 2000.
 9. John Judge is a Washington DC researcher into assassinations and con-
spiracies.
10. Mae Brussell hosted a conspiracy theory radio show – World Watchers 
International – from KLRB in Carmel. California. and KAZU, Paciﬁc Grove, 
California, and was an active researcher into political assassination and 
political scandal, providing a role model for conspiracy theorists. According 
to Mark Fenster, her work was publicized by countercultural publication, 
The Realist (1999: 183). Virginia McCullough is the archivist of the Mae 
Brussell Archive, which is set to be located at the Stanford University 
Library.
11. See James Daugherty, A-albionic, http://www.a-albionic.com.
12. The Center For The Preservation Of Modern History, Prevailing Winds 
Research, PO Box 23511 Santa Barbara, CA 93121, USA.
13. Al Hidell in personal email correspondence, 11 May 2000.
14. Jim Keith is the author of many conspiracy related classics including Mind 
Control, World Control (1997); OKBOMB: Conspiracy and Cover-up (1996); 
and editor of Secret and Suppressed: Banned Ideas and Hidden History 
(1993).
15. Ron Bonds in personal email correspondence with the author, 8 May 2000.
16. Richard Linklater’s ﬁlm featured a character who was writing a conspiracy 
book called Conspiracy A Go-Go.
17. Conspiracy narratives have, of course, provided a plot device for Hollywood 
ﬁlms for over half a century. One only needs to think of 1950s war, spy 
and science ﬁction ﬁlms, or the conspiracy narratives of the 1970s, such 
as Francis Ford Coppola’s The Conversation (1974), Alan J. Pakula’s ‘so-
called paranoia trilogy’ (Jameson 1992: 52), Klute (1971), The Parallax 
View (1974), and All the President’s Men (1976), and Sydney Pollack’s 
Three Days of the Condor (1975). However, conspiracy ﬁlms of the 1990s 
can be seen to resonate within a conspiracy theory industry. The 1970s 
conspiracy ﬁlm, that is, could be read as a contained conspiracy narrative. 
This is not to deny the wider, extra-diegetic, political implications of the 
1970s conspiracy ﬁlms, but to observe the ways in which the 1990s ﬁlms 
and television programmes are generally more reliant upon the audience’s 
capacity to contextualize the narratives within a wider public discourse 
of popular conspiracy theories and the conspiracies that the 1970s ﬁlms 
represented. The 1970s ﬁlms could be said to emerge from the leftist legacy 
of conspiracy theory, reacting against a discourse of political denial that 
stems from the House of Un-American Activities Committee investigations, 
focusing on the idea of political conspiracy, whereas the 1990s ﬁlms and 
television programmes seem reliant upon the particular manifestation and 
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social inﬂection of conspiracy theory as a popular knowledge of circulation 
and exchange. Whereas the 1970s films seem to present conspiracy 
narratives that respond to a political climate, the 1990s ﬁlms are dependent 
upon a commercial form of conspiracy theory that draws on that 1970s 
political climate, but not exclusively so, rendering any ideology inconsistent. 
The 1990s ﬁlms and television serials rely on a particular form of popular 
narrative: a form that the makers of those 1970s ﬁlms could surely not have 
anticipated.
18. Some of the many compendia include Jonathan Vankin and John Whalen, 
The Giant Book of Conspiracies (1995); Jonathan Vankin, Conspiracies, 
Cover-Ups and Crimes: From Dallas to Waco (1996); Doug Moench, The 
Big Book of Conspiracies (1995).
19. Before The X-Files ended, Fox Network had a specially dedicated shopping 
site: The X-Files Store online at http://www.fox.com (accessed 21 December 
2001).
20. A local Roswell newspaper report in 1997 points towards the commercial 
gains of being associated with conspiracy theory:
Michael Anador is high as an alien saucer this week. His business, the 
Apache Gallery, has increased sales by about 90 percent in the last two 
weeks, he said, and it’s only going to get better. But his normal stock of 
Mexican and Native American art has gone by the wayside for now. ‘This 
week – anything to do with aliens goes,’ he said. Most of his business is 
in alien jewellery and crop-circle T-shirts, he said. Visitors are welcomed 
in by an old Army jeep occupied by dummy aliens wearing various head-
dress and clothing from his store. UFO and alien buffs have already 
converged on this normally docile town of about 50,000, and organizers 
say the gathering is bound to get bigger by the weekend. (Wise 1997: 1)
21. Although, as Matthew Hills points out, Appadurai’s conﬁguration of the 
commodity reductively imposes a logic of identity: ‘at point “a” in time the 
object is purely a commodity, whereas at point “b” in time this same object 
is purely a non-commodity. The awkward question which then remains, is 
how and where is the deﬁnite division between these events to be located?’ 
(1999: 81). While, therefore, it might be easy for us to identify when a text 
produced through the optic of conspiracy theory is deﬁnitely a commodity, 
it might be more difﬁcult for us to decide when it is not.
22. Interestingly, Kellner expresses both views in the same paper.
23. A contributor to one of the conspiracy theory discussion boards I monitored 
at the time of Diana’s death (the Conspiracy Theory Discussion Board, 
available http//www.internet-inquirer.com) referred to the Paris deaths as 
‘Dianagate’ with an obvious reference to the Watergate affair, a discursive 
tactic that has been utilized for many scandals and exposés from ‘Irangate’ 
(the Iran-Contra affair) to ‘Zippergate’ (the Monica Lewinsky affair). This 
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situates the Diana case within a continuum of scandals and cover ups, 
each of which became embroiled in legal proceedings and only came to 
light after extensive investigations. The term ‘Dianagate’, then, indicates the 
anticipation of an exposé and sets forth the complexity of the task ahead 
of conspiracy theorists. By invoking the rhetoric of political exposés, the 
contributor attempts to accentuate the political signiﬁcance of contrib-
utors’ endeavours and to push the boundaries of how and where their 
theories can resonate (beyond the limits of the board itself); but the playful 
element is also signiﬁcant.
24. Inferno, ‘Theories and ideas so far – update’, Conspiracy Theory Discussion 
Board, 4 September 1997, http://www.internet-inquirer.com/board.htm 
(accessed 20 October 1997).
25. Donna J., ‘Things that make you go hmmm . . .’, Conspiracy Theory Discussion 
Board, 4 September 1997, http://www.internet-inquirer.com/board.htm 
(accessed 20 October 1997).
26. MZA, ‘Re: A Moslem Mother of King of England’, Conspiracy Theory Dis-
cussion Board, 17 September 1997, http://www.internet-inquirer.com/
board.htm (accessed 20 October 1997).
27. James Country, ‘Survivor’, Conspiracy Theory Discussion Board, 4 Sep-
tember 1997, http://www.internet-inquirer.com/board.htm (accessed 20 
October 1997).
28. Inferno, ‘Theories and ideas so far – update’, Conspiracy Theory Discussion 
Board, 4 September 1997, http://www.internet-inquirer.com/board.htm 
(20 October 1997).
29. Peter Knight and Alasdair Spark describe how: ‘the assassination pro-
vides the “motherlode” for conspiracies (the event at which almost all 
conspiracies eventually touch base), and therefore 22 November 1963 
serves as one of the fractures from which the modern conspiracy era has 
been dated, and – as important – is back-dated to by the contemporary 
“reverse mapping” of recent American history as conspiracy led’ (1997). 
This trend is evident in the Internet discussion of Diana. For example, on 
the Conspiracy Theory Discussion Board (http//www.internet-inquirer.
com), the Warren Commission Report serves as an implicit and explicit 
point of reference for contributors. One contributor writes how s/he wants 
the Paris investigation to be different from the ‘inane machinations of the 
Warren Report.’ Another refers to the explanation that the car crash was an 
accident as the new version of the lone gunman theory proposed by the 
Warren Commission Report. Even the names of some of the contributors 
to the board draw on JFK conspiracy folklore, such as ‘Umbrella Woman’, 
whose assumed name refers to the ﬁgure reported to have opened his/her 
umbrella in Dealey Plaza on the day of the assassination as a sign to the 
other conspirators. One contributor sees the board as a way of stopping 
‘another JFK’. This refers not only to the mission of the board to prevent 
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a cover up, but also, ironically, for the board to prevent a proliferation of 
theories that would result in the event of Diana’s death becoming obscured 
by a series of narratives. References to the infamous Warren Report, 
which endorsed the lone gunman theory over conclusions of a conspiracy, 
highlight the distrust conspiracy theorists have in reports that do not ratify 
their own conclusions. While there are few concentrated attempts to trace 
Diana’s death back to that of JFK in the way that Knight and Spark suggest, 
it is clear that this seminal event permeates and shapes the rhetoric on the 
board that I considered for my research: the Conspiracy Theory Discussion 
Board.
30. The First Diana Conspiracy Site, 31 August 1997, http://www.healey.com.
au/~themagic/di.htm (accessed 15 November 1998).
31. KL, ‘Americans knew before the Britons’, 31 August 1997. Quoted from a 
selection of theories posted to alt.conspiracy.princess-diana and uk.current-
events.princess-diana collected by http://www.mcn.org/b/poisonfrog/
diana/usenet.htm (accessed 21 October 1997).
32. Of course, the Internet has also gained a reputation for being an arena for 
useless, illegitimate knowledge: ‘a vast repository of drivel, pornography, 
consumption, and gambling’ (Dean 2002: 75).
33. ‘George’, a user of Parascope’s Matrix Message board, derides a fellow 
user by suggesting that ‘he probably got his information off the web’, 27 
October 1997, http://www.parascope.com (accessed 29 October 1997). 
Other entries on this message board indicate a low tolerance for poorly 
researched hypotheses.
34. Anonymous, ‘Unconvinced but Pondering’, Conspiracy Theory Discussion 
Board, 10 September 1997. http//www.internet-inquirer.com (accessed 20 
September 1998).
35. James, ‘anti-depressants: yeah right’, Conspiracy Theory Discussion Board, 
10 September 1997, http//www.internet-inquirer.com (accessed 20 
September 1998).
36. Bang@value.net. ‘Re: Dodo Delete’, 1 September 1997. Quoted from a sel-
ection of theories posted to alt.conspiracy.princess-diana and uk.current-
events.princess-diana collected by http://www.mcn.org/b/poisonfrog/
diana/usenet.htm (accessed 21 October 1997).
37. ‘Four of the hijackers’ passports were recovered, including one found on 
the street minutes after the plane he was aboard crashed into the north 
tower of the World Trade Center’ (Associated Press 2004).
38. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis explain this working through 
as ‘the process by means of which analysis implants an interpretation and 
overcomes the resistances to which it has given rise. Working-through is 
taken to be a sort of psychical work which allows the subject to accept 
certain repressed elements and to free himself from the grip of mechanisms 
of repetition’ (1988: 488).
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CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL STUDIES ON/AS  
CONSPIRACY THEORY
1. Paul Gilroy, ‘History of Cultural Studies,’ Save Cultural Studies Campaign, 
available http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/culturalstudies/history.htm (accessed 
2 March 2005).
2. Elaine Showalter, ‘Slaying the Hydra’, Conspiracy Cultures Conference at 
King Alfred’s College of Higher Education, Winchester, 1998.
3. Lyotard writes: ‘A wrong results from the fact that the rules of the genre 
of discourse according to which one judges are not those of the genre or 
genres judged’ ([1983] 1988: 9).
4. One of the most obvious examples of such a challenge can be found in 
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition ([1979] 1994). In this by now seminal 
text, Lyotard shows how the legitimating strategy of science – its recourse to 
philosophy – relies upon that which science professes to be in opposition 
to, namely narrative knowledge. In this way, ‘as resolute a philosophy as that 
of Descartes can only demonstrate the legitimacy of science through what 
Valéry called the story of the mind, or else in a Bildungsroman’ (29). Unlike 
narrative knowledge, ‘a statement of science gains no validity from the fact 
of being reported’ (26). Such an opposition, however, cannot be conﬁned 
to scientific and narrative knowledge. Indeed, Lyotard’s configuration 
risks a certain homogenization of the latter. The philosophical discourse 
and Cashinahua oral tradition that Lyotard cites as instances of narrative 
knowledges, for example, have a less than simple afﬁliation. I would argue 
that the relationship between certain ‘popular’ narrative knowledges, and 
knowledges that have undergone institutional processes of legitimation such 
as philosophy may be as problematic as that between science and narrative 
knowledge.
5. However, it is important to note and take on board the consequences that the 
same could be said for a ‘new’ interpretation as well as a ‘bad’ interpretation. It 
is this tension that Lyotard sees as one problem with scientiﬁc communities 
of consensus (see below).
6. Eco admires the ‘esthetic of the free, deviant, desirous and malicious use 
of texts’ such as the work of Borges, but these are always ‘uses’ rather than 
‘interpretations’. More uncertainly, he refers to Barthesian jouissance as 
being on the dividing line between ‘the free use of a text taken as imaginative 
stimulus and the interpretation of an ‘open’ text.’ While he concludes that 
this decision would rely on whether jouissance was imposed onto the text 
or found within its own strategy, such arbitration appears highly problematic 
(1997: 44).
7. To provide another example of this at work, in ‘Cogito and the History of 
Madness’, Derrida problematizes the distinction between reason and madness 
by explaining that although the Cogito apparently ensures reason, it actually 
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 allows for the possibility of madness. The possibility of iterability ensures 
that the Cogito must be able to be repeated in the event of one’s madness, 
placing madness within the transcendental, ideal ‘I’ that is invoked in the 
Cogito and exceeds the totality of what one can think. Thus the ‘inside’, 
in this case ‘reason’, taken to its (il)logical conclusion, will lead beyond its 
perceived boundary. To think madness from a position of reason is to see 
the way in which reason is always already outside itself (Derrida [1967c] 
1981: 31–63).
 8. As an indicator of negative feelings towards cultural studies, comments 
like the following (which appeared in the supposedly ‘left-wing’, British 
newspaper, the Guardian) are a commonplace sentiment amongst the 
chattering classes: ‘You need only glance down the list of texts in the 
burgeoning ﬁeld of “cultural studies” to bring on a ﬁt of “the world’s gone 
mad” fever’ (Brockes 2003).
 9. I should point out here that attacks on cultural studies come from differ-
ent angles, partly depending on which version of cultural studies is being 
targeted. In the US, cultural studies is very much associated with theoretical 
encounters and Sokal seemed to be more concerned with attacking the 
likes of Althusser, Deleuze, Latour, Lacan, Baudrillard and so on. However, 
Sokal’s essay and the incident in general are linked with Andrew Ross, 
one of the editors of the cultural studies journal Social Text, who would 
easily be aligned with a more ‘British’ version of cultural studies.
10. See Ofﬁcial Secrets Act 1989 (c. 6) Section 2 (Defence), available http://
www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/Ukpga_19890006_en_2.htm (accessed 
1/6/04).
CHAPTER 4: HOT GOSSIP: THE CULTURAL POLITICS  
OF SPECULATION
1. Various policies have been proposed and implemented by the Blair govern-
ment as a direct result of research conducted into the knowledge economy 
(as outlined in the 1998 DTI White Paper, Our Competitive Future: Building 
the Knowledge Driven Economy).
2. ‘An explosion which turned out to be a dam blast in southern Iran sent 
jitters through ﬁnancial markets amid speculation that the country’s only 
nuclear reactor had come under attack’ (McDowall and Penketh 2005).
3. Biblical references are taken from The New Oxford Annotated Bible, New 
Revised Standard Version, B. M. Metzger and R. E. Murphy (eds), Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and New York.
4. Qur’anic quotations are adapted from the edition by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The 
Qur’an: With Text, Translation and Commentary, New York: Tahrike Tarsile 
Quran, 1998.
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 5. In legal terms, hearsay is deﬁned as: ‘second-hand evidence in which the 
witness is not telling what he/she knows personally, but what others have 
said to him/her’, and ‘scuttlebutt or gossip’ (see Hill and Hill 1995).
 6. It was, ironically, a previous respondent who suggested I must look at Miller 
and McHoul if I want to talk about non-speculative readings of culture.
 7. My discussion of Miller and McHoul’s speculation is inﬂuenced in part 
by Jacques Derrida’s ‘To Speculate – On “Freud”’ ([1980] 1987). Not least 
because the dismissal of philosophy that Derrida observes in Freud’s work 
serves as an exemplary precedent to any attempt to limit speculation. Freud 
initially puts his hopes in the observation of patients as a way of securing 
psychoanalysis against the charge of philosophy and I think we can hear 
echoes of Freud’s failure to recognize his debts in cultural studies’ recent 
turn to ethnographic sociology and political economy. Of course, I should 
say at the outset that Derrida’s discussion of the speculative operations at 
work within Beyond is only one element of a painstakingly close reading. 
And when dealing with an essay that is concerned with borrowing and the 
trope of debt, it is with no small amount of irony that I am going to borrow 
and lift from context a small part of Derrida’s reading to derive a generality 
concerning speculation.
 8. The pleasure principle, for Freud, is a governing principle that seeks to avoid 
unpleasure (by reducing or regulating excitations) – and so we can instantly 
see why the death drive, which is a tendency to the state of inertia (another 
reduction of excitations, but this time to the point of non-existence), and 
the fact that we repeat unpleasurable experiences, causes problems for the 
pleasure principle that Freud needed to address. He attempts to do just this 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
 9. Of course, one could argue that this whole book is ﬁlled with thetic spec-
ulations. But we would have to ask what status that thesis has if it involves 
a discussion, as it does here, of those aspects of knowledge that prevent it 
from being a fully sealed, self-identical argument. I am very interested in 
what exceeds existing discussions of gossip, while knowing that my own 
reading will be subject to excesses in turn.
10. To be fair, however, the book does seem to aim at a market beyond the 
strictly academic, which could also account for Mellencamp’s theoretically 
light touch.
11. The report is published online at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/
Page1470.asp (accessed 2 June 2004). The BBC news article outlining the 
similarities between the government’s document and the doctoral thesis of 
Ibrahim al-Marashi appears as ‘A piece of plagiarism?’ BBC News, 7 February 
2003, available http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2736149.stm 
(accessed 2 June 2004).
12. The claim that Saddam Hussein could launch weapons of mass destruction 
in forty-ﬁve minutes was set out as part of its case for war in the government 
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dossier Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – The assessment of the 
British Government, 24 September 2002, available http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/ Page271.asp (accessed 3 June 2004).
CHAPTER 5: SEXED UP: GOSSIP BY STEALTH
1. ‘Blair’s War: Frontline’, PBS, 3 April 2003, available http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blair/prime/blairbush.html (accessed 5 May 
2005).
2. Channel 4 News obtained a copy of the summary of the conﬁdential legal 
advice written by the Attorney General Lord Goldsmith and sent to the Prime 
Minister on March 7th, two weeks before the war with Iraq. The documents 
reveal that Lord Goldsmith warned Mr Blair that failure to secure a second 
United Nations resolution explicitly authorizing military action would force 
the government “urgently” to reconsider its legal case.’ ‘Complete Legal 
Documents,’ Channel 4 News, 27 April 2005, available http://www.channel4.
com/news/special-reports/special-reports-storypage.jsp?id=91 (accessed 
4 June 2005).
3. Sean Ley reports that, in a move to distract from his allegiance with America, 
Blair tried to suggest that ousting Saddam Hussein was simply following 
‘Labour’s moral and long established belief in liberating people from 
dictators. In other words, Tony Blair is not clinging onto the coat tails of a 
Republican President playing out the last act of a family revenge drama – as 
some of Labour’s anti-war campaigners believe. Instead, this is a Labour Party 
leader acting within his party’s tradition’ (Ley 2003). Such a suggestion ﬁts 
with my argument here, that the decision wasn’t a rupture in any way.
4. It’s not clear how far Gilligan escapes this charge of a programmatic dec-
ision. On the one hand, he speculated and took a risk whether he was aware 
of it or not (a recent televised drama of the Kelly/Gilligan affair suggested 
Gilligan was simply a slipshod journalist who slept in late the morning of 
his broadcast). The gossip he heard from Kelly perhaps forced a decision 
upon him. Gilligan didn’t know what kind of return his reported gossip 
would prompt (which was, as it turned out, personally tragic for the Kelly 
family, disruptive to Gilligan’s own career and the BBC as a whole, and highly 
challenging to the government and its style of doing business). Gilligan said 
what many thought but dared not say. In this speculation, Gilligan perhaps 
got more than he bargained for. Though Gilligan didn’t have watertight 
proof, one could say that the ‘intelligence’ he did rely upon was as at least 
as uncertain and uncorroborated as the government’s case for war and 
their claim about Saddam Hussein’s WMD. But on the other hand, Gilligan’s 
accusations were still contained within a knowable schema in keeping 
with Gilligan and Campbell’s mutual dislike (Campbell allegedly referred 
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to his nemesis as ‘Gullible Gilligan’ after the journalist wrote a story about 
a proposal for a new constitution for the European Union in 2000), or the 
BBC’s marginally anti-war stance.
CONCLUSION: OLD ENOUGH TO KNOW BETTER?  
THE WORK OF CULTURAL STUDIES
1. A glance at any university prospectus reveals the use of such language, 
although the pursuit of knowledge is often grounded by a claim to social 
responsibility. Of course, this apparently self-evident role or identity of the 
university is not stable. Rather, it is subject to market conditions. A notable 
attempt to think through this changing identity can be found in Bill Readings’ 
The University in Ruins (1996), which ﬁnds a modern university devoted to 
a meaningless or at least commercially driven idea of ‘excellence’, rather 
than culture.
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